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HERMAN MELVILLE’S LITERARY HERESIES AND THE DOCTRINES OF 
EMPIRE 
 
Jeffrey W. Hole, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007 
 
 
“Invention of an Infidel” examines Herman Melville’s prose fiction written in the wake 
of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  Specifically addressing Moby-Dick, “Benito Cereno,” 
and The Confidence-Man, I argue that these imaginative works attempt to expose the 
catastrophic associations between the U.S.’s domestic “problems”—such as Negro slave 
revolt and Indian insurrection—and the U.S.’s broader global interventions in politics and 
commerce.  I show that it was through invention, through historical discovery and re-
making, that Melville was able to characterize new and intense forces of domination and 
regulation over human populations, property, and networks of exchange that 
accompanied American interests in opening and liberalizing commerce.  Melville’s 
heretical inventions, I further show, were not necessarily limited to religious and 
theological contexts, as many previous critics have presupposed, but rather had 
developed simultaneously in relation to a dominant U.S. discourse that conflated the 
religious notions of redemption and election with liberal and secular expressions of 
American power.  These expressions, or what I call doctrines of empire, were often 
evinced in the discourse of the American sublime and American transcendentalism.  
Writing in the midst of and attempting to provide a literary understanding of the 
intensification and transnational reach of American power during the nineteenth century, 
Melville’s heretical inventions make possible a theorization of American power that, I 
argue, is important for studies of the U.S. and its geopolitical influence over the globe in 
our own moment. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
The title of this dissertation recalls the term “infidel” as a category important to 
Herman Melville’s literary and intellectual engagement with the conditions and 
arrangements of power that followed the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act in the 
United States.  My work addresses Melville’s propensity towards heresy and his 
understanding of the “infidel” in a manner that extends and challenges the theoretical 
scope of previous scholarship, and I do so by situating this critical category in the context 
of the struggles and conflicts that dominated the 1850s.  “Invention of an Infidel,” 
therefore, traverses earlier scholarship that has addressed the question of war (work by 
Joyce Sparer Adler and John Berstein, for instance) as well as a growing body of 
criticism that has attended to the topic of religion in Melville’s writing.1 Regarding the 
latter, it was William Braswell’s Melville’s Religious Thought, first published in 1943, 
which initially helped establish an important field of knowledge on Melville’s derisive 
                                                 
1 See Joyce Sparer Adler, War in Melville’s Imagination (New York: New York University Press, 1981); 
John  Bernstein, Pacifism and Rebellion in the Writings of Herman Melville (London, The Hague, Paris: 
Mouton, 1964). On the topic of Melville and religion, see William Braswell, Melville’s Religious Thought: 
An Essay in Interpretation (Durham: Duke University Press, 1943);  Lawrence Thompson, Melville’s 
Quarrel with God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952); H. Bruce Franklin, The Wake of the Gods: 
Melville’s Mythology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); T. Walker Herbert, Jr., Moby-Dick and 
Calvinism: A World Dismantled (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1977); Robin Grey, The 
Complicity of Imagination: The American Renaissance, Contests of Authority, and Seventeenth-Century 
English Culture (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Robin Grey, 
“Surmising the Infidel: Interpreting Melville’s Annotations on Milton’s Poetry,” Milton Quarterly 26:4 
(1992), 103–113. Gail H. Coffler, “Melville’s Allusion to Religion,” Leviathan: A Journal of Melville 
Studies 8:1 (March 2006), 107-119; Gail H. Coffler, Melville's Allusions to Religion: A Comprehensive 
Index and Glossary (Westport and London: Preager, 2004). 
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treatment of Christian doxa.  With subsequent criticism, including works by H. Bruce 
Franklin, T. Walter Herbert, Lawrence Thompson, and most recently Robin Grey, this 
field formation has often focused on the question of the “infidel” or “heresy” in 
Melville’s oeuvre as one regarding disbelief, theocentric irreverence, or the flouting of 
“religious taboos.”2   
It is true that Melville remained skeptical of both conservative and liberal, 
Calvinist and Unitarian theology in the mid-nineteenth century, and it is equally true that 
the “infidel” figured centrally in Melville’s reading of Sir Thomas Browne, Montaigne, 
Pierre Bayle, and John Milton, among others.  That said, however, the above mentioned 
body of scholarship tends to repeat the central premise evinced by the title of Lawrence 
Thompson’s book, Melville’s Quarrel with God.  I show in this dissertation that 
Melville’s understanding of the “infidel” was not necessarily restricted to religious and 
theological discourse and was not necessarily limited to an understanding of conflict qua 
metaphysical “quarreling” between humans and divinity.  The category “infidel,” instead, 
provided Melville an historical account of a figure that emerges out of a set of relations 
established in and through conflict.  What we find in Melville’s prose fiction of the 
1850s, particularly Moby-Dick, “Benito Cereno,” and The Confidence-Man, is a mind 
engaged with new intensifications and reconfigurations of U.S. state force and, with these 
reconfigurations, a discourse that conflated Christian notions of election and redemption 
with secular and liberal expressions of American power.   
Although many of Melville’s contemporaries such as Walt Whitman, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, and Frederick Douglass, all of whom I address throughout this 
                                                 
2 Gail H. Coffler, “Melville’s Allusion to Religion,” 108. 
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dissertation, had celebrated and called on the emancipatory possibilities of American 
power, had celebrated the notions of transcendence, movement, and sublime transport as 
integral to this notion of power, Melville’s literary works of this decade mark a critical 
or, more accurately, heretical departure from these panegyrics.  As does Jonathan Arac in 
his illuminating study of nineteenth-century “locomotion” and “vision,” Commissioned 
Spirits: The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickens, Carlyle, Melville, and Hawthorne, my 
dissertation addresses concepts of movement, energy, and transport.3  Unlike Arac, 
though, I argue that Melville’s prose fiction does not necessarily lend itself to a “system 
of vision” and governmental “overview.”  Melville’s writings, like others in the 
nineteenth century, Arac claims, “parallel the activity of the centralizing agencies of 
government that were studying and shaping the new human problems of a society much 
larger and more mobile than had ever before been known.”4  Challenging this idea, I 
propose that Melville’s literary work renders problematic the arrangements of power that 
make possible this totalizing perspective or what I call global purview, and I further show 
that Melville linked the U.S.’s exercise of managerial and regulatory force with the 
passage and federal enforcement of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act.  This piece of 
legislation was not an aberration, as many of his contemporaries had wanted to believe, 
but was an instantiation of the U.S.’s commitment to securing commercial networks, 
governing populations, and enforcing property law.   
Recalling how Melville had drawn on the tactics and cunning intelligence of 
previous heretical minds, my dissertation resituates Melville’s literary inventions within 
                                                 
3 Jonathan Arac, Commissioned Spirits: The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickens, Carlyle, Melville, and 
Hawthorne (New York: Colombia University Press, 1979). 
 
4 Arac, 7. 
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the context of the U.S.’s nineteenth-century geopolitical influence. Within this global 
context, I further show, Melville’s heretical inventions illuminate the catastrophes and 
violence brought about by the intensification and expansion of U.S. markets in China, the 
opening of commerce throughout the Pacific, and the transnational flow of commodities 
and human labor over the “terraqueous globe.”  
In the opening chapter, “Fishing for Whales: Moby-Dick and the Trappings of 
American Power,” I explain how my use of the term “invention” draws on the rhetorical 
and philological notion of the Latin inventio or Greek huresis, meaning both to discover 
and make.  Throughout this chapter and others, I make use of works by Michel de 
Certeau, Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Edward Said, and Giambattista Vico 
to help elucidate an important link between Melville’s literary inventions and an order of 
cunning intelligence that struggles within and recognizes the nineteenth-century 
American scene as a set of arrangements from which there is no ready escape, no 
resolution to strife.5  This chapter intervenes in a recent discussion in American literary 
studies on Melville that attempts to account for the radical transformations and revisions 
that Melville made in the writing of Moby-Dick.   While critics such as Howard Vincent, 
George Stewart, and, most recently, Robert Sattelmeyer have long recognized the traces 
of revision in Moby-Dick, this scholarship has generally failed to fully investigate and 
theorize how, as I do, the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 obliged Melville to 
                                                 
5 See Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant who trace out this genealogy on animal intelligence in 
Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978); Michel de Certeau, 
Practices of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, Los Angelos, and London: University of 
California Press, 1984); Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1975).  Said also attends to the category of “invention” throughout a number of works too 
numerous to mention here.  In most of these cases, his understanding of “invention” derives from Vico as 
does mine. See Giambattista Vico, On the Study of Methods of Our Time, trans. Elio Gianturco (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), and The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Max H. Fisch and 
Thomas G. Bergin (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1968). 
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reconceptualize the arrangement of the hunt or chase as a heuristic for understanding the 
arrangements of power and conflict of the mid-nineteenth-century occasion.6   
Focusing specifically on Amasa Delano as a figure who evinces characteristics of 
American power, chapter two, “Bloody Enforcement on a Grand Global Scale,” shows 
how “Benito Cereno” critically depicts Delano’s ostensibly “benevolent” and 
“charitable” actions as an exercise of violence, a violence that is attendant with emerging 
managerial techniques and state regulatory power.  This is a form of power, in other 
words, that further regulates human life, provides security over commercial networks, 
and enforces the exchange of chattel property in the nineteenth century.  Melville’s story 
shows how Delano participated and championed the U.S.’s intervention in the economies 
and politics of world affairs and commerce, but “Benito Cereno” also anticipates how 
these global interests had been intertwined with America’s own seemingly domestic 
“problem” of Negro slave revolt.  I begin this chapter by contextualizing the historical 
and geopolitical importance of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act and the 1854 Kansas-
Nebraska Act.  By staging Delano as a figure who quells a slave revolt aboard a Spanish 
ship, who enforces the rights of “property” owners, and who evinces the qualities of 
modern management and security, Melville’s “Benito Cereno” further anticipates how 
American influence extends beyond a domestic sphere to the “terraqueous globe.”   
Chapter three, “Terror and the Negro: A Mediation on Asymmetric Force and 
Fugitive Slave Conflict,” examines how Frederick Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave” and 
Melville’s “Benito Cereno” each depicts violent struggle and slave insurrection in 
relation to American power.  These two depictions, I argue, suggest divergent political 
                                                 
6 Howard Vincent, The Trying Out of Moby-Dick (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1949); George R. Stewart, 
“The Two Moby-Dicks,” American Literature, 25 (Jan. 1954), 418-448; Robert Sattelmeyer, “‘Shanties of 
Chapters and Essays’: Rewriting Moby-Dick,” ESQ 49:4 (2003), 213-247.  
 xi
and aesthetic theories of conflict.  For Douglass, slave insurrection instantiates and must 
be grounded in the revolutionary potential of American power.  His aesthetics and 
notions of political struggle, therefore, reflect an order of conflict carried out in terms of 
symmetric and agonistic relations of force.  In sharp contrast to Douglass’s understanding 
of and fidelity to American power and potential, Melville’s shows that the “terror of the 
Negro” that manifests itself in slave insurrection is a function of the domination and 
brutality exhibited by American power. 
In the final chapter, “The Fidèle and American Movement,” I address how 
Melville’s The Confidence-Man poses the steamboat Fidèle as a figure of American 
power, a figure characterized by a fidelity in movement, energy, and progress.  What this 
figure dramatizes, however, is the genocidal destruction of natives, doctrinal modes of 
thinking, and the mechanisms for opening up and safeguarding trade and global 
commerce.  I take up the question of Melville’s writing as infidelity, examining how The 
Confidence-Man establishes a problematic around the notion of movement and freedom, 
particularly how freedom as movement had formed the basis of a liberal doxa or even 
faith in U.S. instantiations of power.  This is the same order of liberalism that, while 
celebrating concepts of movement and energy, had paradoxically produced a set of 
conditions resembling internal and perpetual conflict.  I show, therefore, that The 
Confidence-Man attempts to dramatize the mid-nineteenth-century moment as one 
defined and influenced by what Paul Virilio calls a permanent “state of siege,” a conflict 
the effects of which can be found in the American West and the Asian Pacific.7 
                                                 
7 Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext[e], 1977). 
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1. FISHING FOR WHALES: MOBY-DICK AND THE TRAPPINGS OF 
AMERICAN POWER  
 
1.1. Invention and the Arrangement of the Hunt 
 
Frantic though such an invention seems to be, it might possibly have been 
accepted as the motive and purpose of an extravaganza had its author been 
consistent with himself. 
From an 1851 review of The Whale.8  
  
. . . to write is to “know” what at the outset cannot be known except by 
inventing it, exactly, intentionally, autodidactically. 
Edward Said, Beginnings9 
 
We know from Herman Melville’s correspondence with British publisher Richard 
Bentley in June of 1850 that the book Melville had slated to write was initially “a 
romance of adventure founded upon certain wild legends in the Southern Sperm Whale 
                                                 
8 Review of Herman Melville’s The Whale [England October 16, 1851] in Athenæum of London (October 
25, 1851).  See Herman Melville: The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins and Hershel Parker (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 356.   
 
9 Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 349.  
 
 Fisheries.”10  We also know that this is not what finally emerged a year later.  It was just 
several months before Moby-Dick would go to press when Melville composed perhaps 
one of his more eloquent though forlorn letters to Nathaniel Hawthorne.  “I am so pulled 
hither & thither by circumstances,” he confessed.  “The calm, the coolness, the silent 
grass-growing mood in which a man ought always to compose,–that, I fear, can seldom 
be mine.”11  He was referring to matters quotidian—the “building  & patching & 
tinkering away in all directions,”  the “crops to get in . . . and many other things to attend 
to” at Arrowhead, the farm in Pittsfield that he had purchased nearly a year earlier.12  
Under the weight of increasing dept and the every-day obligations of labor—as well as 
feeling “rather sore” about his books and the “blisters on [his] palm”—he turned gravely 
to concerns of craft and market:  “What I feel most moved to write, that is banned,—it 
will not pay.  Yet, altogether, write the other way I cannot.  So the product is a final hash, 
and all my books are botches.”13   
The letter hints of hyperbole, an effect perhaps of late-night cogitation and the 
lingering taste for “the Gin.”  (He presumed no faith in a “Temperance Heaven.”14)   
Certainly Melville’s books were not all botches, as we know from the early success of 
Typee (1846) and Omoo (1847).  Yet in radically revising Moby-Dick, Melville seems to 
have anticipated how readers would judge the finished work.  As one London reviewer 
                                                 
10 Cited in Hugh W. Hetherington, Melville’s Reviewers: British and American 1846-1891 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 189. 
 
11 Herman Melville, Letter to Hawthorne June 1?, 1851, in The Melville Log: A Documentery Life of 
Herman Melville, 1819-1891 2 Vols., ed. Jay Leyda (New York: Gordon Press, 1969), 412. 
 
12 Leyda, 412. 
 
13 Leyda, 412. 
 
14 Leyda, 412-13. 
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 had written, “This is an ill-compounded mixture of romance and matter-of-fact . . . The 
idea of a connected and collected story has obviously visited and abandoned its writer 
again and again in the course of composition.”15  This same reviewer, as I have indicated 
in the epigraph above, suggested that the “invention” could have achieved greater 
aesthetic and commercial success if only Melville had been “more consistent with 
himself.”16   
If indeed Melville was not “consistent with himself,” as the London reviewer had 
claimed, then how were these inconsistencies revealed in the 1851 publication?17  What 
discoveries had Melville made that obliged the rethinking or re-imagining of his craft—
its style and scope, its dramatic and narrative impact?  Melville’s letter to Hawthorne 
offers a glimpse of the conditions and material realities in which he had been composing 
his book on the Whale and how, despite these conditions and the need to publish quickly 
and make money, he belabored the manuscript and engaged in a radical revision, in effect 
creating a “botched” work which contained the traces of the initial “adventure” narrative 
and something altogether new. What was at stake in the revision, the “final hash,” that 
emerged from the materiality of writing and the overwhelming sense of obligation to 
write what “is banned”?    
In composing the whaling narrative, and in recollecting philologically the 
arrangement of the hunt through sources ancient and modern, Melville, I argue here, 
                                                 
15 Review of Herman Melville’s The Whale [England October 16, 1851] in Athenæum of London (October 
25, 1851).  See Herman Melville: The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins and Hershel Parker (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 356.   
 
16 Review, Athenæum of London, 356.   
 
17 In a later section of this chapter, I return to the question of the “inconsistency” in Moby-Dick, a question 
that has preoccupied criticism on Moby-Dick in the twentieth century from R. P. Blackmur to William 
Spanos. 
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 discovered a heuristic by which he attempted to better understand the mid-nineteenth-
century occasion.18  Moby-Dick instantiates that discovery in medias res; it is an 
invention that reveals a mind caught in the middle of the thing, attempting to think and 
understand the thing in the moment of discovery.  Michel de Certaeau has provided 
substantial thought to this notion of invention,19 but it is Edward Said, through his 
continued engagement with Giambattista Vico, who has eloquently recollected the 
relationship between invention and obligation, discovery and “beginning intention.”  “By 
obligation,” Said means,  
the precision with which the concrete circumstances of any undertaking oblige the 
mind to take them into account—the obligation not just passively to continue, but 
the obligation to begin by learning, first, that there is no schematic method that 
makes all things simple, then second, whatever with reference to one’s 
circumstances is necessary in order to begin given one’s field of study.  And by 
referring to sympathetic imagination I mean that to begin to write is to “know” 
what at the outset cannot be known except by inventing it, exactly, intentionally, 
autodidactically.”20 
What does Melville discover that obliges a re-making, revision, and reorganization of the 
narrative?   
                                                 
18 This work marks a departure from Cesare Casarino’s Modernity at Sea (Minneapolis and London: 
Minnesota University Press, 2002), which makes use of Foucault’s reference to the heterotopic space of the 
ship as matrix of modernity. 
 
19 The English translation of L’invention du quotidien does a disservice to the ways in which Michel de 
Certeau helps us theorize invention and its relation to quotidian discoveries and makings.  In the English, 
see Practices of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, Los Angelos, and London: University of 
California Press, 1984).  
 
20 Edward Said, Beginnings, 349. 
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 Moby-Dick is a story about movement and energy, about the capturing, violent 
transformation, and commidification of an animal into a biomass fuel that keeps the 
world alight.  Yet it is also a story about humans confronted with the technologies of 
capital and industry, with the liberalization and expansion of commerce, and the conquest 
of the Pacific.  The ancient practice of the hunt gives way to an absolutely modern 
arrangement of power that privileges movement and speed, the management of laboring 
bodies, the charting of space, and the enforcement of property.  “Possession is the whole 
of the law,” writes Melville rather sardonically.21   
It was this latter topic—the problematic of property, possession, and force—
which obliged Melville to recognize the chase or the hunt as the arrangement par 
excellence of his current political and historical moment.  After Melville had already 
begun work on the manuscript, President Fillmore, on September 18, 1850, signed 
legislation that would expand “federal power [for] the interstate rendition of fugitive 
slaves.”22  In April 1851, several months before Melville published Moby-Dick, Judge 
Lemual Shaw, then Melville’s father-in-law, abandoned his “opposition to slavery on 
grounds of natural right” and enforced this law by deciding that the fugitive Thomas Sims 
should be returned to bondage.23   
In light of these events in the early 1850s, critic Michael Rogin has argued that 
Moby-Dick signals Melville’s rebellion against the “liberal fathers” who, like Lemuel 
                                                 
21 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick, or, The Whale [1851]  ed. Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker (New 
York and London: Norton, 2002), 309. 
 
22 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Goverenment’s 
Relations to Slavery. Ed. and completed by Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
231.  
 
23 See Michael Rogin, Subversive Genealogy: The Politics and Art of Herman Melville (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1983), 141-142. 
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 Shaw, had forsaken their commitment to “human freedom” in order to maintain “social 
order.”24  Rogin calls this Melville’s “subversive genealogy.”  While this genealogy is 
compelling for understanding how Melville viewed the fathers’ willful forgetting of their 
revolutionary responsibilities, I want to suggest that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
opened up the question of U.S. power more broadly.  This was not a question merely of 
genealogical estrangement for Melville but an engagement with the transformations and 
intensifications of U.S. power that were gaining global reach.  After the passage of the 
Fugitive Slave Act, Moby-Dick could no longer be the romantic adventure of whaling; 
the force of the new law obliged a revision or new understanding of “the chase” and 
obliged the writing of a different kind of book, one “wicked”25 and “banned.”  
One of my overall claims in this dissertation is that through invention, through 
historical discovery and remaking in the present, Melville’s works offer a heretical 
account of U.S. power.  I want to be clear, though.  Unlike Rogan, I don’t claim heresy as 
being entirely “subversive,” if by subversive we mean that force which overthrows or 
destroys.  Nor do I claim, as I show in more detail below, that “heresy” approximates 
what William Spanos has termed “errancy.”26  Both “subversive” and “errant art” 
reproduce the idea that Moby-Dick provides an “emancipatory measure” or possibility.27 
I want to suggest, instead, that Melville’s novel opens up—and leaves open—the 
question of the literary as a technique for change.  The force of Moby-Dick’s heresy, I 
                                                 
24 Rogin, 142. 
 
25 Herman Melville, Correspondence, 212. In a letter to Hawthorne, November 1851. 
 
26 William Spanos, The Errant Art of Moby-Dick: The Canon, The Cold War, and the Struggle for 
American Studies (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995). 
 
27 Spanos, 59. 
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 argue, is evidenced in those moments when it addresses the arrangements of American 
power without privileging a liberatory discourse, when it tends to the question of brutality 
without necessarily invoking a redemptive outcome that comes through suffering.28  
What he discovered in 1850 necessitated an order of thinking or meditation on the current 
arrangement of power, its entanglements and webs, without immediately repeating the 
doctrine of futurity, that pious and implicit sense that America’s revolutionary and 
emancipative realities were attainable in the future elsewhere.29   
It is Pip, more than Ishmael, who instantiates a kind of heretical comportment to 
American power and its historical implications.  Pulled to “wondrous depths” by the lines 
that will eventually entangle and bring the Pequod to its destruction, Pip’s surreal 
“drowning” and encounter with “the miser-merman Wisdom” and the “hoarded heaps” at 
the bottom of the Pacific presents a meditation on the catastrophes of history and the 
wreckage left in the wake of U.S. modernity (321).  His is not the story of emancipation, 
however much we would like it to be.  “Cursed” and “castaway” and finally reminded of 
the price he would fetch as a slave in Alabama, Pip’s character dramatizes what 
Ishmael’s story of redemption and escape cannot (321).  Ahab recognizes Pip’s 
“madness” and their “likeness” in “maladies.”  Theirs is both the story of loss, yet Ahab 
refuses the “cure” that Pip can provide, refuses to recognize the catastrophe of history as 
does Pip.  So Ahab unleashes his vengeances and willfully “heaps” violence on an 
                                                 
28 As Deborah Root helps explain, the term “heresy” historically arises with an operation of power, a 
relationship in which a population is designated (not self-identified) as heretical and, therefore, becomes 
the object of policing and surveillance.  Root specifically discusses the way in which Muslims in Spain 
during the sixteenth century were targeted for conversion or expulsion.  This is a population who does not 
necessary identify with and willfully call for subversion, but who are deemed subversive and a threat to the 
order of things.   See Deborah Root, “Speaking Christian: Orthodoxy and Difference in Sixteenth-Century 
Spain,” Representations 23 (Summer, 1988), 118-134, particularly 123-23. 
 
29 The chapters that follow take up directly this doctrine of futurity. 
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 already-violent world.  Like Ishmael, Ahab turns away from the historical and misdirects 
his “hate” toward the “malicious intelligence” of Moby Dick.   
In what follows, I consider how Melville had recognized in the arrangement of 
the hunt a heuristic for giving thought to his current moment.  This heuristic allowed 
Melville to make critical associations between the Fugitive Slave Act and the U.S.’s 
growing influence throughout other parts of the world, particularly the Pacific.30  I begin 
by suggesting that works such as Oppian’s treatises on hunting and fishing provided 
critical categories and a philological touchstone for Melville’s heuristic.   
 
1.2. An Ancient Heuristic for a Modern Arrangement: Póros and Aporía 
 
Fain then am I to sing the glorious devices of the chase. 
From Oppian’s Cynegetica, or The Chase31 
 
It is like Melville’s line, whose two ends remain free, which envelops 
every boat in its complex twists and turns, goes into horrible contortions 
when that moment comes, and always runs the risk of sweeping someone 
away with it. 
Gilles Deleuze, Foucault.32 
                                                 
30 See Jean Heffer, The United States and the Pacific: History of a Frontier (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2002), 47-49, 61. 
 
31 Oppian, Cynegetica, or The Chase, trans. A. W. Mair (New York: Putnam’s, 1928), 5. 
 
32 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. and ed. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
122. 
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But as if perceiving his stratagem, Moby Dick, with that malicious 
intelligence ascribed to him, sidelingly transplanted himself, as it were, in 
an instant, shooting his pleated head lengthwise beneath the boat. 
Moby-Dick, “The Chase—First Day” 
 
Like the Sub-Sub Librarian’s seemingly “thankless” and “painstaking” work of 
introducing the “random allusions to whales” in the “Extracts,” critics have likewise 
indexed the ancient and modern sources Melville had used in Moby-Dick.33  In the novel 
there are allusions to the Rev. Henry Cheever and Beale, Sir Thomas Brown and 
Olmsted, Aristotle and Linnænus, among many more.  From the Penny Cyclopædia entry 
on “whales,” Melville borrows from Cuvier’s elaborate classification system and 
humorously alters it to form a new one, this time organizing whales as “books”—folios, 
octovos, and duodecimo.34  Throughout the novel, Ishmael offers encyclopedic 
knowledge, histories, and accounts of the whale species as well as panegyrics to human 
institutions that had developed around the hunt.  Indeed, we are reminded in the end that 
this is a narrative about the chase, about the hunt of hunts that will end in catastrophe.  
Despite the extensive philological “burrowing” and “grub-worm” work of tracing out the 
allusions to whales and whale fishing in Moby-Dick, little or no attention has been paid 
to how the novel alludes to the second-century treatises Cynegetica (The Chase) and 
Halieutica (On Fishing) attributed to Oppian.  While Moby-Dick makes no direct 
                                                 
33 Moby-Dick, “Extracts,” 8.  As an example of how Melville’s sources have been documented, see the 
“Discussions of Adopted Readings” in the Northwestern-Newberry edition of Moby-Dick (1988), 813-30.  
 
34 See Moby-Dick, Chapter 32 “Cetology,” as well as Penny Cyclopædia vol. 273-74.   
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 mention of Oppian’s name, there’s evidence that he may have encountered his works 
either directly or indirectly.35  The final three chapters of Moby-Dick, all titled “The 
Chase,” invoke the English translation of Cynegetica.  Also, there is an entry on Oppian 
in the same Penny Cyclopædia from which Melville had gleaned other materials, most 
notably the information on whales.36  And Oppian’s name appears in a number of other 
materials that Melville was reading at the time, including Littell’s Living Age, Sir 
Thomas Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica, and Plutarch’s “The Cleverness of Animals.”  
With the frequency in which Moby-Dick refers to the whale’s intelligence, it is likely that 
Melville had some familiarity with Aristotle’s Historia Animalium, “which contains most 
of the material on the intelligence of animals which Oppian, following Plutarch and 
Athenaeus, was later to develop.”37 
Oppian’s treatises are important because they “introduce us into the world of 
traps.”38  “These include not just baits, nets, weels, nooses and snares,” Marcel Detienne 
and Jean-Pierre Vernant remind us, “but also in a certain respect those animals and men 
which appear alternately first as hunted and then as hunter.”39  They further note that the 
terms for strategy (dólos) and technique (téchnē) “recur constantly” and are often 
                                                 
35 I have located with the assistance of the Newberry Library three versions of Oppian’s works published 
and translated into English before Melville’s composition of Moby-Dick.  J. G. Schneider (1776); F. S. 
Lehrs (1846); U. C. Bussemaker (Scholia, 1849).  
 
36 See The Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, Volume XVI 
(London: Charles Knight and Co., 22 Ludgate Street. MDCCCXL), Murillo—Organ, 458-460. Located in 
The Newberry Library, Melville Collections. 
 
37 See Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant who trace out this genealogy on animal intelligence in 
Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), 47. 
 
38 Detienne and Vernant, 28.  
 
39 Detienne and Vernant, 28. 
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 associated with the Greek notion of mêtis or cunning intelligence.40  I mention these 
terms because they also play roles in Melville’s novel.  Ahab in particular understands 
the hunt through these categories.  Like Oppian’s treatises, Moby-Dick introduces us to 
the world of traps as well, but in there modern manifestations.  
After “Etymology” and “Extracts,” the novel opens with the title “Loomings” and 
thus recollects the ancient fascination with the weave—the “bonds, ropes, cords, made 
from twisted willow and twisted snares.”41  It’s an ominous beginning.  Yet as Ishmael 
enters the scene, he describes the watery world with fascination and suggests that it’s a 
cure for his “hypos” and the “November” in his soul (18). The sea is movement and 
“commerce,” and its sense for mobility becomes his “substitute for pistol and ball” (18).  
“Ships from China” appear in the harbor, and it becomes clear that the Atlantic 
“Manhattoes” and Nantucket are commercially linked with locations throughout the 
Pacific (18).  In this opening scene, we recognize echoes of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
admiration for the technological developments and “the thousand various threads” that 
“bind” the world “fast in one web.”42  Here “Loomings” subtly alludes to the expansion 
of trade, the opening of markets in China, and the “watery region” as a “great highway” 
that stretches and connects the Atlantic with the Pacific (199).  It also alludes to the way 
in which the sea has been understood as both the passageway (póros) and that chaotic and 
polymorphic expanse filled with potential traps (aporia). 43  “The original sense of póros 
                                                 
40 Detienne and Vernant, 28. 
 
41 Detienne and Vernant, 41.   
 
42 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American” [1844], Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays & Lectures (New 
York: Library of America, 1983), 213. 
 
43 Detienne and Vernant, 150-151, 222.  
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 was a ford a passage through a stretch of water, and thus came to mean the route or path 
that the navigator has to open up through the póntos [disturbing and mysterious space] 
and across the sea.”44  In Ishmael and Emerson, the nineteenth-century optimism asserts 
its technological conquest of the sea and celebrates “distance annihilated.”45  For them 
the sea is passage and mobility.  Yet Moby-Dick does not allow this optimism to go 
unchecked.  Like Ahab’s “chart” which depicts an increasing number of “lines” and 
“additional courses” crossing and covering “over spaces that before were blank,” 
Ishmael’s account of the sea as an expansive commercial web also begins to resemble the 
“looming” figure of the ancient trap, an endless aporia (166).     
This figure reappears in Ishmael’s lengthy description of the “magical, sometimes 
horrible whale-line.”  The line, he claims, has often been the cause of “repeated whaling 
disasters” whereby men have been wrenched from “out the boat . . . and lost” (227, 229).  
Ishmael takes care to describe the materiality and suppleness of the line and the 
techniques of weaving:   
The line originally used in the fishery was of the best hemp, slightly vapored with 
tar, not impregnated with it, as in the case with ordinary ropes . . . Of late years 
the Manilla rope has in the American fishery almost entirely superseded hemp as 
a material for whale-lines; for, though, not so durable as hemp, it is stronger, and 
far more soft and elastic. (227)   
There are then long descriptions of how the whale-line must be skillfully placed in the 
boats, an elaborate process considering that it “measures something over two hundred 
                                                 
44 Detienne and Vernant, 222. 
 
45 Emerson, “The Young American,” 213. 
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 fathoms” or 1,200 feet.  “Towards the stern of the boat it is spirally coiled away in the 
tub,” forming “layers of concentric spiralizations” (227).  The image is at first comical: 
“When the painted canvas cover is clapped on the American line-tub, the boat looks as if 
it were pulling off with a prodigious great wedding-cake to present to the whales” (228).  
At rest, the coil of line is a seemingly innocuous object resembling “cake” or a block of 
“cheese” (227).  In the occasion of the hunt, however, the full force and potentially 
destructive properties of the rope become immediately palpable.  As if sprung to life by 
the pull of the targeted whale, “the whale-line folds the whole boat in its complicated 
coils, twisting and writhing around it in almost every direction.  All the men are involved 
in its perilous contortions” (228-29).  In the world of traps, the hunter’s technology 
potentially becomes his own demise.  And as Ishmael further describes the motion and 
entanglements of the line, he compares it to one of the nineteenth-century’s most 
advanced pieces of technology, the steam engine: “For, when the line is darting out, to be 
seated then in the boat, is like being seated in the midst of the manifold whizzings of a 
steam-engine in full play, when every flying beam, and shaft, and wheel, is grazing you” 
(229).   
This is a world in which humans are integrally entangled with their own 
machinations, yet Ishmael seems incapable of understanding this entanglement as a 
condition of a specific order of labor in modernity.  Instead, at the end of the chapter, 
Ishmael closes by stating,  
But why say more?  All men live enveloped in whale-lines.  All are born with 
halters round their necks; but it is only when caught in the swift, sudden turn of 
death, that morals realize the silent, subtle, ever-present perils of life. And if you 
13 
 be a philosopher, though seated in the whale-boat, you would not at heart feel one 
whit more of terror, than though seated before your evening fire with a poker, and 
not a harpoon, by your side. (229, my emphasis) 
Though Ishmael is able to observe the ways in which modern technology has fully 
“enveloped” human life, his tendency is to interpret this entanglement or aporia in 
metaphysical terms, thus obfuscating the historical and material contingencies of the 
entanglement, obfuscating as well the ways in which these conditions are constitutive of 
the division of labor and the liberal market that demands whale oil.   
Ishmael exhibits this interpretive strategy again as he “advocates” for the whale 
hunter who suffers “a rather unpoetical” reputation (97). “I am all anxiety to convince ye, 
ye landsmen, of the injustice hereby done to us hunters of whales,” he exclaims (97).  
While Ishmael accurately suggests that their labor is necessitated by the demand for 
whale oil on the global market—“For almost all the tapers, lamps, and candles that burn 
round the globe, burn, as before so many shrines of glory!”—his advocacy is always-
already inscribed in the apologetics of the “business of whaling” (97-98).  In other words, 
Ishmael confuses the distinction between the laborer and the function of labor, and 
ascribes to the hunter a value that can only come through the valorization of the 
“butchering sort of business” (98).   
The distinction is important, for in attempting to advocate for the hunter, he 
valorizes the business of whaling by noting its essential role in making possible the 
expansion of commerce and the rise of empire: “Whaling is imperial,” Ishmael boasts 
(100).  With whaling and because of whaling, commerce and empire are integrally linked.  
In this linkage, the definitions of war and peace become indistinct: “I freely assert,” 
14 
 continues Ishmael, “that the cosmopolite philosopher cannot, for his life, point out one 
single peaceful influence, which within the last sixty years has operated more potentially 
upon the whole broad world, taken in one aggregate, than the high and mighty business 
of whaling” (98).  Yet this understanding of “peace” ironically draws attention to 
Ishmael’s further claims that “The whale-ship has been the pioneer in ferreting out the 
remotest and least known parts of the earth” (99 my emphasis).  “Ferreting,” from the 
Latin furetus, denotes thievery, and Moby-Dick will recall this association between 
empire, whaling, and the use of force in the “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish” chapter.  Ishmael 
continues,  
 She has explored seas and archipelagoes which had no chart, where no Cook or 
Vancouver had ever sailed.  If American and European men-of-war now 
peacefully ride in once savage harbors, let them fire salutes to the honor and glory 
of the whale-ship, which originally showed them the way, and first interpreted 
between them and the savages. (99)  
As the distinction between war and peace blurs, so do the distinctions between whaler, 
pioneer, and military avant-garde—or, more accurately, “forlorn hope.”  Ishmael makes 
use of this term in both his allusions as well as in his explicit descriptions of the whaler’s 
mode of labor.  Caught in a storm while pursuing a whale in “The First Lowering,” for 
instance, Queequeg figures as “the standard-bearer of this forlorn hope” (187).  
Etymologically, the military term “forlorn hope” is an auditory appropriation of the 
Dutch “verloren hoop,” literally meaning “lost troop.”46  Used in the sixteenth and 
                                                 
46 Oxford English Dictionary:  From 1600, J. Dymmok, Ireland (1841) “Before the vantguarde marched the 
forlorn hope,” (32); from 1678 Gaya's Art of War II., “Called the Forlorn Hope, because they . . . fall on 
first, and make a Passage for the rest” (74). 
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 seventeenth centuries, the “forlorn hope” consisted of those soldiers who were the first 
into battle.  Often caught between the advancing guard behind them and the closing 
enemy line in front, the “forlorn hope” had faint possibility for success or survival.  As 
one entry in the Oxford English Dictionary aptly states, “Called the Forlorn Hope, 
because they . . . fall on first, and make a Passage for the rest.” 
The hunt is integral to Ishmael’s story of the U.S. and its place in the world, but 
for him the hunt evinces movement, trajectory, and evolution.  Beginning with the 
“Nantucketers,” he maps this trajectory and shows an ostensibly natural development of a 
people who move farther and farther from the “mere hillock, and elbow of sand” to the 
expansive “watery world” (64).   
Look now at the wonderous traditional story of how the island was settled 
by the red-man. . . . In olden times an eagle swooped down upon the New 
England coast, and carried off an infant Indian in his talons.  With loud lament the 
parents saw their child borne out of sight over the wide waters.  They resolved to 
follow in the same direction.  Setting out in their canoes, after a perilous passage 
they discovered the island, and there they found an empty ivory casket,--the poor 
little Indian’s skeleton. 
What wonder, then, that these Nantucketers, born on a beach, should take 
to the sea for a livelihood!  They first caught crabs and quahogs in the sand; 
grown bolder, they waded out with nets for mackerel; more experienced, they 
pushed off in boats and captured cod; and at last, launching a navy of great ships 
on the sea, explored this watery world; put an incessant belt of circumnavigations 
round it; peeped in at Bhering’s Straits; and in all seasons and all oceans declared 
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 everlasting war with the mightiest animated mass that has survived the flood; 
most monstrous and most mountainous! (65) 
The evolutionary development of the Nantucketers moves from isolated primitivism to 
cosmopolitan militarism.  Here, as in other moments, Ishmael associates the movement to 
sea with the discourse of “everlasting war,” and the hunt takes on characteristics of the 
war machine, “launching a navy of great ships.”  
In retelling the story of this evolutionary movement to the sea, Ishmael ignores 
the colonization of Nantucketers by Europeans and, instead, graphs the “legend” of the 
“red-man” onto the grand narrative of U.S. supremacy over the Pacific and the 
“terraqueous globe” (65).  
And thus have these naked Nantucketers, these sea hermits, issuing from their ant-
hill in the sea, overrun and conquered the watery world like so many Alexanders; 
parceling out among them the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, as the three 
pirate powers did Poland.  Let America add Mexico to Texas, and pile Cuba upon 
Canada; let the English overswarm all India, and hang out their blazing banner 
from the sun; two thirds of this terraqueous globe are the Nantucketer’s.  For the 
sea is his; he owns it, as Emperors own empires; other seaman having but a right 
of way through it. (65)   
The indigenous “Nantucketers” in Ishmael’s story are not so much displaced as they are 
assumed into empire writ large, war and all.  The violation of this historical memory 
recalls the first act of colonial violence, but yet this violence is endlessly repeated, and 
will seemingly be repeated as the imperial Nantucketers “overrun and conquer the watery 
world.”  This “endless war,” this endless repetition of a past, without historical memory, 
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 instantiates an inescapable trap, an aporia.  Oppian introduces the world of traps, but 
Moby-Dick dramatizes this world in its modern instantiation. 
 
1.3. Invention and Revision 
 
What was America in 1492 but a Loose-Fish, in which Columbus struck 
the Spanish standard by way of waifing it for his royal master and 
mistress? What was Poland to the Czar? What Greece to the Turk? What 
India to England? What at last will Mexico be to the United States? All 
Loose-Fish. 
Moby-Dick, “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish” 
 
I have attempted to show how Melville drew upon the arrangement of the hunt as 
a heuristic for understanding American power in the mid-nineteenth century.  In doing so, 
I have so far drawn principally from Ishmael’s narrative—that is, those few chapters 
where it is obvious that Ishmael is the principal storyteller—to illustrate how he creates 
associations between the whale hunt and the practices of empire.  While Ishmael is 
capable of irony, it seems clear that he is not being ironic when he “advocates” (in 
chapter 24) on behalf of his fellow whalers or when he offers his “history” of Nantucket 
(in chapter 14).  This gives us all the more reason to suspect that his panegyrics are 
sincere.  I want to note, too, that the “The Advocate” and the “Nantucket” chapters are 
relatively close in proximity to one another and relatively close to the beginning of the 
novel.  Stylistically, we might describe them as conversational:  “I am all anxiety to 
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 convince ye, ye landsman,” he begins in “The Advocate.”  Skipping ahead some sixty 
chapters, though, we encounter a peculiar variation on the question and presentation of 
empire.  In “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish” (chapter 89), it becomes difficult to tell if Ishmael is 
still the principal storyteller as he had been in the earlier chapters.  While there is still an 
occasional reference to the first-person, this narrator seems more aloof and the style of 
the narration is less colloquial.  More importantly, the narrator’s depiction of empire 
presents a radically different view from that of the Ishmael in “The Advocate” and 
“Nantucket.”   
As I noted in the opening of this chapter, one of the first reviews of Moby-Dick 
had critiqued its “inconsistencies.” 47  The stylistic and ideological change that occurs in 
the narrative between “The Advocate” chapter and “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish” marks one 
instance.  And I will turn to these specific changes anon.  First, I want to give a brief 
account of how the question of consistency and inconsistency has marked a central 
preoccupation in criticism of Melville’s novel through the twentieth century.   
 
Howard Vincent and then George Stewart were the first to note “two versions” of 
the story simultaneously entangled in the one text.48  Melville’s early conceptions of the 
novel as a “mere whaling voyage,” written in “folksy” style, had through revision been 
infused with what Vincent called “the sudden and magnificent release of those 
                                                 
47 Review of Herman Melville’s The Whale [England October 16, 1851] in Athenæum of London (October 
25, 1851).  See Herman Melville: The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Brian Higgins and Hershel Parker (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 356.   
 
48 Howard Vincent, The Trying Out of Moby-Dick (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1949); George R. Stewart, 
“The Two Moby-Dicks,” American Literature, 25 (Jan. 1954), 418-448.  One of the most recent 
contributions to this scholarship on Moby-Dick and the question of revision is Robert Sattelmeyer’s 
“‘Shanties of Chapters and Essays’: Rewriting Moby-Dick,” ESQ 49:4 (2003), 213-247.  
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 Shakespearean forces.”49  Yet there was more at stake in Melville’s final amalgamation 
than the “genius” incarnate of Shakespeare.  Other critics following Vincent would 
remark, as did Edward Said in recent years, on the “irregularities and inconsistencies” in 
the text that accompanied its “wholly different and much heightened prose.”50  One of 
these inconsistencies is the story of Bulkington, who, as Said recalls, “belongs to the first 
version and is supposed to play a significant role there.  In the final text he is referred to 
briefly, [and] then drops out.”51  There is also the inconsistency, possible conflation, and 
interplay between a narrator proper and the first-person account provided by Ishmael, as I 
mentioned above.  Recollecting these inconsistencies, Said was perhaps alluding to R. P. 
Blackmur’s essay on “The Craft of Herman Melville: A Putative Statement.”  While Said 
suggested that these and other “apparent flaws seem actually to add to Melville’s overall 
effect,” Blackmur had argued that it was because of Melville’s “radical inability to master 
a technique”—and by “technique” Blackmur meant the novel as a dramatic form—that he 
had “suffered the exorbitant penalty of his great failure.”52   
Whereas Blackmur had found “fault in a genius so great,” had found that the artist 
had failed to exhibit “mastery” and “control” over his craft,53 William Spanos has 
recently attempted to recover this “failure” in Melville’s fiction by arguing that the 
“errant art” of Moby-Dick makes possible a critical break from the West’s—and, more 
                                                 
49 Vincent, 22-25. 
 
50 Edward Said, “Introduction to Moby-Dick,” Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 360. 
 
51 Said, “Introduction,” 360. 
 
52 Said, 360; R. P. Blackmur, “The Craft of Herman Melville: A Putative Statement,” [1938] in The Lion 
and the Honeycomb: Essays in Solicitude and Critique (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955), 
144. 
 
53 Blackmur, 132. 
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 specifically, the U.S.’s—privileging of transcendental overview and the “principle of 
metaphysical closure.”54  For Spanos, the “failure” of the novel ironically marks its 
success.  And its “errancy,” moreover, functions as a deliberate disjuncture from an 
aesthetics that, as Blackmur summarized, “holds it together, makes it move, gives it a 
center and establishes a direction.”55  “Far from writing or failing to write a novel that 
enacts the encompassing epiphanic closure or tragedy,” Spanos continues, “Melville 
wrote a novel that exists to destroy not simply the idea of tragedy but the metaphysical 
vision that has given privileged status to the tragic form, indeed, to all structurally 
teleological literary forms.”56   
It’s important to remember that, for Spanos, the metaphysics and teleology 
informing Blackmur’s aesthetics made possible and often obfuscated an order of power 
that “legitmated the [U.S.’s] imperial practice of Manifest Destiny.”57  These imperial 
                                                 
54 William Spanos, The Errant Art of Moby-Dick: The Canon, The Cold War, and the Struggle for 
American Studies (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), 59. 
 
55 Blackmur, 132. 
 
56 Spanos, 60 (Emphasis in the original).  Following Blackmur’s New Critical and F. O. Matthiessen’s 
Americanist approaches, critics in the U.S. have long invested in the “achievement” of the tragic form as an 
indication of aesthetic and therefore national or cultural exceptionalism.  In light of this history and the 
privileging of the tragic form in U.S. critical practices, William Spanos has attempted to dismantle or 
“destroy” (particularly through Melville’s Moby-Dick and Pierre) “the idea of tragedy.”  Spanos, however, 
understands “tragedy” as a monolithic category.  Like his predecessors, the fathers he attempts to kill off, 
Spanos repeats an ahistorical account of tragedy by omitting the variances and complexities of tragedy, the 
ways in which, for instance, Aristotelian tragedy is reinterpreted by Horacian, Renaissance, and 
Neoclassical aesthetic theory.  Spanos unwittingly assumes, oddly from the same critics against whom he is 
writing, an understanding of tragedy as “doctrine of instruction” and order, rather than as dramatic “open-
ended explorations of crises and struggles” to borrow from Michelle Gellrich’s work.  See Michelle 
Gellrich, Tragedy and Theory: The Problem of Conflict since Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988) 197.  See especially chapter 3: Renaissance and Neoclassical Theory for the ways in which 
Horacian interpretation re-inscribes moral didacticism into tragic drama.  See also F. O. Matthiessen, 
American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1941); William Spanos, “Pierre’s Extraordinary Emergency: Melville and the Voice of Silence,” Part 
1. boundary 2 28, no. 2 [summer 2001]: 105–31, and “Pierre’s Extraordinary Emergency: Melville and the 
Voice of Silence,” Part 2. boundary 2 28.3 (2001) 133-155. 
  
57 Spanos, 7. 
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 practices, Spanos recalls, were made evident in U.S. state aggression throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were specifically directed towards populations in 
Mexico, the indigenous of the American “frontier,” as well as peoples of Southeast Asia.  
The U.S.’s intervention in Vietnam becomes the object of critique in much of Spanos’s 
criticism, and he aptly recalls how this Cold War conflict signals a repetition of state 
violence that Melville had observed in his nineteenth-century occasion.   
 While I share many of the same concerns regarding U.S. imperialism and the 
metaphysics that accompanies and often legitimates the U.S.’s monopoly on violence, I 
remain skeptical of how Spanos characterizes, in fact attempts to recover, “errancy” as an 
“emancipatory” possibility.  Rhetorically, Spanos arrives at this reading of “errancy” and 
emancipation by pointing out the “precluding” elements of Blackmur’s position.  He 
writes,  
What [Blackmur’s] otherwise valuable New Critical insight necessarily precludes, 
in other words, is the possibility of reading Melville’s “rule of vagary” as an 
emancipatory “measure,” of perceiving the positivity of Melville’s ‘errant’ art in 
the context of a tradition of fiction that priviledges the transcendent eye and the 
principle of metaphysical closure. 58   
This recovery of an “errant art” suggests the extent to which Blackmur’s “putative 
statement” seems to haunt Spanos’s engagement with the novel.  It haunts Spanos to the 
                                                 
58 Spanos, 59.  Spanos also links this to the “destructive” potential of Moby-Dick.  He writes,  
 
“I want to suggest, in other words, that Moby-Dick is a destructive social text—I am tempted to 
call it, after Nietzsche and Foucault, a work of “genealogy” in its parodic modality, or, after 
Mikhail Bakhtin, a “carnivalesque” novel—that finally exists to de-structure the ‘competent 
reader’s’ archivally inscribed –and thus always confident—impulse to read and ‘master’ texts 
spatially: not simply to expose its gaze’s “imperial” project of decipherment, but to release the 
temporality—and the sociopolitical forces—it has colonized” (60-61). 
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 degree that he must arrive at an understanding of Moby-Dick that can thus account for 
the “irregularities and inconsistencies” of the craft, can account for them in such a way 
that these inconsistencies signal not a failure of form, as Blackmur argued, but a type of 
successful resistance to (or “emancipation” from) the “mastery” and “control” that 
Blackmur privileges.59  Interestingly, however, Spanos attempts to exorcize Blackmur’s 
ghost and, therefore, preserve the success of Moby-Dick as craft, by accounting for these 
inconsistencies as a deliberate and willful “strategy” on Melville’s part:   
The “reading” of Moby-Dick that follows will suggest . . . that Melville was 
acutely conscious of his “craft” and that his collapsing of the distinction between 
“Ishmael” and “Melville” or, better, that his rendering the distinction a fluid one, 
was no accident of inattentiveness, but a deliberate destruction of precisely the 
form that “limits, compacts, and therefore controls what can be told and how.”  I 
am going to suggest, in short, that Melville’s “careless” “method” is a care-ful, 
however (or, rather, because) uncertain, “strategy.”60 
In accounting for Melville’s “careful strategy,” that is, the way in which both an 
“Ishmael” and “Melville” function simultaneously as narrator and the disruptor of a telic 
narrative in Moby-Dick, Spanos theoretically hinges his claim on the possibility of a 
“deliberate” though “decentered” authority.  In this way, Spanos presumes to emancipate 
Melville’s craft from Blackmur’s understanding of art—that is, as a centralizing, 
controlling, and direction-bearing form.61  
                                                 
59 Blackmur, 132. 
 
60 Spanos, 81. 
 
61 Spanos particularly resists Blackmur’s understanding of the “dramatic form of the novel.”  By “dramatic 
form,” Blackmur means the controlling and authorial force that “holds it together, makes it move, gives it a 
center and establishes a direction; and it includes the agency of perception, the consciousness set up in the 
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  I recall Spanos’s project here not because it instantiates necessarily a radical 
alternative to the longer tradition of thinking the “inconsistencies” of Melville’s craft but 
because it inadvertently perpetuates this tradition.  In fact, Spanos unwittingly tends to 
the very economy of aesthetic judgment that Blackmur engages—that is, an economy 
wherein the binary categories of failure and success function as the primary values of 
aesthetic judgment.  I, therefore, call into question Spanos’s intervention because it 
attempts to recover value lost in Moby-Dick and then attempts to recuperate that value 
through the narrative’s emancipative qua “destructive” capacities.  In other words, for 
Spanos, errant art figures as the successful technique for change, the art that destroys the 
“metaphysics of [imperial] vision.”62  What Spanos therefore takes as given, and thus 
leaves unaccounted for, is the fundamental question of art or technē (errant as it may be) 
as an instrument of change, as an instrument of human freedom, as “emancipatory.” The 
question, then, that I think we are obliged to at least recognize is: Does the technique of 
an “errant” and “decentered’ literature “emancipate” humans from this metaphysics and 
its attendant violence?63  This question, I think, is central to understanding the very 
problematic Melville had encountered in his writing of Moby-Dick.   
 Rather than marking these “inconsistencies” in the text as a basis for judging the 
book’s aesthetic failures or successes, as these and other critics have done, I hypothesize 
that these differences, in both style and rhetorical presentation, constitute a moment of 
                                                                                                                                                 
book upon which, or through which, the story is registered” (“The Craft of Herman Melville,” 132).  
Spanos continually links Blackmur’s conceptualization of form to the mechanisms of authoritative, 
monological, and imperial oversight demonstrative of the U.S. imperium.  
 
62 Spanos, 60. 
 
63 Pheng Cheah has recently taken up as a critical question the relation between technē and human freedom 
as it is found in the discourse of human rights.  See Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human 
Rights (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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 invention and revision that bring into sharper focus the problems of empire as Melville is 
inventing.  I repeat Edward Said who says in Beginnings, “to begin to write is to “know” 
what at the outset cannot be known except by inventing it, exactly, intentionally, 
autodidactically.”64  Moby-Dick instantiates the moment of Melville’s discovery, when 
the discovery obliges a remaking and reordering.  Melville called this a “botched” 
attempt, and critics through the twentieth century have remarked on the irregularities, 
contradictions, and inconsistencies in the text, yet what we see here, I argue, is a revision, 
a re-writing-over of Ishmael’s ahistorical account of empire and its effect on the world.  
 
The chapter “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish” begins by explaining that the “waif” or 
“waif-pole” is a “grand symbol and badge” and that this waif is used to mark a party’s 
proprietorship over a fish.  So a fish becomes “fast,” the chapter explains, when “it bears 
a waif, or any other recognized symbol of possession” (307). 65  “Alive or dead a fish is 
technically fast when it is connected with an occupied ship or boat, by any medium at all 
controllable by the occupant or occupants—a mast, an oar, a nine-inch cable, a telegraph 
wire, or a strand of cobweb, it is all the same” (308).  As this passage begins to make 
clear, rendering property as “fast” is dependent upon “ability.”  Though a seemingly 
innocuous term, the narrator provides further meaning.  “These are scientific 
commentaries; but the commentaries of the whale-men themselves sometimes consist in 
hard words and harder knocks—the Coke-upon-Littleton of the fist” (308).   
                                                 
64 Said, Beginnings, 349. 
 
65 Oxford English Dictionary, “Waif.” The “waif” dates to the fourteenth century, and has principally meant 
“lost property” that is open to possession 
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 Although here the violence is rendered somewhat caricature-like, the subject 
matter and tone become more serious as the narrator proceeds.  Rendering something 
fast, that is, to take possession, is to act with force.  The narrator then poses a rhetorical 
question that establishes critique around the notions of force, law, and legitimacy:  “Is it 
not a saying in everyone’s mouth, Possession is half of the law: that is, regardless of how 
the thing came into possession?” (309).  To waif something is to take by force, and 
because force can take and possess, it legitimates the law, so that “often possession is the 
whole of law” (309).  
The waif and the act of waifing, moreover, recall Ishmael’s earlier description and 
celebratory account of the whale-ship as a pioneer “ferreting out the remotest and least 
known parts of the earth” (99).  As I mentioned above, the word ferreting comes from the 
same Latin etymology that gives the word furtive.  Waifing and ferreting function 
through force as legitimate thievery.  Ishmael legitimates thievery through imperialist 
violence in his history of the Nantucketers:  
And thus have these naked Nantucketers, these sea hermits, issuing from their ant-
hill in the sea, overrun and conquered the watery world like so many Alexanders; 
parceling out among them the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, as the three 
pirate powers did Poland.  Let America add Mexico to Texas, and pile Cuba upon 
Canada; let the English overswarm all India, and hang out their blazing banner 
from the sun; two thirds of this terraqueous globe are the Nantucketer’s.  For the 
sea is his; he owns it, as Emperors own empires; other seaman having but a right 
of way through it. (65)   
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 I show again this passage from the Nantucket chapter because it performs a similar 
rhythmic and repetitive structure found near the end of “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish.”  One 
critical difference, though, is that “Fast-Fish” performs with interrogatives not panegyric 
exclamations.  
 “What are the sinews and souls of Russian serfs and Republican slaves but Fast-
Fish, whereof possession is the whole of the law?”  What to the rapacious 
landlord is the widow's last mite but a Fast-Fish? What is yonder undetected 
villain's marble mansion with a doorplate for a waif; what is that but a Fast-Fish? . 
. . What is the Archbishop of Savesoul's income of L100,000 seized from the 
scant bread and cheese of hundreds of thousands of broken-backed laborers (all 
sure of heaven without any of Savesoul's help) what is that globular 100,000 but a 
Fast-Fish. . . . What to that redoubted harpooneer, John Bull, is poor Ireland, but a 
Fast-Fish? What to that apostolic lancer, Brother Jonathan, is Texas but a Fast-
Fish? (311-12). 
The stylistic cadence here recalls the Nantucket chapter above, but through the form of 
the question it interrogates the force that legitimates the act of possession.  It interrogates 
the powers that make war with Mexico and enforce slave laws (“The Republican 
slaves”).  The “Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish” chapter, in other words, recollects and destabilizes 
through revision Ishmael’s history of conquest.  As a matter of invention, Melville, while 
composing, discovered what lay hidden beyond the veil, or what Edward Said refers to as 
“pieties,” and doxa of his nineteenth-century moment.  
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2. BLOODY ENFORCEMENT ON A GRAND, GLOBAL SCALE 
 
2.1. “Benito Cereno,” Amasa Delano, and American Power in the 1850s 
Beginning in the October 1855 issue of Putnam’s Monthly, Herman Melville 
published his first of three consecutive installments of “Benito Cereno.”66  Along with 
several other shorter works, particularly “Bartleby the Scribner,” “The Bell-Tower,” and 
“The Encantadas,” collected the following year under the title The Piazza Tales, 
Melville’s “Benito Cereno” dramatizes the conditions and conflicts attendant with the 
increased demand for wage and slave labor in the development and expansion of 
American power and commerce in the mid-nineteenth century.67  Specifically, “Benito 
Cereno” stages scenes from the institution of slavery—the trade, transportation, and 
consequent revolts that would arise under these conditions.  Like much of Melville’s 
prose fiction, “Benito Cereno” draws from a complex of political, historical, and literary 
                                                 
66 Herman Melville, “Benito Cereno,”[originally published in Putnam’s Monthly, October, November, and 
December 1854] Following the story’s first printing in Putnam’s and including revisions for its inclusion in 
The Piazza Tales, I make use of the following edition:  Melville’s Short Novels. (New York: Norton, 
2002).  Hereafter, I cite this text by page number. 
 
67 Melville had been composing and reflecting on “Benito Cereno” since the winter of 1854-55 (See 
Hershel Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, Volume 2, 242). Before Melville decided on the The 
Piazza Tales as a title for his collection, he had initially requested to his publishers Dix and Edwards in 
January of 1856 that the contents come under the title Benito Cereno & Other Sketches.   This title seems to 
suggest the centrality of “Benito Cereno” to Melville’s over-all project and thinking up through the 
beginning of that year.  By February, though, and after having written “The Piazza,” Melville had opted to 
use the title we know presently.  See Melville’s letters to Dix and Edwards in The Letters of Herman 
Melville, Merrell R. Davis and William H. Gilman, editors. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 
177-179. 
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 sources that he had encountered in his extensive reading and amateur philology.68  
Though allusions to these discoveries are many, “Benito Cereno” principally recalls and, 
indeed, reweaves elements from A Narrative of Voyages and Travels (1817), a work 
written by American seaman and ship builder Amasa Delano.69  Some of Melville’s 
contemporaries had recognized his source, and at least one reviewer had cited Delano’s 
Narrative of Voyages as “The Origin of Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno.’”70  Melville was no 
stranger to “borrowing” previously circulated stories.  As in his novel Israel Potter 
(1853), published the year prior to “Benito Cereno,”71 Melville had demonstrated an 
ability to recognize important topics from past materials and, from these materials and 
topics, style his own inventions.  Of all the narratives that were available to Melville on 
the topic of slavery and insurrection—and certainly, the stories of Nat Turner, the 
Amistad and Creole revolts, as well as Toussaint L’Ouverture’s revolution in San 
Dominique, among others, would not have escaped his notice72—what obliged Melville 
to appropriate Delano’s 1817 travel narrative as an obvious and deliberate source for his 
                                                 
68 I use this term in its etymological sense, that is, philology as a “love of learning, of literature,” from the 
Latin philologia and Greek philien and logos.  The critic who studies Melville understands the labor, love, 
and memory that it requires to read along with his work. 
 
69 Amasa Delano, A Narrative of Voyages and Travels in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres: 
Comprising Three Voyages Round the World, Together with a Voyage of Survey and Discovery in the 
Pacific and Oriental Islands [Boston, 1817] (New York: Preager, 1970). 
 
70 “The Origin of Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” New York Evening Post [October 9, 1855] in Brian Higgins 
and Hershel Parker, editors, Herman Melville: The Contemporary Reviews (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) 469. 
 
71 Herman Melville, Israel Potter: His Fifty Years of Exile [1853] (Evanston: Northwester University Press, 
1982). 
 
72 Carolyn Karcher has made an important claim that the Amistad Case was a central influence on 
Melville’s “Benito Cererno.” See “The Riddle of the Sphinx: Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno’ and the Amistad 
Case,” in Critical Essays on Herman Melville’s “Benito Cereno,”  Robert E. Burkholder, ed. (New York: 
G.K. Hall, 1992),  196-229.  I have no doubt that the events surrounding the Amistad had influenced 
Melville’s understanding of slave insurrection, but his deliberate and obvious appropriation of Delano’s 
narrative poses the problematic of American power rather differently than the emancipatory and redemptive 
possibilities that brings resolution to the Amistad narrative.  
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 1855 novella, specifically?  And how was Delano, as both a narrator of his own work and 
a figure in Melville’s fiction, important to Melville’s meditations on America’s influence 
in the world in the mid-nineteenth century, generally?  In other words, if there was 
something to be learned about America from Delano and his Narrative, what was it?  
And, most significantly, how could Melville’s own invention offer an adequate 
intelligence or way of knowing and understanding the forces that America had come to 
instantiate in the nineteenth-century historical occasion?   
By posing these questions, my aim in this chapter is to show how Delano 
functions as the American par excellence in “Benito Cereno.”  That is, while Melville’s 
novella initially (and ostensibly) provides a perspective akin to Delano’s point of view, 
this perspective and its congruency with American power is called into question as the 
narrative slowly and ironically reveals the myths and doctrines that inform it.  In other 
words, to understand Melville’s meditation on American power in the mid-nineteenth 
century, and why he had made use of Delano’s Narrative as a resource for his own 
invention, I want to suggest that we need to understand how the figure of Delano 
provided Melville the literary and topical “stuff” that his story about America is made on.  
Two central and related topics come forth in Melville’s discovery and reweaving of 
Delano as both narrator and historical figure; the first of which is Delano’s investment 
and participation in global commerce and his relationship to a growing world market.  
The second of which is Delano’s “charitable” efforts to subdue a slave insurrection and 
return slave property to the rightful Spanish owner.  Melville aptly recognized in 
Delano’s Narrative of Voyages a figure who had participated and championed the U.S.’s 
intervention in the economies and politics of world affairs and commerce, but Melville 
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 also anticipated how these global interests were intertwined with America’s own 
seemingly domestic “problem” of Negro slave revolt.   
Of the nearly 600 pages in A Narrative of Voyages, Melville’s novella borrows 
principally from chapter 18, which tells “the account of the capture of the Spanish ship” 
and the suppression of rebellious slaves who had on board “risen and murdered many of 
the people.”73  “Benito Cereno” opens by showing how Delano and his crew come upon 
and perceive “a strange sail” in the harbor of St. Maria, a Pacific island off the coast of 
Chili.74  This is a story of intrigue, and it exhibits many conventions and images of gothic 
fiction.  For instance, the scene Delano first encounters appears “like a white-washed 
monastery after a thunder-storm, seen perched upon some dun cliff among the Pyrenees” 
(“Benito Cereno” 36).  To Delano, in fact, the image before him seems “nothing less than 
a ship-load of monks,” “dark figures” and “throngs of dark cowls” walking the deck (36).  
The figurations of the monastery, the profiles of monks, the image of ruins, as well as the 
vapors that mysteriously shroud the “peculiar” and distant vessel recall much of the 
Gothic topoi used in the literature of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in both 
England and the United States.75   
                                                 
73 Delano, 318. 
 
74 Though not the first, Eric Sundquist’s essay on “Benito Cereno” is perhaps the most comprehensive work 
to note the differences and allegorical significances between Delano’s narrative and the changes and 
additions Melville had deployed.  See Eric J. Sundquist, “‘Benito Cereno’ and New World Slavery,” from 
Reconstructing American Literary History, Sacvan Bercovitch, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986) 93-122. 
 
75  There is, as one recalls, a similar apparition that appears at the end of Lord Byron’s Don Juan: “It was no 
mouse—but lo! a monk, arrayed / In cowl and beads” (16. 160-7).  A more serious and sinister depiction of 
the figure of “the monk” occurs in Matthew Lewis’s 1796 publication The Monk.  See also Sir Walther 
Scott’s The Monastery, to which Melville also alludes in White Jacket.  For essays that examine the Gothic 
in “Benito Cereno” see most recently Peter Coviello’s “The American in Charity: ‘Benito Cereno’ and 
gothic anti-sentimentality,” Studies in American Fiction 30 (2002): 155-80.  See also Charles Berryman, 
“‘Benito Cereno’ and the Black Friars,” Studies in American Fiction 18.2 (1990): 159-170. 
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 The “strange sail,” as Melville’s novella slowly reveals, is the dilapidated Spanish 
slave ship, the San Dominick, captained by Don Benito Cereno.  On board, Delano is led 
to believe that what he has encountered is a ship in distress, for “every soul on board, 
down to the youngest negress,” rehearses this scenario (56).  It’s not until the end of the 
narrative, however, that Delano is able to detect that the peculiarity and “strangeness” of 
the Spanish ship before him is actually the site of a slave insurrection in medias res.  In 
the final moments of Melville’s narrative, Delano assists the Spanish captain by subduing 
and securing this rebellious “property,” returning it to its Spanish owners.  As one 
contemporary reviewer in the New York Evening Post had stated, Amasa Delano’s A 
Narrative of Voyages and Travels marks America’s involvement in this event as a 
“bloody” enforcement of “a fugitive slave law on so grand a scale.”76   
Indeed, this prospect of “bloody” enforcement on a “grand” and even global scale 
had been a preoccupation for others in the year that Melville wrote and published “Benito 
Cereno.”  In the same October 1855 issue of Putnam’s that “Benito Cereno” first 
appeared, for instance, an essay entitled “The Kansas Question,” referring to the 
disastrous effects of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), argued that “there is not a thinking 
man among us who is not absorbed in this topic of the domination and spread of 
slavery.”77   This legislative maneuvering, supported by the slave-holding states and 
some legislators in the North, and signed by President Franklin Pierce, not only upended 
the earlier “Compromises” of 1820 and 1850 by shifting the once-agreed-upon 
                                                 
76 “The Origin of Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” New York Evening Post [October 9, 1855] in Brian Higgins 
and Hershel Parker, editors, Herman Melville: The Contemporary Reviews (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) 469. 
 
77 “The Kansas Question,” Putnam’s Monthly Magazine of American Literature, Science, and Art 6:34 
October 1855, (425-433), 425. 
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 boundaries of slavery in the U.S. territories from 36-degrees latitude to the north fortieth 
parallel, it further legitimized the role of what Stephen Douglas and others called popular 
sovereignty and thus the possibility that this seemingly minor expansion of slavery would 
be as limitless as the purview and ambition of the emerging U.S. imperium.  I’ll return to 
and elaborate on the term purview throughout this chapter, particularly in the following 
section. 
This emphasis on popular sovereignty poses two interrelated problematics with 
which Melville’s “Benito Cereno” grapples in its depiction of Delano’s encounter with 
the Spanish slave vessel—an encounter that occurs, importantly, in a trans-Pacific 
context wherein Delano and his crew are “procuring seals” off the coast of Chili intended 
“for the Chinese market”:78  First, popular sovereignty (as it was conceived under the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act and earlier under the Compromise of 1850) and the potentially 
limitless expansion of the slave institution rendered the North-versus-South geographical 
and political framework as inadequate for understanding an arrangement of forces that 
could spread and operate throughout the global sphere.  That is, while the 1854 Act used 
the fortieth parallel as the ostensible limit for the expansion of slavery, Melville’s “Benito 
Cereno” allegorizes how this territorial line disperses into a non-linear geometrical 
configuration, into networks and forces that exercise and enforce the trans-Atlantic and 
trans-Pacific flow of commerce and slave-labor.  Second, and this is perhaps the insidious 
irony of the legislation, popular sovereignty further posed the problematic that territories 
like Kansas could, if necessary, invoke the power of the U.S. state to secure the 
territories’ interests.  The principal interest, of course, is the maintenance and assurance 
                                                 
78 Delano, 308. 
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 of the slavocracy, extending the necessary enforcement of the fugitive slave law 
potentially to any part of the globe.79  Several years earlier, in fact, it was Frederick 
Douglass who contemptuously recalled John C. Calhoun’s declaration that “American 
ships were American territories” and therefore “constituted a part of the national domain” 
so that “wherever the American star-spangled banner waved, of course the right of 
slaveholders to hold their property was to be sacredly guarded.”80  Now, what I think is 
important about this moment in 1855, and as “Benito Cereno” helps us understand, is 
how this enforcement of U.S. law and security is supra-territorial (if not transnational) in 
scope and range, that in fact the institution and business of slavery requires the state to 
supersede the interests of the national body politic in order to maintain and secure the 
“popular sovereignty” of individual territories like Kansas and its right to hold slaves.  It 
anticipates, too, the outcome of the 1857 Supreme Court decision regarding the case of 
Dred Scott, whereby the U.S. must enforce, under “due process” of law, the protection of 
property—even in those states where this slave “property” has been outlawed.  So while 
this is ostensibly about slavery, the protection of property, and territorial sovereignty, it is 
more specifically about a reconfiguration of state force and an emergent arrangement of 
“bloody” enforcement on a global “grand scale.”81 
                                                 
79 See especially Sections 9 and 10 of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Statutes at Large, 33rd Congress, 1st 
Session. “Chapter LIX. An Act to Organize the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska” (May 30, 1854) 277-
290.   This can be found at the Library of Congress’s website and its online project “American Memory”: A 
Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 – 1875.   
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=010/llsl010.db&recNum=298 
 
80 Frederick Douglass, “Slavery: The Slumbering Volcano: An Address Delivered in New York, New 
York, on 23 April 1849,” The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One: Speeches, Debates, and Interviews, 
Volume 2: 1847-54 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 157. 
 
81 Against previous unsubstantiated claims, Stanley W. Campbell has argued convincingly that federal 
authorities had successfully executed and enforced the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act.  See Stanley W. Campbell, 
The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1970). 
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 *              *               * 
As a source, Amasa Delano (both the narrator and author of Narratives and 
Voyages) provided Melville with the “American” figure who made his home upon and 
extended influence over the globe.  As his Narrative attests, Delano completed no less 
than three voyages around the world, had an expert familiarity with the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans as well as other “remote waters,” and helped lay the “foundation of the American 
commercial marine” in the period following the American Revolution.82  Delano’s 
contributions followed and further bolstered an order of knowledge that had been the 
result of a long history of sea exploration and circumnavigation recorded and circulated 
previously by such figures as James Cook, Otto von Kotzebue, John Carteret, and George 
Vancouver among others—all of whom Melville had alluded to in previous works of 
fiction.83  Delano’s surveys and documentations of the Earth’s expansive and inscrutable 
watery spaces—as well as the peoples who populated these spaces—had contributed to a 
growing body of knowledge that rendered the Pacific region and other world spaces more 
intelligible for the future of navigation, the expansion of trade, the opening of new 
markets (particularly in China), and the general acceleration and flow of commerce.  
While the stakes of Delano’s contribution to the discourse on global space and the 
expansion of commerce are many, what Melville’s “Benito Cereno” obliges readers to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
82 “The Origin of Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” New York Evening Post [October 9, 1855] in Brian Higgins 
and Hershel Parker, editors, Herman Melville: The Contemporary Reviews (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) 474. 
 
83 Melville’s interest in figures like these is made evident from the beginning of his writing career.   These 
figures and others Melville mentions in chapter 24 of his first novel Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life 
[1846] (New York: Penguin, 1996), 177.  And if space here permitted, we might trace out how this 
knowledge had merged with the nineteenth century developments in “modern geography,” initiated by 
Alexander von Humboldt and Carl Ritter in Europe and its further development in North America. 
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 better understand, I argue here, are the techniques and forms of regulation and 
management that emerged with this broad accumulation of information and its 
organization as knowledge.84  Melville’s “Benito Cereno” shows that this is the kind of 
regulation and management commensurate with the “bloody enforcement” of “fugitive” 
property.  
Historically, this notion of manageability and the practice of management itself, 
linked closely with intelligibility, had become a central concern for American 
institutions, both commercial as well as governmental, in the expansion and 
intensification of American influence over the globe in the nineteenth century.  Several 
scholars, particularly Merritt Roe Smith and most recently Manuel DeLanda, have noted 
that the techniques and practices of management—that is, “management” as an object of 
study—emerged not exclusively in industrial capitalism as many historians have 
suggested, but in an important nexus that links industrialization with state institutions, 
notably military enterprise.85  Following Smith and DeLanda, I am interested in reading 
                                                 
84 While critics have generally avoided this dynamic of Meville’s “Benito Cereno,” the critic who comes 
closest, I would argue, is Eric J. Sundquist.  See his “‘Benito Cereno’ and New World Slavery,” from 
Reconstructing American Literary History, Sacvan Bercovitch, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986) 93-122.  Here Sundquist places “Benito Cereno” in the hemispherical debate on slavery and its 
further expansion throughout the Americas or “New World” as his title suggests. 
 
85 Merritt Roe Smith, “Introduction,” Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the 
American Experience, ed. Merritt Row Smith (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 1  See also Smith’s chapter 
“Army Ordnance and the ‘American System’ of Manufacturing, 1815-1861” (39-86) in this same volume.  
Manuel DeLanda has recently published on this topic and relies heavily on Smith’s research to suggest that 
technologies of organization and management, developed and practiced by the military, had become 
disciplinary innovations and techniques that were “slowly transferred to civilian factories.”  See Manuel 
DeLanda, “Beyond the Problematic of Legitimacy: Military Influences on Civilian Society,” boundary 2 
32:1 (2005): 117-128.  Although Sidney Pollard’s influential study of emergent management techniques 
doesn’t explicitly discuss the relationship and influence of military practices with industrialization, there 
are instances in his citations where one can see the influence of military paradigms and the necessity to 
control or discipline bodies in relation to particular material practices and forces.  See The Genesis of 
Modern Management: A Study in the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain (London: Edward Arnold, 
1965) and particular the reference to Napoleon (258).   See also Jonathan Arac’s contribution to this 
discussion, which demonstrates important links between emergent managerial systems and the 
epistemological problematic of “overview” addressed by nineteenth-century British and American 
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 Melville’s “Benito Cereno” within a critical genealogy that traces out the connections 
between the “deepening of military involvement in civilian society in the last two 
centuries,” if not earlier, to the “production of obedience” and manageability of 
humans.86  This is a genealogy, moreover, that opens up ways for examining and 
understanding techniques of discipline and control that mobilize and regulate humans as 
resources in an arrangement of forces that resembles “total warfare”—a term that has 
taken on significance since Carl von Clausewitz’s theorization of post-Napoleonic 
conflict and suggests that the practices of war are inscribed in and permeate human 
civilization.87 (To be clear, Clausewitz’s theories had arrived late to American war 
strategy, but as many historians have suggested, “Indian wars”—and I would argue 
Negro slave revolts—resembled on some level the practices and strategies of total war 
against an “internal” enemy.)88   
*              *               * 
This notion of global enforcement and its concomitancy with limitless purview 
initiate my reading of “Benito Cereno.”  In tandem with the following chapter, “Terror 
and the Negro,” I read Melville’s writing from the mid-1850s as a critical and even 
heretical engagement with the more doxological perspectives of American power.  Rather 
than praising America as the new beginning, the endless futurity, or the culminating force 
                                                                                                                                                 
literature.  Jonathan Arac, Commissioned Spirits: The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickins, Carlyle, 
Melville, and Hawthorne (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 22. 
 
86 DeLanda, 119-121. 
 
87 DeLanda, 119.  In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz understood that war is more than a purely military 
endeavor, that politics extends the field of battle and, conversely, that war is the extension of politics by 
other means.  
 
88 See Robert M. Utley, “Total War on the American Indian Frontier” in Anticipating Total War: The 
German and American Experiences, 1871-1914.  Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Forster, 
eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 399-414. 
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 bequeathing liberation, freedom, or redemption (about which Melville had previously 
expressed skepticism), “Benito Cereno” poses, and thus allows us to better understand, an 
intensification of American power—that is, its regulatory and managerial techniques over 
humans, its propensity for greater security over property and commercial networks.   
Methodologically and theoretically, I understand this literary production not to be merely 
a reflection or mimetic representation, but a willful act of intelligence and historical 
memory that allows us to understand better a configuration of forces or arrangement of 
power that often escapes recognition by others in the mid-nineteenth century—and even 
today.  In both this and the subsequent chapter, I address how “Benito Cereno” stages (or 
invents) two figures who instantiate different orders of mind in this mid-nineteenth 
century arrangement of forces.  These two figures are the American captain Amasa 
Delano, whom I have already begun to examine, and the slave Babo, a central figure in 
the following chapter, “Terror and the Negro.”  In this chapter, I address Delano as a 
figure who sees and attempts to order the world in a manner that is congruent with 
American power.     
Continually referred to as “the American” in “Benito Cereno,” Delano’s 
comportment in and perspective of the world further evinces a mind committed to 
movement and flow of commodities, resources, and bodies for the sake of expansion and 
movement itself, committed to what Paul Virilio reminds us is an often repeated 
conflation in modernity between freedom and movement, demos and dromos, democracy 
and “dromology.”89  In fact, as I have shown in a previous chapter of this dissertation, 
Ishmael in Moby Dick makes a similar conflation, particularly in his defense or apology 
                                                 
89 Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext[e], 1977). 
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 for the business of whale-fishing, a business he describes as spreading empire as well as 
democracy.  The history of this conflation is long.  In ancient Greece, Moses Finley 
reminds us, Athenian democracy had been inextricably intertwined with the project of 
empire.90  Like Ishmael’s depiction of the Nantucketers—“these sea hermits, issuing 
from their ant-hill in the sea, overrun[ing] and conquer[ing] the water world”—the 
Athenians had before them created an empire in the form of a “thassalocracy—literally a 
rule over the sea.”91  In “Benito Cereno,” I argue, Delano’s character exemplifies a 
perspective of the globe that has as much to do with movement and proper regulation, 
with history as progress and chronology, with “uninterrupted, circular voyage,”92 as it 
does with producing a comprehensive vista of the world.  Indeed, all of these elements 
that Delano values and evinces—movement, regulation, security, vista, detection, history 
as progress—are entangled in the strategic impulse of maintaining American power—or, 
rather, America as an arrangement of power that yields what Melville’s “Benito Cereno” 
helps us understand as “bloody enforcement” on a global scale.   
As Melville’s works attempt to show—and what I think we can learn from 
them—is that America is an arrangement of power that constitutes and maintains the 
mythic conflation between dromos and demos, between movement and freedom—or 
movement as freedom.  (Indeed, America comes forth as an intensification or modulation 
of previous empires built on movement—that is, Athenian empire as Finley understands 
                                                 
90 M. I. Finley, Democracy: Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972).  See 
chapter 2 and particulary pages 87-88.  
 
91 Peter T. Manicas, “War, Stasis, and Greek Political Thought,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 24 (October 1982), 684.  For further reference, Manicas also cites A. H. M. Jones, Athenian 
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957). 
 
92 Virilio, 41. 
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 it.) So it’s not surprising that one of the concerns that Melville’s works like “Benito 
Cereno,” “Bartleby,” and Moby Dick and others often return to is the question of energy 
in relation to movement.  Movement, as Melville reminds us in his fiction, requires 
energy; it necessitates coal, wind, wood; it takes whale oil and its petroleum substitutes; 
and, most importantly, it takes bodies and laborers to produce this energy.93  In turn, 
these bodies and laborers become energy, too.  Charles Olson had stated it succinctly if 
not poetically in his essay on Moby Dick: “Americans still fancy themselves such 
democrats.  But their triumphs are of the machine.  It is the only master of space the 
average person ever knows, ox-wheel to piston, muscle to jet.  It gives trajectory.”94  And 
all the while energy (that which “gives trajectory”) is being produced, and all the while 
movement or dromos is the predominant mode for organizing the world, this set of 
conditions and relations of power become increasingly more hostile to human life.   
A year prior to the publication of “Benito Cereno,” Melville’s “Bartleby” had 
depicted how this hostility to human life comes forth ironically in the lawyer-manager-
narrator’s concluding apostrophe to the dead scrivener: “Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity!” he 
exclaims.95  While his apostrophe invokes Bartleby’s misery as a universal condition of 
human experience, Melville’s narrative ironically calls attention to the fact that this pale 
invalid’s plight is a particular condition attendant with modernity and the incessant need 
for human bodies to work as efficiently and efficaciously as inhuman machines.  The 
narrator’s apostrophe, in other words, is not to “humanity” as the narrator is wont to 
                                                 
93 For an informative genealogy of energy in the context I am describing here, see Vaclav Smil, Energy in 
World History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).  
 
94 Charles Olson, Call Me Ishmael: A Study of Melville (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1947), 15. 
 
95 Herman Melville, “Bartleby, The Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street,” Melville’s Short Novels. (New 
York: Norton, 2002), 34. 
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 believe, but to humanity’s death, its post-human or inhuman form in mid-nineteenth 
century conditions.  As Melville’s literary works from Moby Dick to “Bartleby” and from 
“The Bell-Tower” to “Benito Cereno” suggest, this is a set of conditions that transforms 
humans, and all the creative, poetic, and inventive possibilities of which humans are 
capable, into inhuman energies conducive to empire and its continuation.   
Regarding the possibility of creation and invention, intelligence and mind, under 
these inhuman conditions, Melville’s “Benito Cereno” draws different conclusions (or 
questions) than “Bartleby,” however.  Rather than the sheer annihilation of the creative 
possibilities of human action and intelligence—that is, the violent transformation or 
separation of intelligence and mind from the laboring and mechanized body— as we see 
in “Bartleby,” “Benito Cereno” shows rather saliently how empire and global 
“enforcement” cannot always account for and anticipate invention, especially invention 
from the very minds and bodies that empire deems as inhuman.  Babo—the “personal 
attendant” or slave to the Spanish Captain, Don Benito Cereno—is the figure in “Benito 
Cereno” who exhibits this intelligence and invention.  I address Babo and the question of 
invention in the subsequent chapter, where I explain in depth my interest in and 
understanding of “invention” that develops in the arts of rhetoric (but which is not 
necessarily limited to it) from which the meaning and practices of invention can be traced 
out in a genealogy that includes Cicero and Vico.  In the long historical sense of the term, 
from the Latin inventio or Greek heuresis, Babo’s invention is an act of discovery and 
making which takes as its starting point the resources or “topics” (topoi) available to him.  
Melville’s novel shows how Babo deftly makes use of the discursive resources and topoi 
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 such as race and nationality, gender and strength, sublimity and terror, to mask his 
rebellious plot. 
In the following three sections of this chapter, I examine how Delano invokes the 
conventions of the Gothic and Transcendentalist sublime when he encounters the slave 
ship.  I then demonstrate how this discourse of the sublime and its American 
manifestations—aligned with influential concepts introduced by Edmund Burke’s 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful—
provides Delano with a set of categories for conceptualizing the site of potential conflict, 
the site where Delano exercises force for the sake of order, stability, and the security of 
property and networks of capital flow.  In brief, Delano makes use of these Burkean 
aesthetic concepts of the sublime in order to convert the crisis before him into a scene 
that can be framed within his own American myths regarding race and nationality, history 
and progress, management and work, order and chaos, movement and stasis.  I conclude 
this chapter by addressing how Delano’s propensity for regulation further dramatizes his 
inability to recognize this conflict as an historical problematic that is attendant with the 
very arrangement of power he supports and “enforces.”  
 
2.2. The American looking out to the Horizon and the Global Sublime 
 
After the immediate introduction of Captain Amasa Delano, the American 
commander of “a large sealer and general trader” named the Bachelors Delight, a name 
Melville deliberately changed from the Perseverance, the narrative of “Benito Cereno” 
shows how Delano observes through “troubled gray vapors” and “shadows” a “strange 
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 sail . . . coming into the bay” (36).  With each successive inspection of the “stranger,” the 
narrative point of view, synchronized with Delano’s, moves closer in geographic space to 
the object being observed.  “Upon a still nigher approach,” both third-person narrator and 
Captain Delano—in a moment wherein their respective fields of vision are still 
conflated—discover the “true character of the vessel.”  The narrative identifies the object 
of Delano’s intrigue as “a Spanish merchantman of the first class; carrying negro slaves, 
amongst other valuable freight, from one colonial port to another” (36).  Delano then 
surmises that “it might be a ship in distress” and that he would prepare to “board her, and, 
at the least, pilot her in” (36). 
The initial conflation of Delano’s perspective with the limited omniscience of the 
third-person narrative point of view introduces the problem of intelligibility, detection, 
and perception that will recur throughout the narrative.  In this opening scene, Delano’s 
ability to render intelligible the “singular” phenomenon before him is contingent upon 
proximity and vista.  Delano understands that information gathering is ostensibly 
proportionate to the shrinking geographical space that initially separates his position from 
that of the mysterious ship’s location in the distance.  The shifting perspective begins first 
from a position of “a less remote view,” and then to a position that is “still nigher,” and, 
finally to one where, “As the whale-boat drew more and more nigh, the cause of the 
peculiar pipe-clayed aspect of the stranger was seen in the slovenly neglect pervading 
her” (37 My emphasis).  This attempt by Delano to shrink space—or, more precisely, to 
order and chart space and time in such a manner as to index and govern objects in it, to 
move through space with more efficiency and speed—stages many of the questions about 
the global sphere that Moby Dick attempts to raise.  With more concision, though, 
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 “Benito Cereno” introduces these questions immediately by depicting Delano’s point of 
view, a view that moves forward in space, that attempts a “less remote view.”  
In a scenario that resembles the strategies of gaining purview, Delano attempts to 
overcome or transcend that which limits his will-to-vision and perception.   
With no small interest, Captain Delano continued to watch her—a proceeding not 
much facilitated by the vapors partly mantling the hull, through which the far 
matin light from her cabin streamed equivocally enough; much like the sun—by 
this time hemisphered on the rim of the horizon, and apparently, in company with 
the strange ship, entering the harbor—which wimpled by the same low, creeping 
clouds, showed not unlike a Lima intriguante’s one sinister eye across the Plaza 
from the Indian loop-hole of her dusk saya-y-manta. (35-36) 
Focusing on the curvature of space and the obfuscation of light as temporary 
impediments of vision, “Benito Cereno” evokes through the figure of Delano the 
common eighteenth- and nineteenth-century geographical and romanticized trope of the 
horizon.  Delano’s vision of the ship’s “far matin light” as it is placed spatially on the 
same liminal or subliminal threshold as the sun, “hemisphered on the rim of the horizon,” 
recalls how the horizon signifies an epistemological and phenomenological crisis to be 
overcome or resolved.96  As a matter of intrigue and detection, Delano enacts a kind of 
purview that attempts to predict, apprehend, and give order to this singular phenomenon 
at the edge of subliminal space, drawing it into an intelligible and rational frame.  It 
becomes clear in these opening passages in “Benito Cereno” that Delano’s habit of mind 
is to make use of or even naturalize Gothic topoi, transforming or aestheticizing that 
                                                 
96 Cf. James B. Twitchell, Romantic Horizons: Aspects of the Sublime in English Poetry and Painting, 
1770-1850 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983). 
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 which initially seems “singular” and “strange” into a recognizable convention of sign 
systems.  These Gothic topoi and Delano’s invocation of the sublime further help render 
his experiences both “strange” yet familiar, terribly dangerous yet thrillingly 
“delightful”—categories used in tandem when the novel describes Delano’s way of 
understanding the scene before him.   
The term “delight” or delightfulness in relation to notions of terror has an 
important genealogy in the discourse of the sublime that emerges in the eighteenth 
century, particularly out of Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful.97   In developing a body of thought on the category 
of terror in relation to the sublime, Burke reasons that a “species of delight” is derivative 
of terror—even though terror is ostensibly “a cause so apparently contrary to” delight 
(134).  Explaining how a set of conditions in which delight may arise in the encounter 
with terror, Burke writes, “In all these cases, if the pain and terror are so modified as not 
to be actually noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not 
conversant about the present destruction of the person, as these emotions clear the parts, 
whether fine, or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance, they are capable of 
                                                 
97 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
[1757] (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968).  While Immanuel Kant uses the 
category of terror as well in his examination of the sublime in Critique of Judgment, it is Burke who 
initially formulates and provides a significant body of thought on the category of terror in relation to the 
sublime.  Indeed, for Burke the notion of the sublime relies on the sense of terror.  The changes from Burke 
and the stakes of Kant’s philosophical Critique are too numerous to rehearse here, but for a brief overview 
of this change, see Raimonda Modiano’s “Humanism and the Comic Sublime: From Kant to Friedrich 
Theodor Vischer,” Studies in Romanticism 26.2 (1987), 231-244.  “Benito Cereno” seems also to be an 
explicit engagement with Burkean categories, particularly the notion of “delight” as it provides a sense of 
security or safety from the mortal dangers of terror.  I give further attention to this below, particularly in my 
discussion of Delano’s habit of aesthetizing his encounter with the event before him.  Before Burke, but not 
to the extent, John Dennis in the Grounds of Criticism had outlined six “Enthusiastic Passions.” They are 
admiration, terror, horror, joy, sadness, and desire. As Samuel Monk notes, Dennis discussed admiration 
and terror before he was able to finish the work.  Samuel H. Monk, The Sublime: A Study of Critical 
Theories in Eighteenth-Century England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), 51. 
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 producing delight” (136).  He continues to argue that what he means by delight is “not 
pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with terror; which as it 
belongs to self-preservation is one of the strongest of all the passions”  (136).    
In Part Four, Burke’s emphasis that “delightfulness” is “not pleasure” recalls his 
earlier formulation in Part One wherein he establishes a distinction between the concept 
of the beautiful and the sublime.  While certain forms of pain are “analogous to terror” 
and are therefore a “source of the sublime,” pleasure is a sensation that is isomorphic 
with beauty.98  So for Burke, this sensation of “delightful horror” is essential for one to 
achieve the sublime, and as critic James Twitchell notes in Romantic Horizons, the 
sensation of delight that Burke posits here forms the basis for romantic and transcendent 
vision: Transcendence comes at the moment when the viewer, “overcoming anxiety” and 
danger in the encounter with horror, then moves out “into something beyond.”  It is this 
form of vision, Twitchell argues, that “facscinated the poets and painters in the early 
nineteenth century” in both England and the United States (14).   
In Burke’s formulation on the sublime—and particularly in how he understands 
the viewer’s encounter with terror that can potentially bring about a sensation of 
delight—horror functions as an aestheticized object of experience.  According to Burke, 
if terror doesn’t lead to death but instead becomes the impetus for the viewer to seek and 
be aware of his or her own “self-preservation,” then the viewer has encountered the 
sensation of “delightful horror,” a sense of the sublime whereby the viewer is raised 
above or beyond the quotidian perspective.  Burke is then able to reason that terror, and 
its inherent dangerousness, can be surveyed or experienced from a transcendent position, 
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 that is, from a point of view capable of observing terror from a safe but thrilling vantage 
point, thus bringing about what he calls a “species of delight,”99 an aestheticization, and, 
just as importantly, a means of securing a once-potentially dangerous threat or encounter. 
This relation between the “species of delight” and the encounter with terror is 
made all the more interesting if we recall that with Burke the figure of the Negro plays a 
subtle but altogether important role in codifying the percept of blackness and the concept 
of terror.  To do this, Burke establishes the postulate that “Darkness [is] terrible in its 
own nature.”  “We have all considered darkness as a cause of the sublime,” writes Burke, 
“and we have all along considered the sublime as depending on some modification of 
pain or terror” (143).  He continues by positing a universal “association” between 
darkness and terror, an association “which takes in all mankind,” and he further relates 
this sense of terror to the lack of “safety” or security that results from darkness:  “For in 
utter darkness,” continues Burke,  
it is impossible to know in what degree of safety we stand; we are ignorant of 
objects that surround us; we may every moment strike against some dangerous 
obstruction; we may fall down a precipice the first step we take; and if an enemy 
approach, we know not in what quarter to defend ourselves; in such a case 
strength is no sure protection; wisdom can only act by guess; the boldest are 
staggered, and he who would pray for nothing else towards his defence [sic], is 
forced to pray for light. (143) 
                                                 
99 For Kant the notion of security that I’m discussing in Burke’s work is grounded in the category of 
Reason. Of course, this statement is a mere synthesis of what really requires an in-depth elaboration on 
Kant’s thought.  For now, I might point to section 29: “It is attractive because reason exerts a dominion 
over sensibility in order to extend it in conformity with its proper realm (the practical) and to make it look 
out into the infinite, which is for it an abyss.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement.  J.H. Bernard, Trans. 
(New York: Hafner, 1951) 105. 
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 In the subsequent pages of Burke’s Enquiry, the problems of security, intelligibility, and 
illumination—the necessity “to pray for light”—converge on Burke’s discussion of the 
blackness of the Negro, a “negro women” to be exact.  “I must observe, that the ideas of 
darkness and blackness are much the same,” reasons Burke.  In order to concretize the 
concept of terror with the blackness of the Negro, Burke continues by referring to a 1729 
publication in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society by the famous English 
surgeon William Cheselden.  For Burke, Chelselden offers an important empirical 
“account” that supports his claim.  The account is of a “young Gentleman, who was born 
blind, or lost his Sight so early, that he had no Remembrance of ever having seen”; this 
gentleman’s sight was then restored through surgery at the age of thirteen or fourteen.  
Burke continues:   
Among many remarkable particulars that attended [the boy’s] first perceptions, 
and judgments on visual objects, Cheselden tells us, that the first time the boy saw 
a black object, it gave him great uneasiness; and that some time after, upon 
accidentally seeing a negro women, he was struck with great horror at the sight. 
(144) 
Burke’s account of the sublime, specifically the relation between the “blackness” 
of the Negro and the experience of terror, occasions both critical inquiry and departure in 
Melville’s “Benito Cereno.”  Where other American gothic and transcendentalist writers 
from Charles Brockden Brown and Edgar Allan Poe to Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt 
Whitman exhibit some aspects of Burke’s concept of the sublime (or derivations of 
Burke’s thought in German idealism) and replicate in their writing and thinking the 
aesthetic movement to a kind of Burkean “delightful horror” or romantic transcendent 
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 vision, Melville’s “Benito Cereno” is suspicious of how this vision is produced, how the 
discourse of race and racialogical thought are inscribed within theories of the sublime, 
and how a sublime perspective and point of view become privileged epistemologies in 
the mid-nineteenth century historical moment, a moment that is defined in many ways by 
the intensification of empire and a “global purview.”100  Permit me to elaborate on the 
etymological, historical, and geopolitical importance of this term purview. 
I find the term “purview” important, for it has an historical development that is 
inextricably tied to questions of sovereignty, regulation, and strategy brought about by 
American interests in expanding commerce and creating markets since the late-eighteenth 
century.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, from its earliest formulations in 
the fifteenth century, the term “purview” referred to the provisional clause of a legislative 
document.  Developing from this earlier juridical use of the term as “proviso” (i.e., the 
establishment of the “purview” of the legal document), “purview” by the late-eighteenth 
century had come to mean “the scope or limits of any document, statement, scheme, 
subject, book, or the like,” and it further denoted the “purpose or intent” as well as the 
“range, sphere, or field of a person’s labour or occupation.”101   
                                                 
100 In Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland, for instance, the effect of terror operates throughout the 
narrative as that which cannot be seen, identified, or rendered fully intelligible.  The residents of Wieland 
estate are haunted by apparitions and intrusions, but this sense of terror is resolved by the end of the novel 
when it is revealed that Carwin, through acts of ventriloquism, has been the cause.  See Charles Brockden 
Brown, Wieland, or The Transformation (New York: Prometheus Books).  Similarly, in Edgar Allan Poe’s 
“The Sphinx,” the “monster” that terrorizes the narrator is, by the narrative’s resolution, placed in a safe 
and proper perspective by the detective work of the narrator’s companion.  In both narratives, the placing of 
the problem or potential threat into proper perspective helps bring about secure position from which to 
view horror, at once rendering this horror into the domain of delightfulness.  See Edgar Allan Poe, “The 
Sphinx,” Edgar Allan Poe: Poetry and Tales (New York: Library of America, 1984) 843-847.  As I 
demonstrate later in this chapter, Delano’s perception and modes of viewing the event of the slave revolt, 
and particularly his propensity to frame the event within the Gothic categories of delightful horror, is 
presented as one of the central problematics in “Benito Cereno.”  
 
101 Oxford English Dictionary, “Purview.” 
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 This eighteenth-century meaning, and its further elaboration on the categories 
“range” and “sphere,” had arisen from a problematic that James Madison introduced in 
the Federalist Papers.  He writes, “In determining the extent of information required in 
the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the 
purview of that authority.”102  While his use of the term “recourse” seems ambiguous 
here, what is clear about Madison’s essay is its interest in delimiting and establishing “the 
objects [within the purview] of federal legislation.”  These objects are “commerce, 
taxation, and the militia.”  For the sake of “proper regulation”—that is, for the sake of 
stabilizing market networks and commodity flow over space—“commerce requires much 
information” (Madison, Federalist #56).  The question that Madison and others set out to 
resolve is how, and under what arrangement of state representation, could government 
best gather, organize, and put this information to use.  More important than Madison’s 
argument for a republic with a limited number of state representatives, however, is his 
concern with the relationship between governance and “authority” over the “proper 
regulation of commerce.”  What is at stake in Madison’s use of the term “purview” is a 
problematic that requires him to ask how or under what configuration of force and 
regulation must the U.S. gather information and, therefore, extend its purview.   
Altering slightly but also expanding Madison’s initial use of “purview” in the 
Federalist Papers, the nineteenth century meaning of the term had come to include 
notions of “view,” “range of vision,” and “outlook.”  These denotations further extended 
(by way of epistemological categories like vision and oversight) the problematic that 
Madison and others sought to address.  One might phrase the problematic this way: The 
                                                 
102 James Madison, “Federalist #56.”  This is also the sentence cited in the OED.  My emphasis.  Hereafter, 
I cite Madison parenthetically. 
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 “exercise of a particular authority” depends on the ability of the “authority” or governing 
force to overcome the limits within its “range”—to have “recourse . . . to the objects 
within [its] purview.”   Although Madison articulates this as a problematic particular to 
U.S. national institutions, his use of “purview,” I want to suggest, expresses an 
arrangement of forces that extends and intensifies governmental regulation over 
transnational or supra-territorial spaces, whereby the interests and success of the nation 
and its institutions depends on broader managerial regulations or controls over 
geopolitical spaces and global commerce.  As historian Richard Van Alystyne in the 
1960s had argued, the debates occurring among the intellectuals, investors, and founders 
of the U.S. state and its Constitution (including Madison) reflected a complex of 
international forces (i.e., imperial hegemonies) that were in contest not only for 
continental territory but, more importantly, for dominion over emerging markets and 
commercial networks, indeed, for global sea power itself.103  I understand global purview 
as an intention that is attendant with these imperial ambitions, and I understand Delano’s 
work as a contribution to this purview.  Purview, in other words, operates as a corollary 
of American power; its limits are tied to America’s ability to exercise governmental force 
and oversight.  For Madison, then, the problematic is one of devising ways or “recourses” 
for overcoming the limits in order to achieve maximum purview.   
Melville’s “Benito Cereno” signals that the tropes most useful to the practices of 
regulation and security, to managerial perspective and oversight, are found in the 
                                                 
103 Richard Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence: The International History of the American Revolution 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), vii-viii.  See also chapter eight of this book (191-232) as well as 
Van Alstyne’s The Rising American Empire (New York: Norton, 1974) [originally published by Blackwell, 
1960]. 
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 aesthetics and topoi of an American gothic and transcendental sublimity.104  His 
discovery or invention of Delano in this narrative marks an instance where the 
problematic of governance, regulation, and purview conjoins with a particularly 
American articulation of the sublime.  Tracing out the linkages between the Anglo and 
Continental notions of the sublime and transcendence found in British romanticism and 
German idealism and how this discourse had influenced (and even ramified within) 
American “vision” and habits of thought, Donald Pease’s important essay “Sublime 
Politics” addresses an American propensity to invoke the sublime as a means of 
legitimating “man’s future power over the landscape,” to express legitimacy “in the 
policy of western expansion.”105  Rob Wilson, following some of Pease’s initial insights, 
recalls that early and nineteenth-century American appropriations of the sublime 
provided a set of tropes and discursive functions that were integral to the material and 
institutional practices of American power. 106  These tropes, in other words, lent 
themselves to a metaphysics that allowed or even legitimized the American (and America 
                                                 
104 Cf. Jonathan Arac, Commissioned Spirits: The Shaping of Social Motion in Dickins, Carlyle, Melville, 
and Hawthorne (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).    While Arac does not take up directly the 
question of the sublime in this particular work, there’s no doubt that the sublime, which had informed 
Romantic British and American writers, contributed to the type of  “overview” that Arac suggests is 
characteristic and complicit with the rise of managerial and disciplinary practices.  Arac’s work reflects his 
reading of Michel Foucault’s genealogy of disciplinary forces instantiated by Jeremy Bentham’s design of 
the panopticon. 
 
105 Donald Pease, “Sublime Politics,” The American Sublime, Mary Arensberg, ed. (Albany: State Univ. of 
New York Press, 1986) 46. 
 
106 For an extensive and important study of the sublime in relation to American literary production and 
ideology, see Rob Wilson, American Sublime: The Genealogy of a Poetic Genre (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin, 1991).   I find the genealogical implications of Wilson’s study to contain valuable insights on 
the connections between American conceptions of power and what I call global purview; I do, however, 
take exception to Wilson’s intentions of “altering (decreating/creating) this American sublime . . .  into a 
stance of empowerment that better fits the post-Cold War future” (40).  Understood as an ideology, the 
American Sublime for Wilson can be “altered” and reinstalled into a more “pluralist,” inclusive, and 
“empowering” national project.  My work on Melville (a figure noticeably absent from Wilson’s study) 
recalls some of Wilson’s genealogy but toward a very different aim.  
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 itself) to “rise above” and, as Walt Whitman’s mid nineteenth-century poetics pronounce, 
envision “the fiery fields emanative, and the endless vistas beyond.”107   
This “perspective” further bolstered if not constituted America’s new role in the 
world.  This was a role that Ralph Waldo Emerson and other proponents of expansion 
typified in the category “Young America”—a category that presupposed a critical break 
or liberation from “Old World” institutions.  Again, Richard Van Alstyne’s study of 
American empire suggests rather correctly a link between Emerson’s aesthetics and the 
web of banking, trading, transportation, and political interests of men like Stephen A. 
Douglas, George N. Sanders, Judah P. Benjamin, and George Law, “each of whom was 
active in business, and identified themselves as ‘Young Americans.’” 108   It is Emerson, 
among others, who had given voice to the potentialities of American force, a force made 
manifest through the “development of our American internal resources, the extension to 
the utmost of the commercial system, and the appearance of new moral causes which are 
to modify the State.”  All of this, Emerson euphorically exclaims, bestows an “aspect of 
greatness to the Future.”109 
Dramatizing how this seemingly benevolent aesthetics evinced by Emerson and 
others had become subsumed within American power, Melville’s “Benito Cereno” stages 
Amasa Delano as a figure who evinces an American propensity to gain an 
uncompromised perspective of the globe.  This is a figure who, much like Emerson, 
praises the “annihilation” of distance, “the locomotive and the steamboat” and other 
                                                 
107 Walt Whitman, “To the Leaven’d Soil They Trod,” Leaves of Grass. 
 
108 See Richard Van Alstyne’s The Rising American Empire (New York: Norton, 1974) [originally 
published by Blackwell, 1960], 153. 
 
109 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American” [1844]. 
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 machines and ships, which “shoot every day across the thousand various threads of 
national descent and employment, and bind them fast in one web.”110  “Benito Cereno” 
helps to anticipate, in other words, how Delano’s view of the world and how Delano’s A 
Narrative of Voyages and Travels contributed to and extended the “range” and thus the 
purview of American influence—a point that did not go unnoticed by German political 
theorist Carl Schmitt in the twentieth century.111  What is at stake in this extension and 
expansion of purview is an attendant violence that permeates potentially every part of the 
world.  The annihilation of distance, the conquest of space over time, and the fabrication 
of “one web”—all of which Emerson venerates in “The Young American”—form also 
the trappings of market expansion and the appropriation qua regulation of spaces and 
populations.  This is, moreover, one of the reasons that Delano, as both the reputable self-
made “American” and the author of A Narrative of Voyages, figures as an object of 
Melville’s understanding of (and growing skepticism towards) America’s seemingly 
                                                 
110 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American” [1844]. I quote the passage for a fuller 
contextualization: “This rage for road building is beneficent for America, where vast distance is so main a 
consideration in our domestic politics and trade, inasmuch as the great political promise of the invention is 
to hold the Union staunch, whose days seemed already numbered by the mere inconvenience of 
transporting representatives, judges, and officers across such tedious distances of land and water. Not only 
is distance annihilated, but when, as now, the locomotive and the steamboat, like enormous shuttles, shoot 
every day across the thousand various threads of national descent and employment, and bind them fast in 
one web, an hourly assimilation goes forward, and there is no danger that local peculiarities and hostilities 
should be preserved.”   
 
111 This is something that did not go unnoticed by the twentieth-century conservative German political 
theorist Carl Schmitt—albeit for a different purpose and politics than I have put forth here.  As Thomas 
Beebee has recently noted, Schmitt repeatedly referenced Melville’s “Benito Cereno” as a story which 
provides the “mythic context” for what “we call globalization” (115).  Schmitt’s identification with the 
Spanish captain, Benito Cereno, provides Schmitt a theoretical frame (or myth) through which Schmitt can 
account for the ascendancy of American power and the larger struggles Europe, particularly Germany, was 
facing.  Beebee further suggests, “Invoking the ‘ship-of-state’ allegory, Schmitt predicts the impending 
destruction of Germany as a sovereign nation” (119).  More must be said about this statement, but it does 
bear on the importance “Benito Cereno” has for those attempting to understand America power and new 
geopolitical and global arrangements.  See Thomas O. Beebee, “Carl Schmitt’s Myth of Benito Cereno,” 
Seminar: A Journal of German Studies 42:2 (2006) 114-134.  
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 benevolent role in the world, I argue here.112  Melville’s depiction of Delano in “Benito 
Cereno” as a mind committed to “benevolent” action helps formulate the basis of a 
problematic that troubles the relationship between American power and the inhuman 
conditions of market expansion, the reliance upon slave labor, as well as the 
intensification of security and control mechanisms over populations during the nineteenth 
century that are attendant with this power. 
In a style that invokes both the gothic and detective fiction of the period, the 
novella portrays Delano making his way toward the “strange” and seemingly distressed 
Spanish slaver, the San Dominick.  Alluding to dominant late-eighteenth and nineteenth 
century romantic conceptions of sublimity, “Benito Cereno” jests with its own depiction 
of Delano, rendering him as the easily identifiable romantic figure looking out at the 
sublime horizon.  As Delano views “the stranger” from the vantage point of his own ship, 
ironically called the Bachelors Delight, the novella deploys recognizable gothic topoi and 
tells how “the lawlessness and loneliness of the spot” invokes “the sort of stories, at that 
day, associated with those seas” (35)—as if these were the very categories and narrative 
conventions by which Delano’s mind frames and orders the singularity that he has 
encountered.   
Delano has to continually adjust this frame, however, as the scene he encounters 
often tests his own beliefs and perspective of the world.  One of the first instances of this 
is when Delano realizes that the “monks” and “dark cowls” before him in the distance are 
actually Negro slaves: “Upon a still nigher approach, this appearance [of gothic 
                                                 
112 For an account that glorifies both America’s exploits in the Pacific as well as Delano’s achievements 
and self reliance (and that interestingly omits any mention of Melville’s narrative on said figure) see Daniel 
Henderson, Yankee Ships in China Seas: Adventures of Pioneer Americans in the Troubled Far East (New 
York: Hastings House, 1946). 
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 figurations] was modified, and the true character of the vessel was plain—a Spanish 
merchantman of the first class; carrying negro slaves, amongst other valuable freight, 
from one colonial port to another” (36).   Once on board, he makes observations and 
judgments about what lies before him, and he looks for clues that will help him organize 
what at first “seems unreal” (38).  For Delano, the “strange costumes, gestures, and 
faces” look to be “but a shadowy tableau just emerged from the deep, which directly must 
receive what it gave”—a line that seems to recall Pip from Moby Dick.  Strange and 
peculiar, the encounter with the ship’s population—“whites and blacks . . . the latter out 
numbering the former” and the “common tale of suffering” that is told simultaneously “in 
one language, and as with one voice” (38)—begins to draw his attention and alarm:  
Perhaps it was some such influence as above is attempted to be described, which, 
in Captain Delano’s mind, heightened whatever, upon a staid scrutiny, might have 
seemed unusual; especially the conspicuous figures of four elderly grizzled 
negroes, their heads like black, doddered willow tops, who in venerable contrast 
to the tumult below them were couched sphynx-like, one on the starboard cat-
head, another on the larboard, and the remaining pare face to face on the opposite 
bulwarks above the main-chains.” (38) 
To Delano, more peculiar still are the “six other blacks; each with a rusty hatchet in his 
hand . . . engaged like a scullion in scouring” (39).  Unrecognizable to Delano, these 
same hatchets and the “blacks” who wield them had been at the center of the violent 
insurrection aboard the slave ship just a short time earlier.  Although the scene that 
confronts him seems out of joint, he attributes the slaves’ actions to “the peculiar love in 
negroes of uniting industry with pastime” as they “sideways clashed their hatchets 
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 together, like cymbals, with barbarous din” (39).  Though at first this scene of slaves 
wielding and polishing hatchets appears sinister and potentially threatening, Delano 
attributes their behavior to the “raw aspect of unsophisticated Africans” (39).  Any 
suspicions he has regarding the possible malicious intentions of those on board the San 
Dominick are believed by Delano to be within the agency of the Spaniards, not the slaves.  
And even then, he suppresses his own suspicions, attributing these suspicions to a kind of 
“atheist doubt” that “betrays” the “ever-watchful Providence above” (83). 
 Melville’s novella portrays Delano as a dupe of a racist myth or system of beliefs 
and ideology that posits a paradoxical, if not contradictory, notion of Negro intelligence:  
In one sense, this system of belief presupposes that the Negro, lacking Human 
intelligence, is incapable of entering fully into the domestic and civil sphere of human 
life and is always, therefore, a potential threat to Human civilization; in another sense, the 
conditioning of the Negro mind and body, under proper management and forces of 
control and domestication, renders the Negro as docile—much like the “Newfoundland 
dogs” to which Delano continually compares the Negro.113  For Delano it is initially 
impossible to imagine or recognize that the Negro—the “unsophisticated African”—is 
capable of inventing the “common tale of suffering” that the entire population aboard the 
San Dominick perform as dramatis personae.  To entertain such ideas would be, in 
Delano’s terms, “atheist,” to “doubt” the “ever-watchful Providence above” which has 
given ultimate meaning and order to the world.  Delano’s misrecognition, however, while 
the function of this deep-seated racism inscribed within his own religious and nationalist 
                                                 
113 See David Brion Davis’s Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), which addresses in historical detail the bestialization of African 
slaves. 
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 notions of “Providence,” is also the workings of Babo’s own ability to discover (inventio) 
this racism (as topos) and to use it as a means or strategy to shroud the rebellion.  (I 
address this in further detail in the following chapter.)  Rehearsing a drama that is 
conventionally recognizable to Delano’s hermeneutics and conceptions of tragedy and 
narrative, and to his conceptions of race and intelligence, the slaves are able to cloak their 
rebellious plot, even while traces of the revolt capriciously reveal themselves in Delano’s 
presence.  These revelations and hints of revolt appear to Delano merely as problems of 
mismanagement, as things out of order, to which he generously applies his skills.   
 
2.3. Ordo Mundi, the Geopolitics of Charity, and the Machinery of Control  
 
“In armies, navies, cities, or families, in nature herself, nothing more 
relaxes good order than misery.”114 
  
On board the stranded Spanish vessel, Delano finds himself “Wonted to the quiet 
orderliness of the sealer’s comfortable family of a crew” and finds also that “the noisy 
confusion of the San Dominick’s suffering host repeatedly challenged the eye” (42).  In 
the subsequent two pages and in other instances, the narrative uses terms like 
“mismanagement” and “unsightly disorder” to convey Delano’s perceptions of the 
derelict conditions aboard the Spanish ship.  Viewed by Delano as “confusion” and 
displaced authority, these conditions “challenge” his “eye” on two registers.  In the first 
sense, Melville’s novella alludes to the dramatic or narrative convention of blindness and 
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 insight, the trope of blindness as misperception and ignorance (agnoia) that “brings 
error.”115  In a gesture toward Sophocles’s understanding of hubris and fate as important 
elements of the tragedy—or even Homeric notions of sight and recognition—the “blunt-
thinking American’s eyes” (46) become central to Melville’s concern with the 
American’s inability to understand the trajectory of nineteenth-century forces, even while 
these forces are committed to a kind of full-spectrum dominance or global purview.  I 
take up this question of hubris and blindness in the next section, arguing that in “Benito 
Cereno” there is no moment of anagnorisis, no recognition scene where Delano truly 
understands why the “events ought not to have happened.”116  The “challenge” to 
Delano’s eyes plays out on another register here as well.  As if the weight of the entire 
ordo mundi—the alignment and movement of politics, economy, and history—were 
always in the balance, Delano thinks to himself, “in armies, navies, cities, or families, 
nothing more relaxes good order than misery” (40).   
For a mind like Delano’s, order is the first principle.  In this sense, Delano 
understands that the organization of power, exercised as management and governance, 
necessitates the maintenance of an “order” that is congruous throughout all levels of 
society—military, polis or cosmopolis, family, and “in nature herself” (40).  Anticipating 
Michel Foucault’s reading of the post-Machiavellian La Perriere, Delano’s remarks in 
                                                 
115 Michelle Gellrich, Tragedy and Theory: The Problem of Conflict since Aristotle. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 143. 
 
116 Sheila Murnaghan, “Sucking the Juice without Biting the Rind: Aristotle and Tragic Mimesis,” New 
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violence between philio, ‘close friends or relatives’ (Poetics 14.1453b19-23), actions that compound the 
horror of death and physical suffering with the violation of ties that are supposed to be secured by their 
sanctity and their basis in nature” (758). 
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 “Benito Cereno” instantiate an understanding of sovereign power that emerges in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century (and Foucault includes here the U.S.) as the “practices” 
or “art of governance.”117  “Like La Perriere,” states Foucault, “others who write on the 
art of government constantly recall that one speaks also of ‘governing’ a household, 
souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, a family.”118  This is a form of 
governance that does not refer exclusively to territory, in the sense that Machiavelli had 
intended, Foucault suggests, but a new arrangement of powers which governs “things.”119  
In La Perriere’s Miroir Politique, “things” include more than mere territory.  “Things” 
suggest “a sort of complex composed of men and things.”120 
The things, in this sense, with which government is to be concerned are in fact 
men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those things that 
are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific 
qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation to those 
other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; and 
finally men in their relation to those still other things that might be accidents and 
misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, and so on.121 
Referencing the regulation and ordering of “things,” the metaphor most often invoked by 
treatises on government is that of the ship, Foucault states.  It would be helpful to recall 
                                                 
117 See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” Power: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Volume 
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 Delano’s own habits and propensities for order in Foucault’s description of this relation 
of force: The governance of a ship “means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also 
its boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks, and 
storms; and it consists in the activity of establishing a relation between the sailors, who 
are to be taken care of, and the ship, which is to be taken care of, and the cargo, which is 
to be brought safely to port, and all of those eventualities like wind, rocks, storms, and so 
on.”122  These are all the forms of governance that Delano finds lacking aboard the 
“noisy confusion” and miserable conditions of the San Dominick.  And these are the 
conditions that legitimize Delano to reestablish order.   
How does he do this, though?  Several times throughout the story Delano 
mentions his own “charitable” and “compassionate” response to the misery and how, out 
of his own benevolence, feels compelled to assist the Spanish slave ship.  For Delano, 
world spaces and populations, under proper command or management and with the right 
application of force or energy, can be brought into a kind of orderliness that he himself 
practices as commander of his own ship.   In order to legitimize his compassionate 
intervention aboard the San Dominick, Delano offers “charity.”  Melville would later take 
up rather critically the category and exercise of charity in The Confidence-Man (1857), 
but in “Benito Cereno” we can see already how “charity” provides Melville a way to 
understand practices of governance.  More to the point, we can find in Delano’s 
invocation of the term “charity” not only an important conflation of “economy” with 
“politics” that Foucault discusses, but Delano’s means of extending this political 
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 economy outward onto the “strange” and foreign world and populations that the 
American encounters in his global endeavors. 
The term stranger, oft repeated in the opening of the novella, hints at Delano’s 
own endeavors in expanding America’s influence over the globe, whereby the opening of 
new markets and exploration of new territories often occasions encounters with “strange” 
and unfamiliar geographies and populations.  I have already theorized how Delano’s 
habit of mind reads his encounter with the “stranger” through a Gothic lens or 
hermeneutic.  There’s more to this, though.  In an even longer history of the term 
stranger, the ancient Greeks, Michelle Gellrich explains, had made an important 
distinction between strangers or outsiders (thuraioi, in this case) and insiders or kinsmen 
(oikeioi).  This was a distinction that was central to the political and tragic elements of 
Sophocles’ Antigone and the ancient Greeks’ understanding of order.123  Philologically, 
it’s Giambattista Vico who suggested the correlation between “the first commerce in the 
world” and the category of “stranger.”  Vico writes that the word for stranger, hostis, 
“means both guest or stranger and enemy.”124  Vico scholar Giuseppe Mazzotta 
elaborates on this relation and Vico’s contribution:  
The stranger, in Greek texts, is the one who enters the city—the space of defined 
structures—and with him a new world enters the perimeter of the polis.  The 
stranger’s arrival reveals the existence of worlds other than one’s own, each world 
                                                 
123 See Michelle Gellrich, Tragedy and Theory: The Problem of Conflict since Aristotle. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 59.  Gellrich offers an insightful reading of the political stakes involved 
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124 Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Max H. Fisch and Thomas G. Bergin 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1968), para. 11.  Giuseppe Mazzotta, The New Map of the World: The 
Poetic Philosophy of Giambattista Vico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 175.  It might be 
fruitful to trace out the relation, too, between Gellrich’s term for “outsider” (thuraioi) in the Greek and 
Vico’s “stranger” (hostis) in the Latin.   
 
62 
 unknown to the other, and yet each accessible to the other.  In this encounter, 
which the god favors, stranger and host exchange the gift of friendship, a precious 
inviolable gift that would bind them forever.  While all of this is true, Vico also 
perceives that the encounter between stranger and host puts in place a strange 
relation, a relation of strangeness.125 
This relation between stranger and host allows Vico “to draft the archeology of civil 
disturbance.”126  While this archeology and its implications are too extensive to trace out 
here, the categories stranger and host, as Vico had understood them, obliges us to 
reconsider the changing dynamic of these relations.  This is a dynamic that flexes with 
the site of the “encounter.”  No longer relegated to the perimeters of the city in the 
ancient sense, the encounter between strangers at the moment of commerce gives way to 
a different arrangement within modernity.  The polis becomes cosmopolis.  In other 
words, this is an arrangement in which the conditions for commerce are potentially made 
possible throughout any space on the planet.  But what happens in the encounter between 
strangers?  How does “strangeness,” as Vico understood it historically and philologically, 
shift with the ancient orders to modern conditions?  Again, “Benito Cereno” helps us 
consider this: As charity is proffered by Delano to the stranger, a new order is extended 
outward, resulting in an annexation (absorption or interiorizing) of the “stranger” or 
thuraioi into oikeioi, from which derives the word “economy.”   
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 Indeed, Delano’s act of charity instantiates what Foucault marks as the “modern 
meaning” of economy, the “introduction of economy into political practice.”127  Charity 
is the act or strategy by which Delano is able to extend a political economy to the 
“stranger” (or “enemy” if we trace out how Vico understands the “diction” and 
“contradiction” within the term) and to apply certain mechanisms of control.  By 
invoking charity, Delano legitimizes his intervention in a situation that is the result of 
mismanagement by a weak and “hypochondriac” Spanish captain, Benito Cereno.  
According to the American, “misery” and disorder aboard the Spanish San Dominick are 
directly the consequences of Benito Cereno’s inadequacies as a captain and a man: “He 
was rather tall, but seemed never to have been robust, and now with nervous suffering 
was almost worn to a skeleton” (40).  This sense of inadequacy follows Delano’s 
perception of the Spaniard throughout the novella, finally summarized in the last pages 
by an image of male impotency: “And that silver-mounted sword, apparent symbol of 
despotic command, was not, indeed, a sword, but the ghost of one.  The scabbard, 
artificially stiffened was empty” (102).  The energy and potency that Delano finds 
ostensibly lacking in the effete Cereno further bolsters a disdain for the Spaniard.  “Is it, 
thought Captain Delano, that this hapless man is one of those paper captains I’ve known, 
who by policy wink at what by power they cannot put down?  I know no sadder sight 
than a commander who has little of command but the name” (47).  Melville’s ironically 
charged characterization of Delano’s perception of the Spanish as inferior reflected much 
of the complex political, military, and historical relationship between the United States 
and Latin America of that moment. As Don Coerver and Linda Hall have argued through 
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 their research, “The ease with which the war with Mexico was won, and the extraordinary 
amount of territory which was taken, led to the perception that Latin Americans were 
somehow inferior and could be easily dominated by the U.S. military.”128 
For Delano, strong policy is a direct function of strong energy, and Delano’s habit 
of mind is to think of good order in terms of management, policy, and discipline.  Misery 
and misrule can be avoided, according to Delano, by using strategies of control and acts 
of sheer disciplinary force or energy.  This is made specifically evident when he judges 
that Cereno lacks sufficient control of the unruly San Dominick: “Still, Captain Delano 
was not without the idea, that had Benito Cereno been a man of greater energy, misrule 
would hardly have come to the present pass” (40, My emphasis).  Charity, in this sense, is 
the application of Delano’s own surplus energy to a problem that is inadequately 
addressed and “mismanaged” by Benito Cereno’s emasculated command.129  My 
intention here is to open up and show instances of how the discourse of philanthropy and 
the micro-politics of charity, particularly here in “Benito Cereno” (and we see this in 
“Bartleby” as well as other titles), are congruent with the larger machinations of global 
purview and empire.130  In Melville’s world, the practice of charitable politics is the 
extension or counterpart to other, often blatantly violent, mechanisms of control or 
bloody enforcement. 
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 To further contextualize this, Delano’s actions, manner of thought, and overall 
comportment alludes to and forms a composite image of a number of “American” figures, 
from Thomas Jefferson and Ralph Waldo Emerson to John O’Sullivan.  By invoking the 
discourse of charity, Delano reflects specifically O’Sullivan’s 1847 essay “The War,” 
published in the Democratic Review.  O’Sullivan writes, “It is an acknowledged law of 
nations, that when a country sinks into a state of anarchy, unable to govern itself, and 
dangerous to its neighbors, it becomes the duty of the most powerful of those neighbors 
to interfere and settle its affairs.”131  Justification on grounds that order and governance 
must prevail, intervention on the San Dominick is reason enough for Delano, and is 
reason enough for the U.S.’s grand act of charity in the form of war with the misgoverned 
Mexico, according to O’Sullivan and his ilk.  For O’Sullivan echoing Delano (or Delano 
echoing O’Sullivan), the “motto” becomes, “‘The Spaniards have ceased to rule in 
Mexico.’”  
 The war is not a matter of choice.  It exists through the acts of Mexico without 
any present prospect of peace.  The known obstinacy of the Spanish race, and the 
want of any respectable head to the Mexican government, indicates that the war 
can be ultimately terminated only by the seizure of all the large cities, including 
Mexico, occupying them by strong garrisons, and, while suppressing every 
species of Mexican military force, protecting the people from every kind of 
oppression, and, affording security to property, throwing the whole open to the 
free trade of all nations.132   
                                                 
131 “The War,” The United States Magazine and Democratic Review  20 (February 1847): 101   99-102. 
 
132 “The War,” 99-102.  
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 On grounds that an application of force will better serve the “prospect for peace,” the 
protection of “the people,” and the “security” of “property” and “free trade,” O’Sullivan 
and Delano both call for, in policy, an exercise of force that functions as “charity.”   
This application of force recalls the relation of power that Michel Foucault 
recognizes and attempts to analyze in his inversion of Karl von Clausewitz’s proposition.  
For Foucault, as for others like Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Paul Virilio, who 
essay on this very problem of power around the same time (1975-80), “politics is the 
continuation of war by other means.”133  Security and peace, that is, the general 
management of a kind of order, must be examined in a “relationship of force that was 
established in and through war.”134  Charity, in this instance, operates as a strategic 
exercise of force: Delano thinks to himself that “indulgent as he was at the first” with the 
stranded vessel and crew, “in judging the Spaniard” as an unfit commander, “he [Delano] 
might not, after all, have exercised charity enough” (41, my emphasis).  Delano’s 
“exercise of charity” functions as one strategy among many.   Charity, accompanied with 
other strategies of coercion, is deployed with varying intensities and intervenes in 
multiple strata—the individual, the crew of the ship, the tangential populations caught in 
the shifting and fluid oceanic geopolitical spaces. 
In the midst of one particular conversation with Benito Cereno, Delano is “struck 
by one of those instances of insubordination previously alluded to” (47).  The narrative 
describes the scene and Delano’s response as follows:  
                                                 
133 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76. David Macy, 
trans. (New York: Picador, 2003) 15.  See also Gilles Deleuze and Feliz Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987) and Paul Virilio, L’insécurité du 
territoire (Paris: Stock, 1975); Speed and Politics, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext[e]). 
 
134 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 15. 
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 Three black boys, with two Spanish boys, were sitting together on the hatches, 
scraping a rude wooden platter, in which some scanty mess had recently been 
cooked.  Suddenly, one of the black boys, enraged at a word dropped by on of his 
white companions, seized a knife, and though called to forbear by one of the 
oakum-pickers, struck the lad over the head, inflicting a gash from which blood 
flowed. (47) 
This act of black on white violence finds Delano in a state of “amazement.”  And he 
retorts, “Had such a thing happened on board the Bachelor’s Delight, instant punishment 
would have followed” (47).  Readers of Melville cannot forget here the allusion to White 
Jacket and the ways in which flogging operates as a central technique for order and 
command.  As a captain of his own ship,  Delano addresses “insubordination” with 
disciplinary and punishing force, and does so rather swiftly.  
While critics of “Benito Cereno” have often remarked that Delano occupies a 
“Yankee” position or perspective of the world (and of the Negro and Spaniard), I argue 
that his actions are constitutive of the same forces and relations of power that make 
slavery possible, a relation of power and politics that render the North-South, Yankee-
Dixie polarities inadequate for understanding the level of complicity that America as a 
whole had in maintaining the institution of slavery.135  For Delano, bodies become 
manageable and docile through the correct application of force, whether by charity or the 
whip. The practice of charity as a politics, policy, and even policing is not far removed 
                                                 
135 Though a number of critics have emphasized a reading of “Benito Cereno” based on the idea that 
Delano represents a kind of Yankee perspective, I want to trouble that reading here by noting the important 
conflations between Delano’s propensity to organize and manage (by what whatever means necessary) and 
the South’s increased militarization.  Another interesting fact supports this.  While Delano is indeed from 
Massachusetts, the text never at any point refers to him as Yankee.  In fact, the word Yankee, in my closest 
reading of the text, never appears.  Instead, Delano is constantly referred to as “the American,” a point 
critics should not take lightly. 
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 from forceful, violent, or military intervention.  Delano exercises on different levels what 
historian Herbert Aptheker describes in American Negro Slave Revolts as “the machinery 
of control” and militarism practiced by Southern slave-holders.   
Aptheker’s research presents the extent and ubiquity of militarism and martial law 
throughout the antebellum south, put in place for fear of slave insurrection and its 
consequences.  In one of many important anecdotal instances, he recalls that “a famous 
British scientist, visiting the south at the end of the eighteenth century”—the same 
moment in which Melville sets the story of “Benito Cereno”—observes how “all the 
white men” of the south “are all soldiers.”  Aptheker also notes how another gentleman 
by the name of Basil Hall, as he was passing through Virginia, was “struck by the 
‘military police . . . constantly kept up’ in Charleston.”136  Aptheker depicts the extent to 
which the south exemplifies a militarized zone and police state, and this becomes 
forcefully clear in his quotation from Governor Robert Y. Hayne of South Caroline: “A 
state of military preparation must always be with us a state of perfect domestic security.  
A period of profound peace and consequent apathy may expose us to the danger of 
domestic insurrection.”137  Melville’s “Benito Cereno” depicts Delano’s propensity for 
enforcing and maintaining order—“in armies, navies, cities, or families, in nature 
herself,” including the maintenance of property rights—as an extension and exercise of 
war and the machinery of control, modeled on a seemingly regional Southern problem.  
Under the watch of this “American” figure, however, this is a problem that is potentially 
dispersed and intensified throughout the globe. 
                                                 
136 Herbert Aptheker American Negro Slave Revolts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). 68-69. 
 
137 Governor Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina quoted by Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave 
Revolts (New York: International Publishers, 1943) 69. 
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  In his act of “charity,” Delano generously administers a lesson to Benito Cereno 
about how to manage a crew, how the administration of punishment and control should 
be carried out, and how order should be maintained aboard ship so as to suppress 
potential insubordination, insurrection, or mutiny (even though Delano doesn’t realize 
that this has actually already occurred here).  “‘I should think, Don Benito,’ he now said, 
glancing towards the oakum-picker who had sought to interfere with the boys, ‘that you 
would find it advantageous to keep all your blacks employed, especially the younger 
ones, no matter at what useless task, and no matter what happens to the ship’” (47).  In 
this moment, Delano is aware that the oakum-picker’s earlier intervention in the fight 
between the boys is another instance of what he thinks is displaced authority.  Authority 
should reside in the commander of the ship, not in other crew members and especially not 
in Negro slaves.  Describing then his own managerial technique as an example of proper 
authority, Delano states, “Why, even with my little band, I find such a course 
indispensable.  I once kept a crew on my quarterdeck thrumming mats for my cabin, 
when for three days, I had given up my ship—mats, men, and all—for a speedy loss, 
owing to the violence of the gale, in which we could do nothing but helplessly drive 
before it” (47-48).  This expenditure of the crew’s energy on these seemingly menial 
tasks like “thrumming mats” continually assures that potential and wayward energies are 
stifled and redirected into the vectors and trajectories that Delano has set.  For Delano, it 
is better that “ship—mats, men, and all” are destroyed than for the order of command to 
be displaced by a rebellious crew.  If order is the first principle, then, for Delano, proper 
management and regulation are an essential function of this principle.   
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 2.4. Literary Involutions and Historical Entanglements 
 
From the opening pages of the novella, Delano is confronted with events that 
seem out of joint.  What does he encounter?  A “strange sail” in a “lawless and lonely 
spot” off the coast of Chili; a hypochondriac for a captain; slaves running freely on the 
deck of the ship; whites with seemingly less authority than blacks, to name just a few 
instances in the disturbance of the natural order of things.  Disordered and inverted, the 
setting obliges him to correct, to manage, to re-order.  Indeed, the narrative stylistically 
presents these scenes in a manner that reflects Delano’s own disoriented perspective.  
“Benito Cereno” moves in and out of free indirect discourse; it confuses and conflates 
Delano’s point of view with the narrator’s; it offers hints but doesn’t necessarily or 
immediately reveal the narrative’s purpose or motivation.  The images and metaphorics 
of “shadows” and “troubled gray vapors” in which Delano initially finds the Spanish ship 
are present throughout the entire story, but these tropes give way to others which 
obfuscate and bewilder the scene as well.  That is, as much as the narrative shrouds the 
event in a “shadowy tableau,” the event itself constitutes a twisted entanglement or knot, 
a set of reversals, doublings, and folds.   
The full force of this entanglement reveals itself in the brief moment that Delano 
is confronted with the reality of the slave revolt, which until this point had been 
concealed by the slaves’ ability to stage a scenario that plays to Delano’s presuppositions 
regarding relations of power between master and slave, American and Spaniard, New 
World and Old.  (This is an invention that I address in the following chapter.)  Before the 
moment that “a flash of revelation,” the dropping of “scales . . . from his eyes,” and an 
“illuminating and unanticipated clearness” sweeps “across [his] long-benighted mind,” 
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 Captain Delano finds it nearly impossible, despite all his efforts, to organize in time and 
space the circumstances and “enigmatic event of the day” (85).  As if to punctuate its 
singular importance, the text offers a one-sentence paragraph that describes the moment 
of the dramatic reversal (peripeteia): “All this, with what preceded, and what followed, 
occurred with such involution of rapidity, that past, present, and future seemed one” (85).  
Initially, this sentence seems to present the problematic of narrating the chaos and tumult 
of this dramatic conflict—“all that preceded and what followed”—but there’s more to 
this sentence than the problematic of narrative structuring and sequence.   
To borrow Melville’s own term, the question becomes rather “involved”: How 
does one present the slave revolt aboard this Spanish ship?  The scene of disorder and 
mismanagement that Delano had initially encountered and set out to correct on the San 
Dominick gives way to a subtler problematic regarding historical time and order.  
Melville uses the term “involution” to describe the knotting or entanglement of the past 
with the present and even the future.  At this particular instant, the revelation of the slave 
revolt ruptures the chronometrical and manageable relations between events and time, 
between men and their arranged movement in space.  In other words, things and men (to 
recall Foucault’s terms) haven’t been what they seem for Delano.  This dramatic reversal 
(peripeteia) in the narrative reveals or “unmasks” the slave revolt as a previous and still-
occurring reversal in the relations of power between master and slave.  The narrative then 
shows these convoluted or, if I may, “involuted” relations as a temporal-historical 
problematic that exceeds Delano’s recognition—a term that takes on a dramatic and 
ironic sense of seeing and knowing here.  Despite his own attempts to detect, render 
intelligible, and therefore manage bodies in time and space—to align the operation of the 
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 “ship” with what he understands to be the “good order” and progress of history and 
“nature herself”—Delano’s mind cannot recognize (as anagnorisis) the full historical 
weight of this moment.  Melville uses dramatic conventions like anagnorisis, peripeteia, 
and hubris to stage an unconventional disruption of order and power, a disruption that 
does not eventually lead to order through the resolution of the conflict as Aristotle and 
others had long understood the relations between tragedy and life, conflict and order in 
the cosmos.  I give closer attention to the questions of conflict and tragedy in the 
following chapter where I show the stakes of Melville’s “Benito Cereno” in relation to 
Frederick Douglass’ “The Heroic Slave,” a narrative about the slave insurrection aboard 
The Creole.  In the remainder of this chapter, I want to address how Delano’s propensity 
to regulate and bring order actually dramatizes his inability to recognize, in the fullest 
sense of the term, the scene of misery as an historical problematic that is attendant with 
the very forces Delano champions despite his beneficence. 
The temporality that Delano experiences in this moment recalls other figurations 
of historical involution and entanglement that are central to Melville’s story.  In the 
opening scene of the novella, for instance, one is given a brief and cryptic description of 
the slave ship’s figure-head, motto, and name:  
Whether the ship had a figure-head, or only a plain beak, was not quite certain, 
owing to a canvas wrapped about that part, either to protect it while undergoing a 
re-furbishing, or else decently to hide its decay.  Rudely painted or chalked, as in 
a sailor freak, along the forward side of a sort of pedestal below the canvas, was 
the sentence, “Siguid vuestro jefe,” (follow your leader); while upon the tarnished 
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 bead-boards, near by, appeared, in stately capitals, once gilt, the ship’s name, 
“San Dominick.” (37)  
These figures recur again at this moment of “revelation,” when Captain Delano sees “the 
negroes, not in misrule, not in tumult, not as if frantically concerned for Don Benito, but 
with mask torn away, flourishing hatchets and knives, in ferocious piratical revolt” (85).   
In this “unmasking,” Delano further witnesses what lies under the canvas that enwraps 
the figure-head of the ship:  
“But by this time the cable of the San Dominick had been cut; and the fag-end, in 
lashing out, whipped away the canvas shroud about the beak, suddenly revealing, 
as the bleached hull swung round towards the open ocean, death for the figure-
head, in a human skeleton; chalky comment on the chalked words below, “Follow 
your leader” (86). 
 Don Benito, “covering his face,” cries out, saying that the “human skeleton” is Don 
Alexandro Aranda, his “murdered, unburied friend” and master of the San Dominick’s 
live “cargo.”   
The narrative later reveals in the “deposition of Benito Cereno” that Aranda’s 
murder had been used as exemplum: While “pointing to the prow,” Babo had instructed 
Benito Cereno to “keep faith with the blacks from here to Senegal” or, as he further 
shows, “you shall in spirit, as now in body, follow your leader” (93).  This exemplum, 
though, is significant on two different registers.  In one sense, it serves as the terrifying 
example for what will happen to the other Spaniards if they resist or “attempt to frustrate” 
the insurrectionary plot.  And in the second, more important sense, it recalls the historical 
problematic of the event itself.  To wit, the ship’s “proper figure-head,” the story reveals, 
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 is “the image of Christopher Colon, the discoverer of the New World” (93).  And as all 
these images, signs, and figures (the island of San Dominick, Columbus, and Aranda—all 
figures of the New World and its institutions) are superimposed on one another as 
palimpsest, layers, and enfolded in canvas, the enfolding becomes not only a historical 
problematic but a problematic of power as well.  Here the phrase “follow your leader” 
recalls a kind of trajectory (or lines of force) emergent with the triangulated flow of 
commodities and human labor among Africa, Europe, and the Americas over the 
Atlantic—further intensifying geographically and morphing geometrically to include the 
“Pacific region.”138  Babo’s command to “follow your leader,” moreover, obliges one to 
trace out a genealogy of these lines of force.  Residue of the slaves’ revolt against their 
master, the murdered and cannibalized chalky bones of Aranda, superimposed on the 
figure of Columbus, quite literally reveal the catastrophe of this history and how this 
catastrophe is a function of the forces of domination spread around several different 
continents and over oceans.  In this difficult passage regarding history as involution, what 
“Benito Cereno” can help us understand is how these lines of force bend and fold back 
onto themselves, how this bending and folding (forming a complex and convoluted 
                                                 
138 As David Brion Davis’s now well-noted research recalls, “It was thus the discoverer of America who 
initiated the transatlantic slave trade, which moved originally from west to east,” and which has been 
financed for the already-established slave trade between Africa and Lisbon by 1477(8).  See David Brion 
Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).  I take the 
term “Pacific region” from John Eperjesi’s treatment of this category as it emerges with certain formations 
of power and U.S. empire in the nineteenth century.  For a further theorization of “Pacific region” 
discourse, see John Eperjesi’s The Imperialist Imaginary: Visions of Asia and the Pacific in American 
Culture. (Hanover, Dartmouth College Press, 2005). 
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 entanglement) occurs at the site of a particular form of conflict, for which the Negro slave 
and slave insurrection serve as important examples.139    
Indeed, while “Benito Cereno” occasions such an examination of these 
entanglements and knots, Melville’s story suggests rather strongly that the American 
mind, characterized here by Delano, cannot or will not recognize how the atrocities of the 
past are interlaced with the present.  Though committed to charting spaces, opening up 
lines of commerce in strange waters and territories, and generally creating a more 
totalizing perspective or vision of the world (in what I have described below as global 
purview), he ironically cannot see the historical implications of the forces in which he 
and the others are entangled.   
The figure of the knot recurs throughout the novella, and in an important scene 
that literally provokes the question of knotting and entanglement, Delano encounters 
aboard the San Dominick an “aged sailer” whose hands are “full of ropes, which he [is] 
working into a large knot” (63). 
Captain Delano crossed over to him, and stood in silence surveying the knot; his 
mind, by a not uncongenial transition, passing from its own entanglements to 
those of the hemp.  For intricacy such a knot he had never seen in an American 
ship, or indeed any other.  The old man looked like an Egyptian priest, making 
Gordian knots for the temple of Ammon.  The knot seemed a combination of 
double-bowline-knot, treble-crown-knot, back-handed-well-knot, knot-in-and-out-
knot, and jamming-knot. (63). 
                                                 
139 While my intention is to follow through with my examination of Delano here, in the following chapter I 
address and theorize the stakes of this conflict.  See “Terror and the Negro: A Meditation on Asymmetric 
Force and Slave Insurrection.” 
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 Stylistically, this passage presents a kind of knotting itself, an intertwining between 
Delano’s mind and perspective (as free-indirect discourse) and the third-person 
narrative’s description of Delano’s mind, but even in this intertwining, the narrative is 
able to show again through dramatic irony how Delano operates as the figure of the 
alazon.140  All along suspecting that something is “peculiar” about the situation before 
him, Delano finds it impossible that the Spaniards, let alone the Negro slaves, are capable 
of a secret cabal against Delano and his crew.  Referring to the slaves, Delano thinks, 
“But they were too stupid. Besides, who ever heard of a white so far a renegade as to 
apostatize from his very species almost by leaguing in against it with negroes?” (63).  
The narrative, moving out of free indirect discourse, comments on how this dilemma 
further confuses Delano and leaves his mind “lost in the mazes” (63).  What Delano is 
ignorant of, of course, is that the slave insurrection is underway, that Babo—lowliest in 
the great chain of being, “a black man’s slave” (50)—plays the eiron to Delano’s alazon 
and is, as well, the principal creator and organizer of the revolt.  
As the singular knot and the confusion of the event get the better of him, Delano 
addresses the “aged sailer” in order “to comprehend the meaning of such a knot” and 
asks, “What are you knotting there, my man?”  To this, the sailer replies, “The knot.”  
                                                 
140 Less than careful readings of “Benito Cereno”, usually those which frame the narrative within 
unproblematized conventions of tragedy, have led critics to form an identification with Delano’s 
perspective and charitable actions.  Read within the categories of good and evil, hero and villain, this 
conventional or naïve reading of tragedy marks a failure to understand how identification and perspective 
become central problems for Melville in this narrative.  See, for instance, F.O. Matthiessen, American 
Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (London: Oxford University Press, 
1941).  There are few references to “Benito Cereno” in American Renaissance, and when Matthiessen 
actually addresses it, he frames his critique around the topic of “tragedy.” I further address this in the final 
section of this chapter.  Similar readings have followed in Matthiessen’s trajectory.  For example, see 
Stanley T. Williams, “‘Follow Your Leader’: Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” Virginia Quarterly Review, 23 
(1947), 61-76; Rosalie Feltenstein, “Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” American Literature, 19 (1947), 245-55; 
Richard Harter Fogle, “The Monk and the Bachelor: Melville’s Benito Cereno,” Tulane Studies in English, 
3 (1952), 155-78; Eleanor Simpson, “Melville and the Negro: From Typee to ‘Benito Cereno,’” American 
Literature, 41 (March 1969). 
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 Then asking what this knot is for, Delano is told that it is “for some one else to undo” 
(63).  “While Captain Delano stood watching him, suddenly the old man threw the knot 
towards him, saying in broken English . . .  ‘Undo it, cut it, quick’” (63).  Because the 
passage above slips in and out of free indirect discourse, it remains unclear here whether 
it is Delano’s mind or the novella itself that makes the allusion to the Gordian knot and 
the act by which the knot is solved.  The Gordian knot, we know, derives from the 
problem set forth by the oracle’s decree to the Phrygians.  During a period of 
interregnum, the oracle decrees that the next man to enter the city driving an oxcart shall 
be the new ruler.  It happens that the first to do so is a poor peasant by the name of 
Gordias, from which the city’s name Gordium, capital of Phrygia, derives.  As a gesture 
of gratitude, Gordias offers his oxcart to Zeus by tying the cart to a post with an intricate 
knot.  By oracle declaration, the one to untie the knot is to be the king of Asia.  The 
problem established by the oracle is the knot as cipher—and as the legend goes, the 
cipher/knot is “consequently laid up in the Acropolis of Gordium,” guarded then for 
centuries by the priests of Zeus until Alexander the Great in his conquest through Asia 
Minor arrives in 333 B.C.141  Unable to find a legitimate means for deciphering or 
untying the intricate knot, he produces an answer to the problem by an act of sheer force, 
in effect, cutting the knot with his sword.   
 As this problem of the cipher is placed before Delano, his inability and then 
refusal to solve it poses an interesting question: why not “cut it” as did Alexander?  
Delano’s response to the problem, instead, is to ignore it: “For a moment, knot in hand, 
                                                 
141 Robert Graves, The Greek Myths. (New York: Penguin, 1992) 282. 
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 and knot in head, Captain Delano stood mute.”  Near Delano stands an “elderly negro,” 
who begs the knot, “for of course, [Delano] would not care to be troubled with it” (64).  
Unconsciously, it was handed to [the negro].  With a sort of congé, the negro 
received it, and turning his back, ferreted into it like a detective Custom House 
officer after smuggled laces.  Soon with some African word, equivalent to pshew, 
he tossed the knot overboard. (64) 
This act of tossing the knot into the sea by the African bears some remarks, particularly 
in contrast to Delano’s response of ignoring it, which is still the principal concern of my 
critique here.  These remarks follow soon.  The narrative continues: “All this is very 
queer now, thought Captain Delano, with a qualmish sort of emotion; but as one feeling 
incipient sea-sickness, he strove by, ignoring the symptoms, to get rid of the malady” 
(64).  As “Benito Cereno” makes clear throughout, and here in particular, as Delano 
“ignores the symptoms” of the “malady,” he must then simultaneously re-frame this 
encounter with the problem/cipher/knot.   As is often the case throughout the story, 
Delano frames his encounter with the strange or singular by invoking or returning to the 
category of “delight.”  After failing to grapple with the knot, he quite literally turns away 
from it: “Once more he looked off for his boat.  To his delight, it was now again in view, 
leaving the rocky spur astern” (64 My emphasis).    
Still the question remains, why not cut the knot?  To cut the knot would require 
not merely an act of force, as Delano is certainly capable of exercising, but one of 
historical memory and recognition as well, a memorable repetition of the Alexandrian 
founding of empire.  If the American is one who continually looks to the future, he is also 
one who sacrifices old mythologies for the new, positing that the historical is merely, as 
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 Delano claims, “the past” (101).  Holding a strong resemblance to the figure of Delano, 
Emerson had understood memory as merely “imitation” which, for him, led to 
“suicide.”142  “But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about 
this corpse of your memory?” he had asked.143  The significant force of Delano’s actions 
here isn’t in the possibility of actually cutting the knot; instead, the American can 
demonstrate by a brute force perhaps even greater than Alexander’s that he is capable of 
ignoring or forgetting the problem of the cipher altogether, indeed, must forget or else 
risk seizing the future.  I’ll explain further. 
While U.S. institutions, both civil and military, devote resources to history and 
memory, Melville’s novella suggests that this form of memory usually serves the 
interests of U.S. purview and empire.  One need only examine a long list of archives and 
texts on military history to see how U.S. state memory helps produce further doctrine that 
enables the continuation of American power.  An example of this can be found in The 
New American State Papers.  While each volume collects and archives manuscripts that 
help document particular lines of American intervention at the levels of policy, 
bureaucracy, and strategy, volume 4 takes up the question of combat, notably guerrilla.  It 
thereby links, through the archive, the military’s nineteenth-century combat, “such as the 
three fought with the Seminoles, and [other] violent threats to domestic tranquility,” with 
the post-Vietnam anxiety over insurgency tactics and guerrilla warfare.144  The state’s 
past failures and successes become synthesized into a matrix of information and 
                                                 
142 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance” [originally published in Essays (1841)] Ralph Waldo Emerson: 
Essays & Lectures. Joel Porte, ed.  (New York: Library of America, 1983).  259, 255-282.  
 
143 “Self Reliance, 265. 
 
144 The New American State Papers: Military Affairs, Volume 4: Combat Operations, ed. Benjamin 
Franklin Cooling (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1979), ix.  
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 knowledge for future successes.  Though Melville constructs Delano as ignoramus, his 
ignorance and incapability is not in his capacities as sea-farer or manager.  Indeed, the 
text is quite clear about this.  Delano operates from an order of knowledge (and a 
particular order of memory) that allows him aptly to engage in purview, to manage his 
crew, to enforce “property” rights rather effectively.  His ignorance, “Benito Cereno” 
ironically suggests, is in the refusal to bear the disastrous and catastrophic effects of his 
own success in the areas of management and enforcement.  To look upon “delight” is to 
refuse the entanglement of his own exercise of power with the brutality and catastrophe 
of that history.  With the figure of the knot held before him, Delano must willfully turn 
away or risk the success, efficiency, and continuation of American power—risk 
“suicide,” recalling Emerson’s term.  The future and delight to which Delano looks 
forward cannot be risked by turning to history’s disastrous past.  
Melville’s anti-cathartic narrative offers a less celebratory future than many of his 
contemporaries had imagined.  The future will remain entangled and knotted in the 
historicality and configuration of forces that Delano helps perpetuate but ignores (as in 
agnoia).  As the Negro throws the knot into the sea, the knot remains forever entangled 
and the past continues to fold into and haunt the present: Christopher Columbus, the first 
to initiate the transatlantic slave trade; Don Alexendro Aranda, the figure of the slave 
owner; San Dominick, an allusion to both the Dominican missionary oppression of the 
indigenous in the New World and the name of the island that gives way to revolt by 
Negro slaves at the pinnacle of the eighteenth-century revolutions.   
Reminiscent of Ishmael’s attempt to essay a sequential story of events, Delano as 
well believes in the chronological and metricized organization of time and history.  After 
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 encountering the terror of the slave insurrection, Delano again resorts to mythos, or to 
what Deleuze recalls as the temporality of “Chronos,” in order to regulate or “encase” the 
event and reestablish a new present that is disconnected from the horrors of the past.145  
After the slave revolt has been discovered and then quelled by Delano’s men, Delano 
states to Benito Cereno, who is still contemplating the real possibility that he as well as 
Delano could have been murdered in the plot, “You generalize, Don Benito; and 
mournfully enough.  But the past is passed; why moralize upon it?  Forget it” (101).  
This moment in the narrative recalls a similar instance of American thought characterized 
in Melville’s earlier 1849 novel, White-Jacket: 
The world has arrived at a period which renders it the part of Wisdom to pay 
homage to the prospective precedents of the Future in preference to those of the 
Past.  The Past is dead, and has no resurrection; but the Future is, in all things, 
our friend. . . . Those who are solely governed by the Past stand like Lot’s wife, 
crystallized in the act of looking backward, and forever incapable of looking 
before.  Let us leave the Past, then, to dictate laws to immovable China.146 
                                                 
145 In a further theorization of metric time, Gille Deleuze also focuses on the figure of Chronos:  “In 
accordance to Chronos, only the present exists in time.  Past, present and future are not three dimensions of 
time; only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to the present in time.  
In other words, whatever is future or past in relation to a certain present (a certain extension or duration) 
belongs to a more vast present which has a greater extension or duration.  There is always a more vast 
present which absorbs the past and the future. . . . Chronos is an encasement . . .” Quoted by Manuel 
DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002) 88.  DeLanda’s recent 
work has begun to take up questions of time and management that had emerged in the connections between 
capital and military practices.  See my earlier discussion of this the first section of this chapter.  See also 
Manuel DeLanda, “Beyond the Problematic of Legitimacy: Military Influences on Civilian Society,” 
boundary 2 32:1 (2005): 117-128.   
 
146 Herman Melville, White-Jacket or The World in a Man-of-War [1849] (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 152.  My emphasis.  A number of critics have read this moment in Melville’s text as a 
reflection of Melville’s own attitudes about American progress and its imperial ambitions.  A recent 
example of this reading is Andrew Delbanco’s biography, Melville: His World and Work (New York: 
Knopf, 2005).  As a matter of careful reading of Melville, I have a number of problems with Delbanco’s 
larger narrative, the first of which is that Delbanco doesn’t always account for the degrees of mediation and 
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 In both White-Jacket and “Benito Cereno” we find characterizations of American minds 
committed to forgetting, to separating the present from the presumably “dead” past.  
Delano can declare with full confidence that the “past is passed.”  What these works 
further reveal is the American’s strategic vision of the world, a belief in the doctrine of 
futurity.147  According to the doctrine, to look back upon these catastrophes, as does 
Lot’s wife, is in essence to be “crystallized,” caught in a state of arrest or stasis.  We have 
to remember that in the West, starting principally with Plato’s Republic, stasis has been 
understood in terms of disease or even “death.”148  Stasis takes on further significance in 
an American context as well, where it runs contrary to a general doxa that praises 
movement as a form of freedom, as the ostensible fruition of American democratic 
principles.  More than principles, though, the U.S.’s commitment to movement (qua 
                                                                                                                                                 
irony that Melville had wittingly invented in his prose fiction, including those moments where he stages 
particular habits of American thought.  
 
147 Michel de Certeau makes important observations on strategic concepts of time.  In a discussion on 
Delano and global purview, de Certeau’s understanding of strategy makes Melville’s text all the more 
illuminating: “The ‘proper’ is the triumph of place over time. It allows one to capitalize acquired 
advantages, to prepare future expansions, and thus to give oneself a certain independence with respect to 
the variability of circumstances.”  De Certeau would also link “strategy” to “management” as well as to 
“Cartesian attitude” and to the “attitude of modern science, politics, and military strategy.”  Michel de 
Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1984), 36.   
 
 
148 With the advent of what I call global purview and with it an arrangement of power that organizes the 
world as an interiorized schematic, an administrative domain, I use the term stasis in order to help theorize 
forms of conflict that emerge in the nineteenth century.  While stasis is a term derivative of Greek political 
philosophy of the polis, and has traditionally signified a form of conflict that is internal to and encompasses 
the entire polis, it’s this sense of internal or interiorized conflict that I suggest might help one theorize the 
relations of power and exercises of force and conflict that emerges in the nineteenth century under global 
purview.  In the opening chapter of this dissertation, I explain further my use of the term stasis, offering a 
brief account of its role in political theory in Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, and then Hobbes, to whom 
Thucydides is extremely important.  As does Michel Foucault, Paul Virilio theorizes the emergence of an 
arrangement or “relationship of force that was established in and through war” whereby the control or 
domination of “movement” is central to this relationship or arrangement.  Citing Colonel Delair, Paul 
Virilio reminds us in Speed and Politics that stasis is often conceptualized as a kind of “death” to the 
machinery and movement or transformation of fortification: “The art of defense must constantly be in 
transformation; it is not exempt from the general law of this world: stasis is death.” See Paul Virilio, Speed 
and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext[e], 1977) 13.  
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 progress and futurity) has historically been expressed as doctrine.149  And these beliefs 
and articulations of doctrine re-emerge here in the figure of Delano, as they do in White 
Jacket, showing the fidelity of this American mind to an arrangement of forces that can 
“dictate laws” and move the “immovable China,” opening markets and releasing the 
floodgates of commodity flows.  But in this doxa, Melville discovers paradox.  In the 
next two chapters, I’ll elaborate on the topic of stasis, arguing that Melville’s works 
suggest that in the U.S.’s commitment and celebration to movement, stasis and 
entanglement become the condition par excellence.  
For Melville, this act of forgetting is not the same as disentangling.  His concept 
of history is that there is no disentanglement, no past that isn’t an involution with the 
present and future.  To understand “Benito Cereno” in this way is also to understand that 
Melville’s work stands as one of the earliest and sharpest critiques of this American 
ahistorical thought, and considering our current twenty-first century moment, it’s a 
critique that continually needs to be redeployed, even in the face of such brutal forces that 
work against it and relegate it to the silence of “the past.” 
With satirical allusions to exemplary “American” figures such as Ralph Emerson 
and Daniel Webster,  Captain Delano reads “nature” as a sign of the present’s return to 
order and new beginnings: “But the past is passed; why moralize upon it?  Forget it.  See, 
yon bright sun has forgotten it all, and the blue sea, and the blue sky; these have turned 
                                                 
149 I am thinking specifically of the Monroe Doctrine of 1832 that has been re-articulated and re-interpreted 
under U.S. imperial ambitions, particularly during the mid-nineteenth century contestations with other state 
powers over Mexico and western territories like Oregon and California.  See again Richard W. Van 
Alstyne’s The Rising American Empire (New York: Norton, 1974) [originally published by Blackwell, 
1960], particularly pages 98-99.  The reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine throughout the nineteenth-
century requires a longer discussion and theorization than I can offer here on how doctrine articulates a 
“fencing in” of the Western hemisphere but how, in practice, this “fence” operates as means for American 
power to have greater access and movement within and without an increasing and extensive sphere of 
influence.   
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 over new leaves.”150  For the Spanish captain, however, this is not the case.  To Delano’s 
statements, Benito Cereno retorts, “Because they have no memory” (101).  By re-
encasing the slave revolt within a past that is disconnected from the present, Delano’s 
sense of history further secures an imagined future, one that is literally cut off from the 
present knot or involution that even Benito Cereno seems to recognize in this scene.   
The allusion further encompasses John O’Sullivan’s doxology to America as the 
instantiation of a particular order of historical time, the achievement of which is always 
the future.  Delano seems, in fact, to be taking a page from O’Sullivan’s essay “The Great 
Nation of Futurity,” published in the Democratic Review in 1839:151   
The American people having derived their origin from many other nations, and 
the Declaration of National Independence being entirely based on the great 
principle of human equality, these facts demonstrate at once our disconnected 
position as regards an other nation; that we have, in reality, but little connection 
with the past history of any of them, and still less with all antiquity, its glories, or 
its crimes.  On the contrary, our national birth was the beginning of a new history, 
the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from 
the past and connects us with the future only; and so far as regards the entire 
development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we 
                                                 
150 “Benito Cereno,” 101. See Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Nature” as well as Daniel Webster’s statements 
after the Compromise of 1850, particularly his remark, “A long and violent convulsion of the elements has 
just passed away, and the heavens, the skies, smile upon us.”  Making note of this connection, see Eric 
Sundquist’s “Slavery, Revolution, and the American Renaissance,” in The American Renaissance 
Reconsidered, Walter Benn Michaels and Donald E. Pease, editors (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985) 1-33. 
 
151 The continuation of this thought is present in a number of projects, most notably in Richard Rorty’s 
Achieving our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1998), which offers a rather uncritical homage to an Emersonian perspective of America in the world 
from Whitman through Dewey. 
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 may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of 
futurity.”152 
It’s fruitful to recognize how Walt Whitman’s poetry in 1855 formulates similar 
beliefs and celebrates this vision of America and its role in the world and history.  
Looking to “the fiery fields emanative, and the endless vistas beyond—to the south and 
the north,”153 Whitman’s vision of America offers a point of view congruent with 
O’Sullivan’s concept of Manifest Destiny and Delano’s practices of global purview.  In 
the same year that Melville publishes “Benito Cereno,” the first edition of Leaves of 
Grass celebrates America as a “new order.”154  And he announces, “the United States 
themselves are the greatest poem” (5).  A “great poem,” he continues, “is no finish . . . 
but rather a beginning;” it extends for “ages and ages” (24).  Whitman couples this 
endless and futural temporality of the nation with a commensurate visionary, the poet, 
whose “expression” and “vista” of America “is transcendent and new” (8).  The poet 
“sees eternity.”  “High up out of reach he stands,” Whitman exclaims, “turning a 
concentrated light . . . he turns the pivot with his finger . . . he baffles the swiftest runners 
as he stands and easily overtakes and envelops them.”155  Such speed and movement (and 
violence, too) Whitman celebrates in his poetic vision of America!   
                                                 
152 “The Great Nation of Futurity” from The United States Magazine and Democratic Review 23 
(November, 1839) 426.  My emphasis. 
 
153 Walt Whitman, “To the Leaven’d Soil They Trod,” Leaves of Grass.   Of course, there are a number of 
examples from Whitman’s poetry that sing the praises of a national futurity. 
 
154 Walt Whitman, “Preface,” Leaves of Grass [1855], Walt Whitman: Complete Poetry and Collected 
Prose (New York: Library of America, 1982), 25. 
 
155 Whitman, 9. Whitman’s ellipses. 
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 Whitman’s celebratory expression of America as the manifestation of a new 
energy and movement, of limitless vision and speed—vision that “easily overtakes and 
envelops”—stands in stark contrast to Herman Melville’s heretical account of America in 
the nineteenth-century global arrangement.  If the publication of Leaves of Grass in July 
of 1855 instantiated a summery156 belief and celebration of America’s new beginning and 
future possibilities, then by contrast Melville’s story published in the autumn of this same 
year marked a growing incredulity in what the founders called “the new order of the 
ages.”157  Whitman, who asked, “. . . and is liberty gone out of this place?” could answer 
emphatically and confidently his own question about America with “No never”—that 
liberty was not gone.158  If Melville’s “Benito Cereno” is a response to Whitman’s same 
question, and I think on some level it is, than the story articulates a deep-seated 
skepticism toward the discourse of “liberty” and “freedom” produced within an 
arrangement of forces that continues to engineer new modes of regulating movement, of 
managing human potentialities, intelligence, and invention, of holding and securing 
certain peoples in bondage and destroying others.  Unlike Delano and others of like 
mindedness, Melville had exhibited in “Benito Cereno” an intelligence committed to 
studying this destruction, knowing its contingencies, trajectories, and morphologies.  
“Benito Cereno” had drawn on the residue and dust of the catastrophic past—its 
                                                 
156 The memorable second stanza of the 1855 edition of Leaves immediately affiliates this seasonal 
impression with American poetic expression: “I loafe and invite my soul, / I lean and loafe at my ease .  .  .  
. observing a spear of summer grass.” Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass [1855], Walt Whitman: Complete 
Poetry and Collected Prose (New York: Library of America, 1982), 27. 
 
157 The “new order of the ages” is the English translation of the motto Novus Ordo Seclorum introduced by 
Charles Thomson, Secretary of Congress, in the making of the Great Seals of the United States in 1782.  
 
158 Whitman, “Preface,” 17. 
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 documents, narratives, archives, etc.—and invented (by an act of discovery and making) 
a story that told again how these catastrophes entwined with the present.   
*              *               * 
In the following chapter, I address further Melville’s skepticism in relation to his 
contemporary Frederick Douglass who, with some similarities to other contemporaries of 
his, conceptualizes conflict and revolt within a framework of beliefs that posits the 
redemptive and futural possibilities of American power, the possibilities of liberation and 
emancipation as the fullest articulation of American power.   In Melville’s “Benito 
Cereno” and Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave,” both narratives about slave revolts aboard 
ship, each focuses on the clever strategies of Negro slave leaders, the designers of the 
rebellious plots.  In a comparative critique of these two narratives, I’m examine how 
Douglass and Melville characterize these slave rebellions as violent struggle or conflict, 
and more specifically how these narratives depict the actions, tactics, and rhetorical 
powers exercised by the Negro slave leaders within these conflicts.  These strategies, I 
suggest, demonstrate important differences between how Melville and Douglass 
understand the forces of their mid-nineteenth century moment.  I make use of the 
categories cunning intelligence (mêtis) and invention (inventio) in order to explain how I 
think Melville understands or conceptualizes both the type of conflict (or arrangement of 
force) in which the slaves are entangled and the types of strategies or tactics they exercise 
while in this conflict.  Referring to work by Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant on 
ancient and classical figures of cunning intelligence, I argue that Melville’s Babo is a 
figure who exhibits a subtlety of mind, a “suppleness and malleability” that invents 
(discovers and makes) strategies for “success” in an arrangement of asymmetric forces or 
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 “domains where there are no ready-made rules for success, no established methods,”159 
and where success, I further argue, is fleeting and impermanent, where there is no 
enduring emancipation or “way out.”  These conditions form, in the fullest sense of the 
word, an aporia.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Sussex: 
Harvester Press, 1978) 21. 
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3. TERROR AND THE NEGRO: A MEDITATION ON ASYMMETRIC 
FORCE AND FUGITIVE SLAVE CONFLICT 
 
3.1. Conflict, Aesthetics, and Theories of American Power 
 
Two years before the publication of “Benito Cereno” in Putnam’s Monthly 
(1855), Herman Melville’s contemporary Frederick Douglass included his only work of 
prose fiction in Autographs of Freedom, a volume of abolitionist writings collected with 
the efforts of The Rochester Ladies’ Anti-Slavery Society and edited by Julia Griffiths.160  
Based on an actual set of historical events, Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave” (1853) depicts 
Madison Washington’s initial escape from slavery in the United States to the freedom of 
Canada, his return to Virginia to free his wife, and finally his successful participation and 
leadership in the insurrection aboard the Creole, a coastal slave ship bound from 
Richmond to New Orleans in 1841, which Washington and other slaves commandeer and 
pilot to the liberty afforded by British Nassau where slavery had been abolished several 
years earlier.161 
                                                 
160 Fredrick Douglass, “The Heroic Slave” in Autographs for Freedom, ed. Julia Griffiths (Cleveland: John 
P. Jewett & Company, 1853) 174-239.  Hereafter, I cite this text by page number.  Douglass had previously 
serialized this work beginning in the March 11th issue of Frederick Douglass’ Paper.   
 
161 British slavery legally ended in August 1834; except for Antigua and Bermuda, however, most of the 
British colonies were under an apprenticeship system that lasted until August 1838.  See Frederick 
Douglass, “A Day, A Deed, An Event, Glorious in the Annals of Philanthropy: An Address Delivered in 
Rochester, New York, on 1 August 1848,” The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One: Speeches, Debates, 
and Interviews, Volume 2: 1847-54 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982) 134, note 2. 
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 While other contemporaries such as William Wells Brown and Lydia Marie Child 
were familiar with and even used the “The Heroic Slave” as a source for their own 
writings,162 only recently have critics examined Douglass’s work broadly, and “The 
Heroic Slave” specifically, in relation to Melville’s.163  To date, Robert K. Wallace has 
made the most recent effort to find connections between these two nineteenth-century 
intellectuals.164  Extending the work of Maggie Montesinos Sale, he cites Melville’s use 
of the phrase “slumbering volcano” from the opening of “Benito Cereno” as a possible 
echo of, if not an actual “inspiration” that derived from, Douglass’s use of the trope in an 
1849 speech of the same title.165  Recalling (with audience “applause”) the actions of 
Madison Washington and the Creole rebellion, Douglass’s speech had further critiqued 
the practices and intentions of the American Colonization Society and warned of the 
                                                 
162 Ivy Wilson’s recent essay on “The Heroic Slave” makes note of this.  See Ivy G. Wilson, “On Native 
Ground: Transnationalism, Frederick Douglass, and ‘The Heroic Slave,’” PMLA 121:2 (2006): 453-468.  
Wilson notes (see number 7) Brown’s The Black Man (1863) and The Negro in the American Rebellion 
(1867) as well as Child’s chapter on Madison Washington in The Freedman’s Book (1865). 
 
163 An MLA bibliography search shows that four works of criticism have offered some degree of 
comparative study of Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave” and Melville’s “Benito Cereno.” See Helen Lock, 
“The Paradox of Slave Mutiny in Herman Melville, Charles Johnson, and Frederick Douglass, College 
Literature 30:4 (2003):54-70; Ivy Glenn Wilson, “ ‘I Give the Sign Democracy’: Race, Labor, and the 
Aesthetics of Nationalism,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2002); Maggie Montesinos Sale, The 
Slumbering Volcano: American Slave Ship Revolts and the Production of Rebellious Masculinity 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Krista Lynn Walter, “Loopholes in History: The Literature of 
American Slavery as Cultural Critique” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 1992).  I think 
it important to add to this list Eric Sundquist’s first two chapters of To Wake the Nations: Race in the 
Making of American Literature (Cambridge: The Balknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993).  Also 
Wallace’s Douglass and Melville, cited above, marks the biographical as well as artistic intersections.  
With the exception of Lock and Wallace, none of these critical works examines Melville’s and Douglass’s 
prose fiction within the same chapter or essay, and none specifically engages the question of conflict in 
ways that I am elaborating here.  
 
164 Robert K. Wallace, Douglass and Melville: Anchored Together in Neighborly Style (New Bedford: 
Spinner Publications, 2005).   
 
165 Wallace argues that Sale’s “interpretation locates Melville’s authorial sympathies closer to the 
complacent white mentality of Captain Delano than to the trenchant anti-slavery action of Babo, so she 
would not be likely to imagine Douglass’s speech as part of the inspiration for Melville’s story” (110). See 
also Maggie Montesinos Sale, The Slumbering Volcano: American Slave Ship Revolts and the Production 
of Rebellious Masculinity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).       
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 destructive forces that enslaved “coloured people” would discharge on their masters “in 
the Southern States.”166  This speech had effectively connected Washington’s rebellion 
with the figure of volcanic force, both the kinetic and potential energies of slave 
resistance.  In Melville’s “Benito Cereno,” the American Captain Amasa Delano invokes 
the “slumbering volcano” phrase in his initial sighting of the Spanish slaver San 
Dominick.  Before he boards and begins to investigate the cause of the ship’s demise, 
Delano surmises that “Maley pirates” may be laying in wait to attack or, “like a 
slumbering volcano, suddenly let loose energies now hid.”167  Later in the narrative, 
Delano will discover that these energies, unbeknownst to him earlier, had already erupted 
in the form of a slave revolt.    
Referring to “Melville’s spatial and intellectual proximity to Douglass at the time 
of the ‘Slumbering Volcano’ speech,” Wallace claims that “Melville’s use of the 
‘slumbering volcano’ phrase is more likely to be a conscious tribute to Douglass.”168  
This may or may not be true.  The phrase, in fact, had circulated in a number of sources 
around the time of and prior to both Douglass’s use of it in 1849 and Melville’s in 
                                                 
166 Frederick Douglass, “Slavery: The Slumbering Volcano: An Address Delivered in New York, New 
York, on 23 April 1849,” The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One: Speeches, Debates, and Interviews, 
Volume 2: 1847-54 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982) 148-167.   The speech was 
later published by National Anti-Slavery Standard, 3 May 1849; Pennsylvania Freeman, 10 May 1849; 
Liberator, 11 May 1849; North Star, 11 May 1849; Foner, Life and Writings, 5:111-19.  
 
167 “Benito Cereno,” 56 (my emphasis).   The greater irony that this passage reveals, as does Melville’s 
story generally, is Delano’s misrecognition of the scene before him and specifically the energies and 
capacities of intelligence exhibited by the Negro slave.  Thinking the Spanish ship may actually be pirates 
feigning distress in order to attract the assistance of Delano and his crew, the American captain cannot 
conceptualize these potential energies as a slave revolt already underway.  To complicate this scene further, 
we should remember as well that Delano’s modes of thought and categories—possibly including the use of 
“slumbering volcano” phrase here—are usually suspect in Melville’s characterization of the American. 
 
168 Wallace, 111. 
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 1855.169  One of these sources, for instance, had specifically reflected on the political 
climate and revolutionary tectonics in France: “It may be, as some alarmists suppose, that 
France is not yet sickened of revolutions, and is even now a slumbering volcano.”170   
Melville’s use of the metaphor may have followed from Douglass’s speech, as 
Wallace is wont to claim; its broader circulation, however, seems to trouble the line of 
continuity or direct “influence” that one author had over the other.  Circulation of the 
“slumber volcano” phrase, moreover, reflected entrenched concerns regarding politics, 
power, and the perceived historical role of conflict that emerged out of revolutionary and 
post-revolutionary discourse of the period.  As Jonathan Arac has reminded readers, “No 
figure was more used by the nineteenth century for revolutionary violence than that of the 
volcano.”171  In January of the same year that Douglass would make his “Slumbering 
Volcano” oration (1849), Melville’s Mardi had alluded in allegorical language to the 
“eruption” and “conflagration” spreading through France and other parts of Europe.172  
Melville staged the enterprise of pith and moment of the “great crowds” and dramatized 
revolutionary diction this way:   
                                                 
169 In my research, I have so far located the phrase in the following sources, listed chronologically: 
“Washington and His Generals,” The American Whig Review, Volume 5, Issue 5 (March 1847), 531; 
“Bride of an Hour,” The Living Age, Volume 3, Issue 31 (14 December 1844), 441; “Gossip of the 
Month,” The United States Democratic Review, Volume 22, Issue 120 (June 1848); “Humboldt’s Aspects 
of Nature in Different Lands,” The Living Age, Volume 23, Issue 293 (29 December 1849), 600; “France, 
Past and Present,” The Living Age, Volume 39, Issue 497 (26 November 1853), 549.   Although Sale’s 
project researches “newspapers” and other non-literary sources, as she claims, her investigation of the 
“slumbering volcano” trope is limited to Melville’s “Benito Cereno” and Douglass’s “Slavery: The 
Slumbering Volcano.”  Neither Wallace nor Sale seems to consider fully this philological complexity in 
light of the phrase’s importance to their readings on Douglass, Melville, and the nineteenth-century 
political milieu.   
 
170 “France, Past and Present,” Littell’s Living Age, Volume 39, Issue 497 (26 November 1853), 549.  
 
171 Jonathan Arac, The Emergence of American Literary Narrative: 1820-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 220. 
 
172 Herman Melville, Mardi and A Voyage Thither [1849]  (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1970), 523 
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 “Hurrah! Another kingdom is burnt down to earth’s edge; another demi-god is 
unhelmed; another republic is dawning.  Shake hands, freeman, shake hands!  
Soon will we hear of Dominora down in the dust; of hapless Verdanna free as 
ourselves; all Porpheero’s [Europe’s] volcanoes are bursting!”173     
By characterizing revolutionary conflict in terms of volcanic energies, the discourse of 
the period further privileged the oscillating categories “liberty” and “terror” as the binary 
expression of revolutionary force and its potentialities.  This discourse and its attending 
categories had become particularly pronounced in the question of whether or not the 
spirit of Revolution should be or could be extended to Africana slaves held in bondage.  I 
will elaborate on this topic anon and how both Melville and Douglass negotiate the 
categories liberty and terror in relation to revolutionary thought and the question of 
slavery.   
In proceeding, I refrain from repeating Wallace’s argument that the relationship 
between Douglass and Melville was best characterized as one of authorial “influence”—
that is, a direct or continuous relationship where one author’s work had derived from the 
other’s.  Wallace’s terms, such as “inspiration” and “conscious tribute” among others, 
describe an empirical connection between Douglass and Melville—an empirical 
connection that, despite Wallace’s efforts, has yet to be textually substantiated.174  I want 
                                                 
173 Mardi, 524.   This is an earlier allusion to the “slumbering volcano” trope to which neither Wallace nor 
Sale gives attention. 
 
174 Wallace, ix.  Wallace’s use of terms such as “profound influence,” “inspiration for,” and “conscious 
tribute” are indicative of his larger project and methodology.   While Wallace’s subtitle of his work on 
Douglass and Melville, “Anchored Together in Neighborly Style,” may even suggest such a relationship of 
contiguity, his use of categories such as “direct influence” and “conscious tribute” implies an empirical and 
derivative relationship.  The subtitle “Anchored Together in Neighborly Style” comes from a sentence in 
Melville’s “Benito Cereno” that describes how Delano’s whale-boat becomes moored to the San Dominick: 
“To be brief, the two vessels, thanks to the pilot's skill, ere long neighborly style lay anchored together” 
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 to suggest that we might imagine, instead, the relationship between Douglass and 
Melville as one which exhibits a contemporaneous contiguity—a relationship in which 
minds have been interlinked by their radical attempts to think and better understand the 
material realities, inhuman conditions, and arrangements of power that characterized the 
mid-nineteenth-century scene.  How directly Melville was in “dialogue with” Douglass 
when he invoked the slumbering volcano metaphor is too difficult to say exactly, but in 
reading works such as “Benito Cereno” and “The Bell-Tower,” among other titles, we do 
know that the conditions and realities regarding slavery and conflict formed central 
preoccupations and subjects of meditation for both writers. 
As works which had similarly taken historical accounts of slave-ship revolt as 
topics for their prose fictions in the mid-1850s, Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave” and 
Melville’s “Benito Cereno” offer noticeably distinct rhetorical and stylistic presentations 
of slave rebellion and of conflict itself—that is, conflict as an aesthetic device within 
narrative as well as the thing being narrated, the manifestation of force between actors 
aboard the slave ship.  I intend this comparative reading of Melville and Douglass as a 
means to extend and further elaborate on theoretical questions I had raised in the previous 
chapter, “Bloody Enforcement on a Grand Global Scale.”  There, I had examined the 
figure of Captain Amasa Delano in “Benito Cereno” as a particular instantiation of 
American power, and I had focused, specifically, on his tendencies toward managerial 
techniques and exercises of regulatory force that, as I argued, approximates the practices 
and strategies of war.  I further attempted to show how these were strategies that totalize 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“Benito Cereno,” 81).  See Wallace’s use of these terms that designate a derivative relationship between 
Douglass and Melville (Wallace, ix, 110, 111).   
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 the field of conflict and permeate the civil and political spheres on a potentially global 
scale.  In this chapter, my aim is to address how Douglass’s and Melville’s aesthetic 
projects suggest divergent conceptualizations of conflict within their nineteenth-century 
moment—conceptualizations, too, of American power if we understand this power as an 
arrangement that makes possible certain orders or types of conflict.175  Principally 
focusing on the rebellious figures Madison Washington and Babo, central to “The Heroic 
Slave” and “Benito Cereno” respectively, I examine the problematic of conflict by asking 
how each narrative characterizes or styles slave rebellion and, more specifically, the 
actions, strategies, and rhetorical tactics exercised by the (slave) actors within these 
conflicts.  How, in other words, do these strategies as they are narrated by Douglass and 
Melville further evince different conceptions of power, and America as a specific 
arrangement of power, in the nineteenth century?   
These questions yoke the political and aesthetic in ways that oblige us to ask 
further how Douglass’s and Melville’s narratives follow, contribute to, or even work 
against particular aesthetic theories of conflict.  Depicting scenes of nineteenth-century 
slave rebellion, how do “The Heroic Slave” and “Benito Cereno,” moreover, draw upon 
and resituate their understanding of strife in relation to a body of knowledge and criticism 
that developed out of and was influenced by Hegelian notions of historical progress, 
whereby conflict qua Kollision had been essential to history’s unfolding?176 
                                                 
175 This question regarding the aesthetics of conflict in a comparative reading of Douglass and Melville has 
yet to be undertaken by critics.  More importantly, my work links this question of aesthetics and conflict to 
larger theoretical questions about conceptions of American power. 
 
176 I later refer to Michelle Gellrich’s work to help explicate this history of aesthetic theory and particular 
theorizations of conflict, aesthetic history, and the role of criticism.  See Michelle Gellrich, Tragedy and 
Theory: The Problem of Conflict since Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
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 While Douglass would not have met Ottilie Assing and engaged her on the topic 
of German idealism until 1856, or have read the work of Ludwig Feuerbach until the 
1860s, his earlier tendencies to view conflict as part of a world-historical movement 
toward freedom were not far from Hegelian paradigms.177  Indeed, it is the notion of 
historical progress and the achievement of greater human self-consciousness (and hence 
freedom), made possible through conflict and human action, that arises in what Paul 
Gilroy has called Douglass’s “metanarrative of emancipation.”178  Douglass’s tendencies 
to invoke the category of freedom within this progressive and liberal frame, to note David 
Ericson’s and Robert Levine’s research as well, contrasts rather sharply with the strife 
and its aftermath that Melville had imagined aboard the Spanish slaver San Dominick.179    
To wit, the conflict in “Benito Cereno” is masked and occurs in “shadowy 
tableau,”180 to be sure, but the story also presents the conflict as a kind of knotting and 
does so, moreover, in a narrative style that is itself knotted and entangled.181  Pertaining 
                                                 
177 See William S. McFeely’s biography, Frederick Douglass (New York: Norton, 1991); Paul Gilroy, The 
Black Atlantic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), particularly pages 60-65; Eric Sundquist, To 
Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature (Cambridge: The Balknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1993) 125; Margaret Kohn has recently added to scholarship on Douglass’s relationship 
to Hegel in “Frederic Douglass’s Master-Slave Dialectic,” The Journal of Politics 67:2 (2005).  See 
especially 505, note 3. 
 
178 Gilroy, 60.   
 
179 On the question of progress and Douglass’s liberalism, see David F. Ericson, The Debate over Slavery: 
Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America (New York and London: New York 
University Press, 2000).  See specifically chapter three, “Child, Douglass, and Antislavery Liberalism,” 39-
61.  See also Robert S. Levine, Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative 
Identity (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.   
 
180 “Benito Cereno” 38. 
 
181 Jean Fagan Yellin’s short chapter on “Benito Cereno” marks one of the first works of criticism to 
engage exclusively with the figure of the knot.  See The Intricate Knot: Black Figures in American 
Literature, 1776 – 1863 (New York: New York University Press, 1972). This chapter and the previous, I 
hope, complicate and contribute to the discussion of “Benito Cereno” as an engagement with the figure of 
the knot, a figure that has been central to Melville’s thinking on history, power, and literature. 
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 to the conflict between slaves and masters, the “nature of the narrative,” Melville writes, 
“has more or less required that . . . instead of being set down in order of occurrence, 
should be retrospectively, or irregularly given.”182  This irregularity suffuses the entire 
story.  Even in the moment of supposed narrative resolution—that moment in the 
narrative where we often invoke the critical French term dénouement, from denouer 
meaning “to unknot”—the story frustrates this unraveling and frustrates too the 
possibility of a regular or regulated outcome.  This is an outcome that the American 
captain Amasa Delano continually attempts to achieve through his own managerial 
techniques, as I’ve discussed in the previous chapter.  These techniques presuppose an 
ordered or regulated resolution (a literal end to the conflict) made possible through 
Delano’s suppression of the slave revolt and the restoration of fugitive slave “property” 
to its rightful Spanish owners.  
If the effect of narrative knotting in Melville’s “Benito Cereno” troubles the 
American captain’s will to order and resolution as well as his regulative tendencies and 
enforcement of fugitive slave law on a grand and global scale (carried out by managerial 
force), it troubles too the narrative or metanarrative of emancipation.  Critics over the last 
several decades have yet to fully examine the stakes of this important problematic.183  In 
the last pages, and in the last paragraph, as the words on the leaf come to an end, “Benito 
Cereno” provides the lingering and spectral image of an intelligence that has neither been 
                                                 
182 “Benito Cereno,” 100; hereafter cited parenthetically by page number. 
 
183 This is a point that many critics of “Benito Cereno” over the last several decades have had difficulty 
theorizing, identifying instead with either Delano or Babo, and consequently with the very binary of liberty 
and terror that this work attempts to problematize.  I intend to show how the effect of “Benito Cereno” 
problematizes sympathy for or identification with either Delano or Babo in order to examine how these 
figures or minds are attendant with the relations or arrangements of power made possible by the U.S. in the 
nineteenth century. 
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 completely obliterated from the historical and material scene of strife nor achieved 
emancipation through conflict and telic resolution:  
Some months after, dragged to the gibbet at the tail of a mule, the black [Babo] 
met his voiceless end.  The body was burned to ashes; but for many days, the 
head, the hive of subtlety, fixed on a pole in the Plaza, met, unabashed, the gaze of 
the whites (102, my emphasis).   
This moment follows closely the previous page where Delano, after the suppression of 
the slave revolt, asks the Spanish captain Benito Cereno, “What has cast such a shadow 
upon you?”  With a look of “mournful” and pensive “melancholy,” Cereno responds, 
“The negro” (101).  Delano is incapable of recognizing the historical weight of Cereno’s 
words.  As I have argued previously, Delano’s lack of memory—his willful commitment 
to forgetting the historical past and its catastrophes—evinces an exercise of force that 
Melville found concurrent with American power.  Melville links this power to forms of 
violence and domination that have the dual capacity to both destroy and regulate humans 
and things on the globe.  Even after Delano helps suppress the revolt and returns the slave 
property to Spanish owners, and after the “the body” of the insurrectionary slave has been 
destroyed, “Benito Cereno” ends with the haunting image of a “subtle” mind, an 
intelligence endowed with the capacity for inventing and carrying out terrific violence.  I 
shall elaborate below on the category of invention in relation to intelligence. 
What is peculiar about Melville’s story is that it imagines this “hive of subtly” as 
the trace of an intelligence that is neither free nor yet fully annihilated.  It is, rather, an 
intelligence which emerges from (and is caught in) an ineluctable conflict, a mind that 
arises with and, indeed, is a function of the arrangements of power and inhuman 
99 
 conditions on which Melville meditates in the 1850s.  To put it differently, Babo himself 
may have been executed, “the body burned to ashes,” but the capacities and “subtle” 
intelligence that had been demonstrated in the dramatis persona of Babo emerge—and 
will unpredictably continue to reemerge—under the conditions of domination and brute 
force that the American both enforces and considers as the natural order of things.184  In 
all its subtlety and cunning, this is intelligence that struggles (in endless conflict) against 
these forces, though without necessarily the possibility that conflict will lead to 
emancipation, the final escape or “final struggle” as Douglass had termed it.185   
*              *               * 
What does this mean, to recognize the nineteenth-century American scene as a set 
of arrangements from which there is no ready escape, no resolution to strife—that is, to 
be caught or entangled in the middle of the thing?  This is the problematic, I think, central 
to Melville’s meditation on violence and force in “Benito Cereno.”  Does this mean 
necessarily that Melville himself was against the idea of emancipation or that he was in 
opposition to the abolitionists’ cause?  No, quite the contrary.  While Melville distanced 
himself from and was highly critical of many abolitionists’ integral ties with Christian 
evangelical and millenarian dogma as well as with “missionary programs and temperance 
crusades,” as Carolyn Karcher has aptly claimed, “he explicitly upheld the charges of 
                                                 
184 On this notion of “enforcement,” see my previous chapter, “Bloody Enforcement on a Grand Global 
Scale.” 
 
185 See Frederick Douglass, “The Final Struggle,” in Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings, 
ed. Philip S. Foner (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 335-36.  This short work was originally 
published in the Frederick Douglass’s Paper, November 16, 1855.  Here Douglass offers a telic view of 
conflict: “There is some consolation in the reflection, that the conflict will not, cannot, last forever.  The 
hour which shall witness the final struggle, is on the wing.  Already we hear the booming of the bell which 
shall yet toll the death knell of human slavery” (355, emphasis in the original). 
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 cruelty and sexual exploitation that the abolitionists leveled at slaveholders.”186  Yet 
while “he condemned slavery as a monstrous betrayal of the American Revolution’s 
egalitarian ideals,”187 Melville had as early as 1850 in White-Jacket expressed how the 
“broad principles of political liberty and equality,” ostensibly made possible by the 
Revolution and Declaration of Independence, were the exception rather than the rule.188  
Recalling the plight of the sailor under martial law, the following line from White-Jacket 
could have included an extensive population, including the Africana slave and the nearly 
annihilated American indigenous, among others, who fell under the domain of U.S. 
power:  “For him our Revolution was in vain; to him our Declaration of Independence is 
a lie.”189  Indeed, Melville’s White-Jacket had followed Richard Henry Dana’s 
condemnation of flogging, a condemnation which dramatized the absolute brutality of the 
captain over the crew and conflated this relationship of brutality with the practices of the 
slave-driver:  “You see your condition!” Captain Frank Thompson booms to his crew in 
Two Years before the Mast (1840). “You see where I’ve got you all, and you know what 
to expect! . . . You’ve got a driver over you!  Yes, a slave-driver—a nigger-driver!  I’ll 
see who’ll tell me he isn’t a nigger slave.”190 
As intellectuals, both Melville and Douglass had recognized and found 
themselves writing in the midst of the Revolution’s failure.  Both had examined closely 
                                                 
186 Carolyn L. Karcher, Shadow over the Promised Land: Slavery, Race, and Violence in Melville’s 
America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980) 15-16. 
 
187 Karcher, 16. 
 
188 Herman Melville, White-Jacket or The World in a Man-of-War [1850] (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 145. 
 
189 White-Jacket, 145. 
 
190 Richard Henry Dana, Two Years before the Mast (New York: New American Library, 2000), 92. 
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 the exceptions that negated the universal realization of the Constitution’s founding 
principles.  And both had, at points in their public careers, expressed their “infidelity” to 
“Christian America” and its unyielding support of institutions that held men and women 
in bondage.191  Where they depart, though, marks the beginning of my intervention here. 
In focusing on the figure of the rebellious slave in Melville’s “Benito Cereno” and 
Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave,” we need to remember that both Babo and Madison 
Washington’s rebellious actions are closely associated with their fugitive status.  In my 
closer reading of these two works, I want to emphasize that the principal context out of 
which Melville and Douglass were writing during the mid-1850s was the U.S.’s 
expansion, intensification, and enforcement of fugitive slave law.  The “problem” of 
fugitive slave property, and the juridical and policing mechanisms that had been created 
as a response, had coincided historically with the formation of institutions and 
                                                 
191 In a speech delivered to the American Anti-Slavery Society in May 1848, Douglass invokes the term 
infidel to describe his opposition to ideological and juridical forces that justified slavery.  
 
We have been accustomed, in this country, to hear much talk about "Christian America, and 
Infidel France." I want to say in behalf of France, that I go for that infidelity—no matter how 
heinous it may be in the estimation of the American people—which strikes the chains from the 
limbs of our brethren; and against that Christianity which puts them on, (applause;)—for that 
infidelity, which, in the person of Cremieux, one of the members of the Provisional Government 
of France, speaks to the black and mulatto men, that come to congratulate them, and express their 
sentiments upon the immediate emancipation of their brethren in the French islands. I sympathize 
with that infidelity that speaks to them in language like this: friends! brothers! men! In France, the 
negro is a man, while you who are throwing up your caps, and waving your banners, and making 
beautiful speeches in behalf of liberty, deny us our humanity, and traffic in our flesh. (122)  
 
See Frederick Douglass, “The Triumphs and Challenges of the Abolitionist Crusade: An Address Delivered 
in New York, New York, on 9 May 1848,” The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One: Speeches, Debates, 
and Interviews, Volume 2: 1847-54 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 117-127. 
In “The Heroic Slave,” Douglass distances himself rhetorically and politically from this infidel figure and 
instead, I argue, appeals to a doxa in American revolutionary potential.  By appealing to doxa, Douglass 
took on the task of extending and broadening the revolutionary project rather than turning away from it and 
remaining the infidel as we see in Melville. 
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 governance in America since the seventeenth century.192  The right of property, 
particularly as it was defined under common law going back to Blackstone, had been 
integral to the framing and enforcement of the juridical system in the U.S. (or what would 
become the U.S.) even before the Constitution had been ratified at the end of the 
eighteenth century.  As historian Don Fehrenbacher notes, for instance, men like George 
Washington and Thomas Jefferson, slave owners themselves, would have presumably 
exercised “a common-law right of ‘recaption,’ which, as defined by Sir William 
Blackstone, permitted private action to recover property wrongfully taken, or a wife, 
child, or servant wrongfully detained, so long as the exertion did not cause ‘strife and 
bodily contention, or endanger the peace of society.’”193   
Blackstone’s formulation would undergo an ironic inversion by the nineteenth 
century.  The protection and security of property, which Blackstone had understood 
earlier as a “private” and necessary exercise for keeping the peace, had given way to a 
form of permanent strife and a totalization of conflict.  With the passage of the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Act as well as with the support of earlier Supreme Court decisions such as 
Prigg v. Pennsylviania in 1837, the legal framework that at one time enabled inter-
colonial and later interstate “recovery” of property by individual owners, by the mid-
nineteenth century, had come to an intense realignment of power that mandated federal 
enforcement of the owner’s Constitutional right to property and its recaption.  The force 
of the new law, therefore, implicated not only fugitives who had escaped their masters, 
                                                 
192 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Goverenment’s 
Relations to Slavery. Ed. and completed by Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
205. See also Herbert Aptheker’s essay on “Slave Guerrilla Warfare” (11-30) in To Be Free: Studies in 
American Negro History (New York: International Publishers, 1948) and his investigation of fugitive 
“maroons” that existed since the seventeenth century.   
 
193 Fehrenbacher, 206. 
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 but implicated as well all citizens (as posse comitatus) in the enforcement of the right of 
property.  Various attempts by abolitionists to rescue or assist slaves in their escapes, in 
fact, had moved President Fillmore in 1851 to request legislation that “would make it 
easier for him to use army, navy, and militia forces in the execution of the federal 
law.”194  And as a response to the first forcible slave rescue of the 1850s, then Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster argued that assistance to the fugitive slave and resistance to the 
law would be looked upon as treason.195  By 1854, under the provisions in the Kansas-
Nebraska Act as well as the ideological and juridical weight attributed to the notion of 
popular sovereignty, the federal enforcement and jurisdiction of this law had been 
expanded to the territories—a slippery category itself, if we recall how John C. Calhoun 
had asserted that the notion of “territory” had terraqueous reach; wherever American 
ships and property may fare, so too does American jurisdiction.196  It was Calhoun, too, 
                                                 
194 Fehrenbacher, 232-34. 
 
195 Fehrenbacher, 234. 
 
196 My reading of “Benito Cereno” and its dramatization of Delano’s enforcement of fugitive slave law on a 
grand, global scale is further bolstered by research conducted by Stanley W. Campbell who argues 
convincingly that there was, indeed, an active enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act in the North.  Even 
though many citizens in the North were opposed to the institution of slavery, Campbell claims, “only a few 
citizens in isolated communities engaged in the active opposition to enforcement of the Fugitive Slave 
Law.”  Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970).   On John C. Calhoun’s comments regarding 
American ships as an extension of U.S. territory, see Frederick Douglass, “Slavery: The Slumbering 
Volcano: An Address Delivered in New York, New York, on 23 April 1849,” The Frederick Douglass 
Papers: Series One: Speeches, Debates, and Interviews, Volume 2: 1847-54 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1982), 157.  Also, as Don Fehrenbacher documents in Slavery, Law, and Politics: The 
Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981),  
In a series of resolutions introduced December 27, 1837, Calhoun also set forth his theory that the 
federal government was created as the “common agent” of the sovereign states with the duty of 
“strengthening and upholding” the domestic institutions of those states.  Slavery, he said in a 
speech, was actually “as much under the protection of the Constitution” in the District of 
Columbia and in the territories as it was “in the states themselves.”  In this manner Calhoun laid 
the basis for that convenient contradiction whereby southerners, especially in the late 1850s, were 
able to maintain that slavery was a local institution beyond the power of Congress to restrain in 
any way, and yet at the same time deserving full protection in the territories by direct force of the 
Constitution itself.  Thus “nonintervention” could be converted at will to mean intervention. (58) 
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 then as Secretary of War in 1820, who, because of territorial “frontier needs,” had 
undertaken the “expansible army” plan, intensifying what military historian Robert Utley 
has described as a scenario of total war.197   
Subterfuges against counter-subterfuges, rebellious property against security 
forces evinced an order of strife that had entangled the entire civil sphere.  “Perfect 
domestic security,” against the “danger of domestic insurrection,” Governor Robert Y. 
Hayne of South Carolina had admitted, required “a state of military preparation.”198  
With the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 this “state of military preparation” achieved a new 
ubiquitous scope.  
Where Douglass and Melville differ, I argue, is in their conceptions and 
dramatizations of the fugitive struggle and slave resistance.  More specifically, the figure 
of the fugitive allowed each to theorize—dramatically and imaginatively—a set of 
relations that reflected their own conceptions of conflict and strife in America as well as 
of America itself—its role in the world, its history, as well as its potentialities.   
As I show in the following section, the fugitive’s flight from bondage—a flight 
frequently incumbent upon the use of force—provided a figure and evinced a set of 
relations that Douglass used to conceptualize a world in which the spirit of revolution 
yielded further and fuller emancipative possibilities.  In the “heroic” narrative of struggle 
                                                 
197 Robert M. Utley, “Total War on the American Indian Frontier” in Anticipating Total War: The German 
and American Experiences, 1871-1914.  Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Forster, eds. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 402. The type of conflict that the U.S. had engaged on the 
frontier with American Indians, in other words, had “made a peacetime army necessary.”  See also Russell 
F. Weigley, Towards and American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962).  Also, as Weigley notes in another text, the “Indian frontier” required 
energies greater than preparing for a “European-style war” (67). See Weigley, The American Way of War: 
A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). 
 
198 Governor Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina quoted by Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave 
Revolts (New York: International Publishers, 1943) 69. 
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 and escape, Douglass had understood the role of conflict—in its rhetorical, aesthetic, and 
material manifestation, waged against master and bondsman—as a technique for change.  
And in the conflict that Madison Washington had waged against his captors, Douglass 
had imagined this technique for change by appealing to the radical continuation and 
hopeful realization of the Revolution where it had ostensibly stalled or been foreclosed.  
It was radical and hopeful because it opened or reopened the potential of the revolution 
and, moreover, imagined rebellious action as the means for emancipation. 
While critics have for some time noted the teleological and progressive frame in 
which Douglass characterized rebellion and escape, and while others have recently 
examined Douglass’s progressive views made complex through his “transnational 
perspective,” my aim here is to examine how, as a rhetorical and political strategy, 
Douglass must have had to elicit a recognizable historicist and, therefore, agonistic 
conception of conflict—a conception that would then link the destiny of white Americans 
with the same though yet unrealized emancipatory and triumphant future of black slaves 
who were actors in the historic struggle for freedom.199  Recalling other men who had 
participated in the revolution of 1776, Douglass radically imbued Madison Washington 
with the physical, rhetorical, and intellectual capacity to take heroic action, overturning 
and forcefully rebelling against the “brutalizing dominion” qua antagonism of the slave 
system.200  All this was radical, as I claim, because Douglass resituated rather 
                                                 
199 See especially Eric Sundquist and Paul Gilroy, cited above. See also Robert S. Levine, Martin Delany, 
Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative Identity (Chapel Hill and London: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1997.  Paul Giles and most recently Ivy Wilson (cited above) situate Douglass’s 
work within the scope of transnational American studies. See Paul Giles, “Narrative Reversals and Power 
Exchanges: Frederick Douglass and British Culture,” chapter two from Virtual Americas: Transnational 
Fictions and Transatlantic Imaginary (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
 
200 The other principal example of this action is Douglass’s self-characterization of his struggle against the 
slave “breaker” Covey.  This was a struggle revised and repeated throughout his narratives.  
106 
 compellingly and paradoxically the Negro slave figure within critical, philosophical, and 
aesthetic thought (as varied and vexed as it was) that Romanticism had come to express 
in the nineteenth century.  Not as a mere echo, but as a re-association of heroic action 
with the slave’s condition under bondage, Douglass’s narrative resonates with 
Romanticism’s homage to heroic action: “Who would be free themselves must strike the 
blow!” he had quoted Byron.201 Along with such diverse minds as Byron and Shelley, 
Carlyle and Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, among others, Douglass not only drew 
from but contributed to the nineteenth-century recuperation of the hero, and he took the 
figure of the fugitive slave as the principal example of heroic potentiality—the one to 
“strike the blow.”202  He would directly resound this poetic phrase again in My Bondage 
and My Freedom (1855),203 and in doing so he also resounded indirectly Emerson’s 
understanding of the “warlike” and “military attitude of the soul” “towards all this 
external evil” as a quality of “Heroism.”204  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
201 From George Gordon Byron’s Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, Canto II, stanza LXXVI. 
 
202 On the extensive references to the figure of the hero in nineteenth-century aesthetic and philosophical 
thought see Walter L. Reed, Meditations on the Hero: A Study of the Romantic Hero in Nineteenth-
Century Fiction (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974). 
 
203 See Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (1855) in Frederick Douglass: Autobiographies, ed. Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Library of America, 1994) 287. 
 
204 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Heroism” from Essays: First Series in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays and 
Lectures ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, 1983) 373-4.  I cite this passage at length here for 
further contextualization: 
Our culture, therefore, must not omit the arming of the man.  Let him hear in season, that he is 
born into the state of war, and that the commonwealth and his own well-being require that he 
should not go dancing in the weeds of peace, but warned, self-collected, and neither defying nor 
dreading the thunder, let him take both reputation and life in his hand, and, with perfect urbanity, 
dare the gibbet and the mob by the absolute truth of his speech, and the rectitude of his behavior.  
Towards all this external evil, the man with the breast assumes a warlike attitude, and affirms his 
ability to cope single-handed with the infinite army of enemies.  To this military attitude of the 
soul we give the name Heroism. 
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 By dramatizing heroic slave action against the antagonism of slavery broadly, and 
the slave holder or “breaker” specifically, Douglass radically turned and therefore re-
imagined the asymmetric relation of domination between slave and master as a 
symmetric conflict.  As an agonistic and symmetrical relation of strife, the slave actors 
along with white abolitionists were imagined as active (and heroic) participants in a 
struggle that would lead to a greater emancipative resolution.  Of course, one could argue 
that “Benito Cereno” exhibits an agonistic conflict as well, and some critics have 
attempted to see the heroic possibilities in Babo’s rebellion.205  As I want to show, 
however, Melville’s meditation on slave insurrection approaches agony of a different 
order.  Where as Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave” invoked agonistic conflict as a means of 
escape and freedom through heroic action and potential—and, moreover, conflict as 
necessary to the regenerative, revolutionary, and progressive forces of history—
Melville’s “Benito Cereno” dramatized strife as a lasting condition constitutive of the 
arrangements of American power.  For Melville, this was not necessarily the arrangement 
of the agon but of stasis and enduring strife, an arrangement of power in which conflict 
may not necessarily yield emancipation.  I use the following sections to elaborate the 
stakes of how each imagined the field of conflict, beginning with Douglass. 
 
3.2. Frederick Douglass’s Tactics of Escape and Aesthetics of the Final Struggle  
 
                                                 
205 See specifically Joshua Leslie and Sterling Stuckey, “The Death of Benito Cereno: A Reading of 
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 Then, as a nation, if we are wise, we will prepare for the last conflict, for 
that final struggle in which the enemy of Freedom must capitulate. . . . 
Let us prepare then for the last battle.  Already the masses are 
moving.206    
actions, moreover, evinced an order of conflict and measured force that even the 
                                                
  
As critics and historians have previously noted, the figure of Madison Washington and 
the Creole event played an important role in Douglass’s thinking on the question of slave 
resistance and, specifically, on the role of armed insurrection in the struggle for the full 
abolishment of slavery in the U.S.207  Before he had written “The Heroic Slave,” for 
instance, Douglass had referred to Washington in a minimum of six speeches, most of 
them given in the mid- to late-1840s.208  Resulting in only two deaths and the liberation 
of 135 slaves, the Creole revolt provided for Douglass and other abolitionists at the time 
an example of slave resistance that didn’t conjure images of bloody excess and Jacobin 
brutality as might other insurrections and plots.  The successful outcome of Washington’s 
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 Garrisonians who spurned “violence of any sort” could tacitly endorse.209  Though 
Douglass had begun to distance himself from Garrison and considered the exercise of 
violent, militant resistance a viable and necessary means for abolition, especially after the 
passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850, he continued to draw upon the figure of 
Madison Washington—his tactics and actions—as the quintessence of emancipation 
through force.210  Yet this question remains: why the Creole revolt and, more 
specifically, why Washington over other figures or instances of rebellion?211 
                                                
The story of Madison Washington’s uprising aboard the Creole allowed Douglass 
to straddle two sides of a very difficult political and rhetorical problematic: On one side 
of this problematic, he had committed himself to the abolishment of slavery, even if this 
meant violent revolt.  Indeed, after his initial meeting with John Brown in 1847, he had 
become “less hopeful of [slavery’s] peaceful abolition,” and he had expressed this openly 
with fellow abolitionist Sojourner Truth.212  “My quaint old sister was of the Garrison 
school of non-resistants,” he stated retrospectively in 1893, “and [she] was shocked at my 
sanguinary doctrine, but she too became an advocate of the sword, when the war for the 
maintenance of the Union was declared.”213  On the other side of this problematic, 
 
209 For further elaboration on this topic, see Ellen Weinauer, “Writing Revolt in the Wake of Nat Turner: 
Frederick Douglass and the Construction of Black Domesticity in ‘The Heroic Slave.’” Studies in 
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Douglass: Autobiographies, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Library of America, 1994) 719. 
  
213 Douglass, Life and Times, 719. 
110 
 though, particularly in the midst of the political milieu of the 1840s and ‘50s, he 
understood that any form of violence or resistance shown by slaves had the effect of 
producing an immediate sense of “terror” in and backlash from a white audience.   
There is no doubt that Douglass was attentive to how white members of his 
audience were preoccupied with slave violence, especially in the wake of Gabriel Prosser 
and Denmark Vesey’s preempted plots as well as Nathaniel Turner’s rebellion.  Mediated 
through his confessor, Thomas R. Gray, Turner described the intended effect of the 
insurrection and bloodshed in Southhampton, Virginia, this way:  
I took my station in the rear, and as it ‘twas my object to carry terror and 
devestation wherever we went, I placed fifteen to twenty of the best armed and 
most to be relied on, in front, who generally approached the house as fast as their 
horses could run; this was for two purposes, to prevent their escape and strike 
terror to the inhabitants.214 
An image in chiaroscuro, Turner’s “confession” (mediated through Gray) was made to 
depict the dark brutality of the revolting slave against the image of white familial 
innocence.  This image, like so many others that had helped compose the mid-nineteenth-
century canvas, recalled the “terror and devastation” of surreptitious schemes and 
rebellions like Turner’s in 1831.  After the Vesey plot, Edwin Holland linked Negro 
terror in the U.S. to what he and others understood as the wayward and residual forces of 
the Revolution.  “Let it never be forgotten, that our Negroes are truly the Jacobins of the 
country,” he argued.  “They are the anarchists and the domestic enemy; the common 
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 enemy of civilized world society, and the barbarians who would, if they could, become 
the destroyers of our race.”215  The potential threat of slave violence at large, as Holland 
and others portrayed it, had affected the rhetorical and political strategies of a number of 
abolitionists, including Douglass.216  
While Douglass understood that forceful resistance might be a legitimate means 
for achieving abolition, his tendency towards violence was tempered in contrast to (or 
even because of) Nat Turner’s actions and the radical juggernaut that his acquaintance 
and interlocutor John Brown had set in motion during the 1850s, particularly in his plan 
to raid Harpers Ferry in the latter-part of that tumultuous decade.217  Upon Brown’s 
urging to have Douglass join his cause, Douglass “could not do so, and could but feel that 
[Brown] was about to rivet the fetters more firmly than ever on the limbs of the 
enslaved.”218  For Douglass, Brown’s use of violence would effect little change and, as 
he recalled in Life and Times, might perpetuate the very forces and institutional practices 
he had set out to dismantle. 
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 In order to resolve the problematic, he understood that the long-term success of 
abolition would only be possible through the rationalization of slave violence within a 
recognizable political frame, most notably the paradigm of revolutionary spirit.  By the 
1840s and 1850s, however, this was no easy endeavor.219  Douglass had the rhetorical 
and critical task of wresting this spirit from deep-seated suspicions of Jacobin excess—
wresting, too, its black revolutionary actors from a discourse that characterized them as 
“domestic enemies” or terrorists.220  The story of Madison Washington and the Creole 
revolt provided Douglass the means for articulating this rationalization, and it provided a 
figure with whom a wider (notably white) readership could identify as one whose actions 
and intelligence marked the rational continuation of America’s revolutionary trajectory 
carried out and fulfilled by a heroic masculine subject—with Washington’s blackness 
being the obvious, though progressively radical, exception.  In other words, Madison 
Washington, who literarily signals in name and embodies in heroic action the 
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 characteristics of American revolutionary fathers, functions as the black progeny capable 
of exercising and directing force within and for the further actualization of America’s 
revolutionary potential.  
*              *               * 
Addressed to “our readers,” the novella opens by locating the life of Madison 
Washington within a heroic genealogy sprung from the “State of Virginia.”221  Virginia, 
Douglass begins, “has been dignified by some the mother of statesmen.” “History,” he 
declares, “has not been sparing in recording their names, or in blazoning their deeds” 
(174).  Noting the “strange neglect” of “one of the truest, manliest, and bravest of 
[Virginia’s] children,” Douglass’s work of prose fiction—as did a number of his previous 
orations—embarks on telling Washington’s story (175).  Less subtly, Douglass then 
situates his own role in this storytelling: Although Madison Washington “holds now no 
higher place in the records of that grand old Commonwealth than is held by a horse or an 
ox,” he begins, Washington’s life will, in the future, “command the pen of genius to set 
his merits forth” (175).  Here, the future materializes in the present.  Douglass’s own pen 
signals “genius” and asserts his role among a select communion of writers who will style 
the life of Madison Washington into “American annals” and into History itself.   
More than asserting his genius, however, Douglass’s opening passage in the 
novella further imagines a black revolutionary genealogy whose origins are spatially 
located in and, in a matter of speaking, spiritually commensurate with the U.S.’s 
founding fathers: 
Let those account for it who can, but there stands the fact, that a man who loved 
liberty as well as did Patrick Henry—who deserved it as much as Thomas 
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 Jefferson—and who fought for it with a valor as high, an arm as strong, and 
against odds as great, as he who led all the armies of the American colonies 
through the great war for freedom and independence, lives now only in the chattel 
records of his native State. (175) 
The story Douglass tells has an origin both historic and heroic.  Recalling Virginia as the 
locus of this origin, Douglass establishes an imaginary narrative trajectory along which 
the story of freedom, previously epitomized by the lives of Henry, Jefferson, and others, 
has yet to be fully told.  “Yet not all the great ones of the Old Dominion have, by the fact 
of their birth-place, escaped undeserved obscurity,” he writes (174-175).  Entangled still 
by the institution and continued practice of chattel slavery, the spirit or movement of 
freedom becomes caught in stasis, unable to move toward its teleological end.  “The 
Heroic Slave” enters into that story—that is, into the greater metanarrative of freedom—
at precisely the moment that the story has stalled.  
For Douglass slave insurrection had instantiated and was grounded in the 
revolutionary potential of American power—a power that would yield liberty and 
freedom through conflict and its resolution within a prescribed set of historical processes.  
Like others of the early and mid-nineteenth century, Douglass tended to conceive of these 
historical processes (and therefore the role of conflict) as moving toward teleological and 
progressive ends—a point that Eric Sundquist in his reading of Douglass’s major works 
has previously and aptly elaborated.222  Douglass’s understanding of historical 
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 revolutionary time, therefore, was not unlike other self-proclaimed patriots and those who 
showed faith in an American power which, set in “motion,” moved from a necessary 
moment of revolutionary violence toward a “permanent peace in the world,” to recall the 
words of Daniel Webster.223  Yet while figures like Webster and Theodore Parker could 
pay homage to the revolutionary conflict within a monumentalized past—when the 
revolution’s “rotation was guarded, regular, and safe”224—Douglass’s own politics 
necessitated the living and continuous memory of the revolution as an instrument of 
change, even if violent, in the mid-nineteenth-century present.  What made Douglass’s 
view more radical, then, was that for him the revolutionary “movement” had not yet 
come to fruition—more radical because it insisted on the liberation of black slaves as a 
necessary culmination of the revolutionary spirit, where others like Webster and Parker, 
despite their differences, considered the belated manifestations of revolutionary violence, 
especially in Europe and San Domingo, as instances of conflict that could bring about 
only “conflagration and terror.”225  Douglass’s retelling of Madison Washington’s story 
functions, therefore, as a reanimation and so begins at the place of spirit’s inert pause.  
                                                 
223 Daniel Webster, “The Bunker Hill Monument” [June 17, 1825] The Great Speeches and Orations of 
Daniel Webster with an Essay on Daniel Webster as a Master of English Style (Boston: Little, Brown, & 
Co., 1889), 132-133. 
 
224 See again Daniel Webster’s speech on the “The Bunker Hill Monument” [June 17, 1825].  See also 
Webster’s “The Completion of the Bunker Hill Monument [June 17, 1843], The Great Speeches and 
Orations of Daniel Webster with an Essay on Daniel Webster as a Master of English Style (Boston: Little, 
Brown, & Co., 1889), 136-151. 
 
225 See Daniel Webster, “The Bunker Hill Monument” [June 17, 1825], 132.  Says Webster, “The great 
wheel of political revolution began to move in America.  Here its rotation was guarded, regular, and safe.  
Transferred to the other continent, from unfortunate but natural cause, it received an irregular and violent 
impulse; it whirled along with a fearful celerity; till at length, like the chariot-wheels in the races of 
antiquity, it took fire from the rapidity of its own motion, and blazoned onward, spreading conflagration 
and terror around” (132).  See also Sundquist’s eloquent elaboration on this topic in To Wake the Nations, 
113 
 
116 
 After recollecting Virginia as the space of heroic origins, Douglass’s novella proceeds by 
reestablishing the direction and motion of freedom’s historic trajectory.  
   Douglass’s narrative thus provides a precise entry point for this reanimation, and 
he turns specifically to “the spring of 1835,” six years prior to the Creole revolt, “on a 
Sabbath morning” (176).  Scenes from the drama that will lead to that climatic 
revolutionary event in 1844 aboard the Creole begin to unfold.  Here the novella presents 
a northerner by the name of Listwell who, while traveling through the State of Virginia, 
catches the “sound of a human voice” (176).  The voice “arrests [the traveller’s] 
attention” and draws him to observe “a soliloquy” delivered by a fugitive slave.  
Focalized through Listwell’s perspective, the slave’s dramatic vocalization depicts the 
makings of internal struggle.  Through this struggle, the slave comes to realize his human 
capacities for liberty:  
But what is freedom to me, or I to it?  I am a slave,—born a slave, an abject 
slave,--even before I made part of this breathing world, the scourge was platted 
for my back; the fetters were forged for my limbs . . . But here am I, a man,--yes, 
a man!—with thoughts and wishes, with powers and faculties as far as angel’s 
flight. (177)   
Madison’s ontological and metaphysical recognition, “I am a man,” thus takes 
precedence over the historical and material conditions that have defined his life up to the 
present as a slave.  Resolution and action then weigh heavily here:  “I am no coward,” 
Madison continues.  Echoing Patrick Henry, he proclaims, “Liberty I will have, or die in 
the attempt to gain it” (178).   
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 If Douglass had intended his white readers to sympathize with the life of Madison 
Washington—that is, to identify with the human qualities that would give rise to the 
heroic dimensions of his character—Douglass bolstered these sympathies by providing a 
narrative that, on one register, showed the familial connections and human strivings in 
Washington’s life prior to the Creole rebellion and, on another register, depicted the 
internal and rather private sentiments whites would (or should) experience in their 
encounters with such a figure. As we also learn from the soliloquy, for instance, Madison 
has a wife, and his love for her (inscribed within notions of masculine responsibility) will 
later in the narrative move him to wager his own freedom in an attempt to gain hers.226  
“How can I leave her?  Poor thing! What can she do when I am gone?” he cries out.  
“Oh! oh! ‘tis impossible that I can leave poor Susan!” (180).  Though heroic, the 
character of Madison exhibits qualities human and sympathetic, but this is sympathy that 
leads not only to profound changes in feeling but, as we see in the figure of Listwell, to 
direct action and ontological change.  
To the point of being overly obvious if not propagandistic, Listwell becomes the 
exemplum of white consciousness which undergoes transformation in the encounter with 
the fugitive slave.  The encounter elicits both pathos as well as sublimity in Listwell, and 
both play out as important elements of Listwell’s transformation and recognition.  I cite 
this important passage at length to show the development of Listwell’s sentiment and 
thought as a result of this encounter:  
Long after Madison had left the ground, Mr. Listwell (our traveler) remained in 
motionless silence, meditating on the extraordinary revelations to which he had 
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 listened.  He seemed fastened to the spot, and stood half hoping, half fearing the 
return of the sable preacher to his solitary temple.  The speech of Madison rung 
through the chambers of his soul, and vibrated through his entire frame.  “Here is 
indeed a man,” thought he, “of rare endowments,--a child of God,--guilty of no 
crime but the color of his skin,--hiding away from the face of humanity, and 
pouring out his thoughts and feelings, his hopes and resolutions to the lonely 
woods; to him those distant church bells have no grateful music.  He shuns the 
church, the alter, and the great congregation of Christian worshippers, and 
wanders away to the gloomy forest, to utter in the vacant air complaints and 
griefs, which the religion of his times and his country can neither console nor 
relieve.  Goaded almost to madness by the sense of injustice done him, he resorts 
hither to give vent to his pent up feelings, and to debate with himself the 
feasibility of his plans, plans of his own invention, for his own deliverance.  From 
this hour I am an abolitionist.  I have seen enough and heard enough, and I shall 
go to my home in Ohio resolved to atone for my past indifference to this ill-
starred race, by making such exertions as I shall be able to do, for the speedy 
emancipation of every slave in the land.” (181-82) 
Though refashioned as a critical and even secular response to “Christian worshippers” 
and their complicity with the slave system, Listwell’s “meditation” comes to resemble a 
story of conversion.  This is conversion set against the backdrop of “Sabbath” and 
“distant church bells.”  In the space of a more “solitary temple,” the words of the “sable 
preacher” “[ring] through the chambers of his soul, and [vibrate] through his entire 
frame” until Listwell can proclaim at last, “From this hour I am an abolitionist.” 
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 Douglass’s characters inhabit a world where persuasion and conversion (in its multivalent 
sense) are not only possible but constitutive of the forces of change.  By contrast, the 
world of Melville’s “Benito Cereno” troubles, or even depicts a world abandoned by, the 
possibility of words to effect change, to bring about action let alone justice.  In the end, 
Babo “uttered no sound, and could not be forced to” (“Benito Cereno” 102).  For 
Douglass, the power of the word has the ability to move souls.   
By troping the Christian conversion narrative, Douglass had tapped a source of 
energy in American discourse and its fascination, if not identification, with movement 
and transport.  This fascination with energy qua movement had its religious and secular 
articulations, and Douglass took advantage of both, as we see in the above passage.  In 
particular, Douglass’s narrative draws on a notion of energy that had been given 
expression in the discourse of the sublime in the U.S.227  Standing in “motionless silence” 
like a speechless Thomas Jefferson peering out from atop the natural bridge overlooking 
the majestic and awesome Albemarle County,228 Listwell’s encounter with the fugitive 
slave’s “mellow and mournful accents” is cause for “meditation” (179).  This meditation 
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 then gives way to action in a way that resembles Madison’s own resolve: “I have seen 
enough and heard enough, and I shall go to my home in Ohio resolved to atone for my 
past indifference to this ill-starred race, by making such exertions as I shall be able to do, 
for the speedy emancipation of every slave in the land” (182).   
Drawing on an understanding of sublimity that had been in circulation since 
earlier translations and appropriations of Longinus’s Peri Hupsous, Douglass’s treatment 
of Listwell’s sublime encounter with Madison resembles something akin to but even 
more potent than persuasion—and more potent than sympathy.  From William Smith to 
Nicolas Boilieau, Edmund Burke to Immanuel Kant, Friedrick Schiller to Hugh Blair, 
among many others, these works drew from and expanded on the Greek notion of 
ekstasis that Longinus had found inherent in hupsos (the sublime).  Of course, from the 
term ekstasis we get the word ecstasy, but rhetorical and then later aesthetic theories drew 
from the word a sense of “transport” and “movement.”  As Smith stated, “the sublime not 
only persuades, but even throws an audience into transport.”229   
By the nineteenth century, discourse of the sublime in the U.S. provided an 
expression that linked the world of nature and America’s fascination with (if not fantasy 
for) transport, movement, and energy.  Longinus’s ancient term had by then given 
meaning to American modernity.  In the encounter with the natural landscape—an 
encounter that was made possible and achieved greater intensity, penetration, and 
purview with emerging (and sublime) technologies—both secular and Christian made use 
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 of the sublime as a category to articulate the experience of conversion and movement.230  
“Objects of exalted grandeur elevate the mind that seriously dwells on them, and impart 
to it greater compass and strength,” Charles Caldwell had put it in 1832.  “Alpine scenery 
and an embattled ocean deepen contemplation, and give their own sublimity to the 
conceptions of the beholders.”231  For Caldwell and others, the sublime held 
transformative powers, and he, like many of his contemporaries, had coupled the 
transformative powers of sublime “scenery” with the transportation potential of the rail-
road system: “Its vastness and magnificence will prove communicable, and add to the 
standard of the intellect of our country.”232  This reverence for the sublime effused 
secular and religious, thereby crystallizing the Jacksonian doctrine of conquest and 
expansion with a liberal doxa that celebrated the transcendence of space and time.  It 
helped crystallize, too, an understanding and articulation of America’s exceptional and 
providential place in history (what the founders understood in the Latin motto Annuit 
Coeptis), further legitimizing as sacred all those techniques for transport.  “Railroad iron 
is a magician’s rod,” Emerson wrote in 1844, “in its power to evoke the sleeping energies 
of land and water.”233  
While Emerson tended toward secular formulations of the sublime, his conception 
of the land, the transformative power of technologies, and the “sleeping energies” that 
                                                 
230 See David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge and London: Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Press, 1994), 27-28.  See also my previous chapter where I examine the links between the 
discourse of the sublime and the epistemologies and exercise of power as purview. 
 
231 Cited in David E. Nye, 58. 
 
232 Nye, 58. 
 
233 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American,” in Essays and Lectures (New York: Library of 
America, 1983), 213. 
 
122 
 could be awakened through “a sublime and friendly Destiny by which the human race is 
guided” found many likenesses in more theological expressions.234  In 1851, with the 
inauguration of the Cleveland Columbus Railroad, S.C. Aiken had celebrated sublime 
transport and linked it to both “a moral and religious point of view as well as a social and 
commercial” one.235  Of “the opening of a great thoroughfare,” Aiken continued, “there 
is sublimity in it, indicating not only march of mind and a higher type of society, but the 
evolution of divine purposes, infinite, eternal—connecting social revolutions with the 
progress of Christianity and the coming reign of Christ.”236   The discourse of the 
sublime in the U.S. provided the explanatory power for conflating both theological and 
secular interests in transport, whereby “movement” could be interpreted through a 
commercial or Christian hermeneutic.  As David Nye and Leo Marx have previously 
noted, the “sublime was intimately connected to religious feelings” and “could hardly 
avoid becoming intimately interwoven with popular religion.”237  Sites such as Niagara 
Falls in New York and the Natural Bridge in Virginia, among other locations, offered not 
only a sense of ekstasis that Jefferson early documented in his purview of the landscape 
but also played out as sites of Christian revivals and baptisms.  “Atheist! Contemplate 
this grand scene, one hour, And though shalt own there is a God of Power,” a poet 
referring to the Natural Bridge had written in 1819.238 
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 In the “The Heroic Slave,” Listwell’s atonement for “past indifference” and then 
resolution to the “speedy emancipation of every slave in the land” marks what Hugh Blair 
called “the power and force” of sublimity.  Not from the landscape but from the 
potentiality of the heroic slave, clearly born out of those same forces that gave rise to the 
American revolutionary project, Douglass drew upon on a concept of the sublime that 
associated rhetorical and physical force with transformative powers.  In his orations, 
printed lectures, and prose fiction, Douglass opportunistically attempted to harness this 
energy and direct it toward the fulfillment of emancipative struggles.  Portrayed through 
the figure of Listwell, and invoking both religious and secular tropes, Douglass depicted 
how Madison Washington’s sublimity sparked conversion and transformation, a 
necessary force for the continuation and achievement of liberty.  In My Bondage and My 
Freedom, published two years later, Douglass attributed sublime qualities to the 
emancipative rhetoric of one of the nation’s founders, Patrick Henry.  It was he who 
could arouse a “magic eloquence,” enough so that his listening audience in the senate 
stood “by him in his boldest flights,” particularly when he proclaimed, “‘GIVE ME 
LIBERTY OR GIVE ME DEATH.’” As Douglass put it, “this saying was a sublime 
one,” and then he added rather subtly if not ironically, “even for a freeman.”239   Of 
figures like Madison Washington or even himself—“men accustomed to the lash and 
chain—men whose sensibilities must have become more or less deadened by their 
bondage”—Douglass reserved the full force of eloquence, saying that these are voices 
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 “incomparably more sublime” in their demand for liberty.240  Recall once more 
Madison’s proclamation in his soliloquy: “Liberty I will have, or die in the attempt to 
gain it” (178).  Douglass would reiterate this link between sublimity and emancipative 
energies again in 1861 by calling the “West Indian Emancipation” a “sublime event.”241   
For Douglass, a technique beyond mere persuasion was needed to jolt the U.S. out 
of stasis, was needed to redirect American power towards achieving its revolutionary 
potential.  An incarnation of this potential, Douglass’s Madison Washington exhibits 
qualities sublime and heroic—one enabling the other.  And these qualities come forth in 
the physical body, Madison’s “manly form,” as well as the “voice.”  Told through 
Listwell’s perspective, or “full view of the unsuspecting speaker,” Douglass describes 
Madison as “Tall, symmetrical, round, and strong” (178-79).  “In his movements he 
seemed to combine, with the strength of the lion, a lion’s elasticity,” he continues.   
His torn sleeves disclosed arms like polished iron.  His face was ‘black, but 
comely.’  His eye, lit with emotion, kept guard under a brow as dark and as glossy 
as the raven’s wing. His whole appearance betokened Herculean strength; yet 
there was nothing savage or forbidding in his aspect.  A child might play in his 
arms, or dance in his shoulders.  A giant’s strength, but not a giant’s heart was in 
him.  His broad mouth and nose spoke only of good nature and kindness. But his 
voice, that unfailing index of his soul, though full and melodious, had that in it 
which could terrify as well as charm. He was just the man you would choose 
when hardships were to be endured, or danger to be encountered,--intelligent and 
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 brave.  He had the head to conceive, and the hand to execute.  In a word, he was 
one to be sought as a friend, but to be dreaded as an enemy. (179, my emphasis) 
Never withdrawing from the physical and material realities of the abolitionist conflict, 
never withdrawing either from the potential that comes from sublime terror, Douglass’s 
narrative is want to simultaneously invoke and yet moderate the violence of the 
“slumbering volcano.”  In contrast to the imminent threat of slave insurrection as the 
irruption of volcanic force of which Douglass had warned in his Jeremiad of 1849, his 
1853 depiction of Madison in “The Heroic Slave” alludes to this force with more 
subtlety.  Madison’s sheer strength—his “arms like polished iron,” his Herculean and 
giant-like physical presence—comes under the domain of reasoned intellect not 
necessarily as an upsurge of incontrollable energy.  His rhetorical prowess, like the his 
physical comportment, exhibits the capacity to persuade or, more specifically, move an 
audience to action by either “charm” or “terror.”  The potential of both of these qualities, 
including the latter, Douglass had not abandoned.  While Madison Washington “was one 
to be sought as a friend,” Listwell says in the narrative, he was also “to be dreaded as an 
enemy.”  Yet Listwell describes the slave’s capacity for terror within the register of 
rhetorical (sublime) force not necessarily the physical: “But his voice, that unfailing 
index of his soul, though full and melodious, had that in it which could terrify as well as 
charm.”  Douglass’s narrative maintains the force of sublimity but modulates terror so as 
to serve better the possibility of rhetorical persuasion or, more accurately, sublime 
conversion and transport.  
Reading Douglass within the context of nineteenth-century temperance discourse, 
Robert Levine has emphasized how Douglass privileged “mind over body, self-control 
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 over rage.”242  Levine argues that Douglass set out to articulate “a measured self-
defense,” an order of “violence that [Douglass] types as temperate.”243  For Douglass the 
notion of intemperance formed an operative and well-established category for illustrating 
the intoxicating and disastrous effects of slavery on both slave holders and slaves—in 
short, on all those associated with the slave system at large.  Temperance and 
intemperance helped Douglass distinguish the differences between human action and 
brute force.  The majority of the overseers in Douglass’s narratives, Levine reminds us, 
are drunkards and prone to use the whip, and Douglass often links the use of the whip 
with intoxication and ravenous consumption.  The discourse of temperance, therefore, 
expressed a set of ideas and practices that avoided the possibility of re-enacting the 
intemperate excess of and the insatiable appetite for power that defined the inhuman 
relationship between handlers and slaves in the South, a relationship which reduced all to 
brutes.244   
Levine’s analysis of how Douglass appealed to the discourse of temperance, 
particularly in My Bondage and My Freedom, has offered nuance to the ways in which 
critics have previously theorized the role of violence in Douglass’s work as an essential 
instrument of liberation.  Levine particularly wants to read “against the grain” of Eric 
Sundquist’s and Nancy Bentley’s work on Douglass, both of whom posit that violence 
played a necessary role in overcoming his oppressors and, moreover, helped “him to 
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 assert his own humanity.”245  While Levine does not fully (or directly) account for 
Listwell’s invocation of the potential terror and dread exhibited by Madison Washington, 
and how terror with conflict occupies some role in the overall project of emancipation, I 
want to suggest that Levine’s reading of temperance does offer a way to examine how 
Douglass engaged with the notion of Negro terror.  
Listwell recognizes the potential for terror in Madison, but terror itself is not the 
means to achieve revolutionary action and political ends. The narrative, rather, situates 
terror in a contrapuntal arrangement with its moderating characteristics: “His whole 
appearance betokened Herculean strength; yet there was nothing savage or forbidding in 
his aspect.”  Rhetorically, Douglass counter-poses the potentially negative attributes of 
the rebellious slave (terror, capricious violence, shear strength) with qualities that affirm 
Madison’s humanity, what could be perceived by his white audience as his likenesses to 
their own preconceptions of heroic character (soul, bravery, charm, comeliness, 
kindness).  In this way, the potential for terror is drawn into the domain of human 
management, what Levine calls temperance, thus enabling and transforming the terrific 
qualities of insurrection into the larger world historical struggles for freedom.   
Still Levine is not as far from Eric Sundquist or Nancy Bentley on the question of 
violence as he wants to imagine.  As Sundquist has argued, conflict (even violent 
conflict) does play a role in Douglass’s cosmography.  And the “capacity for force,” as 
Bentley notes, functions for Douglass as a sign of human will and agency.  Levine, 
though, helps us understand that by the mid-1850s Douglass had applied to human 
agency the necessary ability to master or manage force through tempered and rational 
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 means.  While Douglass had in 1848 likened Madison Washington with Nat Turner, 
drawing them both into what Ellen Weinauer calls a “genealogy of resistance,” by the 
time he published “The Heroic Slave,” he had rhetorically distanced his protagonist from 
Turner’s publicly perceived style of revolt.246  And by 1853, Douglass had altered 
slightly his earlier 1849 allusion to the volcano (to recall again the nineteenth-century 
trope) and presented force as a kind of geothermic energy in reserve, tapped and then 
administered as moderate and moderated kinetic energy which would yield movement 
towards a final and just end.   
More than appealing to the discourse of temperance, as Levine has eloquently 
shown, Douglass’s depiction of conflict and strife, I further argue, provides a 
cosmography in which conflict can be understood in terms of finality and resolution—
and is indeed necessary to resolution.  In fact, Douglass dramatized in “The Heroic 
Slave” a concept of conflict which he had sloganized two years later: “Then, as a nation, 
if we are wise, we will prepare for the last conflict, for that final struggle in which the 
enemy of Freedom must capitulate.”247   “We do not fear the result of such a battle,” he 
continued.  “The sooner the last battle shall be fought, the sooner victory will perch upon 
the standard of the free. . . . Let us prepare then for the last battle.  Already the masses are 
moving.”248  For Douglass, movement and conflict of a particular order was integral to 
the teleological realization of human freedom.  He synchronized the narrative of escape 
and fugitive strife with this realization. 
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 *              *               * 
Of the four parts that comprise “The Heroic Slave,” each presents a series of 
events and encounters that give rise to and culminate in Madison’s ultimate struggle 
aboard the Creole.  The first three parts develop the relationship between Madison and 
Listwell.  It is by chance, so it seems at first, that Listwell happens upon Madison in the 
opening of the story.  Here each undergoes transformation and commits to the abolitionist 
struggle, as I have described above.  In the second section of the novella, “Five years 
after the foregoing singular occurrence, in the winter of 1840,” Madison serendipitously 
encounters Listwell at his home while passing through the state of Ohio on his flight to 
Canada as a fugitive (182).  In Part III, this time while Listwell travels through Virginia, 
he finds Madison once again re-enslaved.  “Mr. Listwell saw, for the first time in his life, 
a slave-gang on their way to market” (215).  After “running his eye up and down the 
fettered ranks, [Listwell] met the glance of one whose face he thought he had seen 
before” (216).  By the end of this third section, the narrative has linked Listwell’s and 
Madison’s decisions and actions to a grander historic development and narrative 
unfolding, an unfolding that will culminate in a final conflict aboard the Creole and 
resolve with the emancipation of over a hundred slaves.  So if not for Listwell’s first 
encounter with Madison, Listwell may never have committed to the abolitionist struggle.  
And again, if not for their third and final meeting in Part III, where Listwell stealthily 
hands Madison the metal files that will aid his escape and rebellion aboard the Creole in 
Part IV, we are left with the possibility that this “last battle” would hardly be possible.   
Separately, the encounters between Listwell and Madison appear coincidental, 
capricious, serendipitous.  Taken together, they evince order and trajectory.  Indeed, the 
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 world of Douglass’s heroic slave unfolds in such a way that events appear as part of a 
greater design and direction, not as arbitrary force or movement.  In the figures of 
Listwell and Madison, figures who both struggle against the institution of slavery, we see 
examples of human decision and action that function in accordance with cosmographic 
forces and historical progression.  Wittingly or unwittingly, Douglass had approximated 
the Hegelian concept of determination or destination (Bestimmun), linking what Michelle 
Gellrich has described as “the progressive movement of the Ideal into . . . individuated 
human action.”249  “Human passions and activities are the vehicles through which Spirit 
expresses itself.”250    
One of the central problematics for both Douglass and Hegel, along with the 
question of human action and contingency, had been the role of conflict in relation to 
order and world-historical processes. Though while not absolutely identical, both 
Douglass and Hegel held a general conception of conflict, whereby, “far from posing an 
ultimate threat to order and stability,” as it had for Plato, conflict functions as “a crucial 
transitional experience in world-historical process.”251  Hegel had referred to this order of 
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 conflict as Kollision, and in it we can see also Douglass’s understanding of an agonistic 
arrangement of forces and strife between slaves and the slave system.252  As Hegel had 
described, “The collision arises, as we are now considering it, in an act of violation, 
which is unable to retain its character as such, but is compelled to find a new principle of 
unity; it is a change in the previously existent condition of harmony, a change which is 
still in process.”253  Though Hegel and Douglass understood change “still in process,” 
they both appealed to the ordering and unifying power of conflict, insofar as conflict 
would bring forth “the resolution of the discord.”254  Recalling similarities to Douglass’s 
temperance, this “requirement of resolution,” as Gellrich notes, is the “importance of not 
carrying out opposition too far,” what Hegel posited as a “principle of necessity 
(Nothwendigkeit).”255  This principle and the appeal to resolution play out in the final 
section of Douglass’s narrative. 
  In Part four, the setting turns again to Virginia.  Shifting to a style noticeably 
different from the previous three sections, the narrative here mediates the Creole revolt 
through a conversation between “ocean birds” in a Marine Coffee-house some “two 
months after the sailing of [and rebellion aboard] the Virginia slave brig” (226).  
Challenged by an ignorant “old salt” by the name of Jack Williams, the first-mate of the 
Creole, Tom Grant, is forced to engage in apologetics and explain why he was unable to 
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 “manage ‘em,” the “rebellious darkies” (227), as Williams boasts he could do if he had 
been in Grant’s situation.  “With my back against the caboose, I could, myself, have 
flogged a dozen of them,” Williams swaggers; “had I been on board, by every monster of 
the deep, every black devil of ‘em all would have had his neck stretched from the yard-
arm” (227).   
The novella’s staging of Williams contra Grant poses an obvious but important 
rhetorical tactic.  Convinced that “a nigger’s a nigger, on sea or land; and is a coward,” 
Williams comes forth in “The Heroic Slave” as one who exemplifies and upholds a 
flawed but conventional nineteenth-century view of Negro intelligence and action.   
To me the whole thing seems unaccountable.  I cannot see how a dozen or two of 
ignorant negroes, not one of whom had ever been to sea before, and all of them 
were closely ironed between decks, should be able to get their fetters off, rush out 
of the hatchway in open daylight, kill two white men, the one the captain and the 
other their master, and then carry the ship into a British port, where every darkey 
of them was set free. (231-232) 
This is a perspective that his interlocutor Tom Grant, the first-mate who bears witness to 
the actual event, slowly dismantles in his own account of the “heroic slave” (228).  Grant 
challenges Williams’s position by first marking that he, himself, is neither a “coward” 
nor an “abolitionist” (230).  “I did all that any man with equal strength and presence of 
mind could have done,” Grant emphatically states to Williams and to the others in the 
Coffee-house.   
Having contributed to the inter-workings of the slave system, and therefore 
having never sympathized with the Negro slave in the past, Grant finds himself in an 
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 awkward position of explaining why he and other sailors aboard the slave ship were 
unable to quell the revolt.  This becomes awkward for Grant because he must rely on and 
attribute to slave property—a category that had, until this moment, been unproblematic 
for him—a sense of human intelligence equal to or, in this case, greater than his own:  
Mr. Williams speaks of ‘ignorant negroes,’ and, as a general rule, they are 
ignorant; but had he been onboard the Creole as I was, he would have seen cause 
to admit that there are exceptions to this general rule.  The leader of the mutiny in 
question was just as shrewd a fellow as ever I met in my life, and was as well 
fitted to lead a dangerous enterprise as any one white man in ten thousand (232). 
A moment later he will add this: “I confess, gentlemen, I felt myself in the presence of a 
superior man; one who, had he been a white man, I would have followed willingly and 
gladly in any horrible enterprise” (237). 
Grant further shifts the terms of the discourse from “murderous” rebellion to 
“mutiny” and, further still, to revolution—each denoting different registers of human 
action and intelligence as well as historic importance.  He explains, “The name of this 
man, strange to say (ominous in greatness,) was MADISON WASHINGTON.  In the 
short time he had on board, he had secured the confidence of every officer.  The negroes 
fairly worshipped him.  His manner and bearing were such, that no one could suspect him 
of a murderous purpose” (232).  In describing the upheaval and homicide aboard the ship, 
Grant reiterates Madison’s understanding of force: “‘Sir, said he, ‘your life is in my 
hands.  I could kill you a dozen times over during this last half hour, and could kill you 
now.  You call me a black murderer.  I am not a murderer.  God as my witness that 
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 LIBERTY, not malice, is the motive for this night’s work’” (234-235, emphasis in 
original). 
Grant reinterprets and therefore understands more clearly the “motive” for the 
slave rebellion as something greater than a random act of murder and brute violence, thus 
conceding Madison’s actions and words to higher, revolutionary ideals of liberty.  “It was 
not that his principles were wrong in the abstract; for they were the principles of 1776,” 
Grant confesses to the other gentlemen (238).  While describing Madison and his 
exceptional qualities, Grant retells the scene of recognition, wherein his ignorance gives 
way to the truth of the Creole revolt and Madison’s higher purpose.  “During all the 
storm, Madison stood firmly at the helm,--his keen eye fixed upon the binnacle,” he 
recounts to his listeners.  
He was not indifferent to the dreadful hurricane; yet he met it with the equanimity 
of an old sailor.  He was silent but not agitated.  The first words he uttered after 
the storm had slightly subsided, were characteristic of the man. ‘Mr. Mate, you 
cannot write the bloody laws of slavery on those restless billows.  The ocean, if 
not the land, is free.’ (237) 
As it had for Listwell in the opening of the narrative, the effect of Madison’s “words” 
play centrally in Grant’s ability to recognize Madison’s character and to recognize as 
well the scene not as murderous revolt but as a conflict that culminates forces writ large 
in nature itself: “The ocean, if not the land, is free.”  Of Madison’s words, Grant further 
elaborates to his audience,  
He seldom spake to any one, and when he did speak, it was with the utmost 
propriety.  His words were well chosen, and his pronunciation equal to that of any 
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 schoolmaster.  It was a mystery to us where he got his knowledge of language; but 
as little was said to him, none of us knew the extent of his intelligence and ability 
till it was too late. (233) 
It seems no accident that Douglass uses the word “propriety” to describe Madison’s 
speech.  “Propriety” expresses, of course, a sense of decorum, of being “proper.” More 
accurately it further denotes how words are “suited” for the specific occasion or action.  
And if we recall, the etymology of propriety derives from the Latin proprius, a sense of 
“one’s own” or “property.”256  So while Madison’s command of language challenges 
Grant’s previously held beliefs about slave intelligence, this ownership or mastery of 
language works in concert with his mastery (as temperance) over the energies of the 
rebellion.  Words and action, under the propriety of the heroic slave, suit the occasion, 
and in that occasion Grant hears and sees the reanimation of the “principles of 1776” 
even while he is charged with the task of opposing them.   
This part of the narrative then not only produces a crisis in Grant’s racial-logical 
cosmography—a cosmography that becomes dismantled by his encounter with a Negro 
slave whose intelligence and purpose recalls the American founders.  It brings to crisis 
and therefore collision the forces of liberty and slavery on a grander historical scale.  A 
couple years after Douglass had published “The Heroic Slave,” he would refer to this 
crisis as “The Final Struggle,” which must end, he argued with the “triumph” of liberty. 
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 The final scene of Douglass’s narrative resolves with an image of the “heroic chief and 
deliverer, Madison Washington,” disembarking the slave ship and marching to the 
“deafening cheers of a multitude of sympathizing spectators” (239).  So, yes, Madison 
Washington’s story becomes the retelling of the American Revolutionary story, even a 
more fully realized version that includes slave’s break from bondage and, therefore, the 
fuller emancipation of all human beings.257  And, yes, in this retelling of the 
revolutionary story, Douglass’s narrative approximates an audience who, like those 
“sympathizing spectators” watching as the liberated slaves disembark the slave vessel for 
the freedom at Nassau, fully recognize the “triumphant leadership of their heroic chief 
and deliverer, Madison Washington” (230).  That said, though, I want to underscore 
again that Douglass conceived of this triumphant ending and escape, this telos or 
destination to recall affinities to Hegel, as an outgrowth of or development from what he 
understood (or portrayed) as a larger agonistic between liberty and slavery.  “Liberty and 
Slavery cannot dwell together forever in the same country,” he had argued in November 
of 1855. “There is not one iota of affinity existing between them.  They hate each other, 
with a hatred which is unto death.”258  The final conflict, as Douglass conceived it, had 
arisen out of these two incommensurable orders.  The “ultimate triumph” would, 
however, belong to liberty, but not before the resolution of “a crisis more critical than any 
which [had] preceded it.”259    
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 The agonistic struggle and its “final” resolution provided Douglass a conceit for 
imagining the role of conflict in history and as an unfolding of history itself.  American 
power, or its full revolutionary potential as it had been articulated in the “principles,” was 
integral to the realization of this history.260  Douglass’s aesthetics could account for 
violent struggle, but this struggle evinced movement, direction, destination.   
In the relation between liberty and slavery, dramatized through the figure of the 
agon, however, Douglass evaded another set of relational possibilities and, therefore, 
another and more problematic order of conflict.261  In other words, he avoided the 
problematic of portraying the struggle between the forces of domination and those 
dominated as a form of permanent strife or stasis attendant with American power.  For 
Douglass, the ultimate conflict provided the ultimate escape, a way out—what, in 
philological and literary terms, we understand as póros.262  This would not be true of 
Melville’s “Benito Cerero.”   
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dominant “liberal consensus” that was shaping the debate over slavery in the nineteenth century.  See 
David F. Ericson, The Debate over Slavery: Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America 
(New York and London: New York University Press, 2000).   
 
261 To have concluded the narrative at the moment of liberation and success Douglass’s “Heroic Slave” also 
necessitated the omission of a juridical, geopolitical, and historical complication.  As David Brion Davis 
recently documents and as other historians and critics have noted, the Creole case sparked a legal feud 
between the U.S. and Britain.  Biting their thumbs at the Americans, the British refused to return the slaves 
to the United States and, moreover, supported the slaves’ appeal for liberty under British domain.  Aligning 
himself with the same interests as the South’s, the Northerner and, at that time, Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster threatened Britain with retaliation, even war, and demanded that slave owners in the U.S. be 
compensated for their loss of property. David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery 
in the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 269. The tension between the two nations 
took over a decade to resolve, and in 1853 a “claims commission ruled in favor of Webster and the United 
States,” thus requiring Britain to “pay $110,330 to American claimants” (Davis, 269).  So while Douglass’s 
narrative had provided an ostensible resolution of the slave conflict aboard the Creole, the event set off and 
intensified geopolitical tensions over slavery, the question of property, and sovereign interests.  
 
262 See Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society 
(Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), 21. 
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3.3. Babo’s Invention, Asymmetric Tactics, and the Aporia of American Power  
 
“As for the black—whose brain, not body, had schemed and led the revolt, 
with the plot . . .” 263  
“Like Negroes, these powers own man sullenly; mindful of their higher 
master, while serving, plot revenge.” 264      
 
While Douglass’s “The Heroic Slave” depicts the successful liberation of 
Madison Washington and the other slaves aboard the Creole as a resolution to the 
narrative, a resolution that is meant also to suggest the further realization of the 
“principles of 1776,” Melville’s “Benito Cereno,” by contrast, neither presents the 
insurrection aboard the San Dominick wholly in terms of revolutionary emancipation.  
Nor does it elide the destruction and violence of the uprising.  Unlike Douglass’s 
portrayal of “tempered” force in “The Heroic Slave,” violence and brutality play centrally 
in Babo’s revolt aboard the San Dominick.  “Babo was the plotter from first to last,” as 
Benito Cereno describes in his deposition; “he ordered every murder, and was the helm 
and keel of the revolt” (97).  Cereno’s deposition further describes the conflict with 
images of Negroes murdering by “hand-spikes and hatchets,” of “negresses” wanting “to 
have tortured to death, instead of simply killing, the Spaniards,” and of other slaves 
                                                 
263 Herman Melville, “Benito Cereno,” [1855]  Melville’s Short Novels. (New York: Norton, 2002) 102. 
 
264 Herman Melville, “The Bell-Tower,” The Piazza Tales [1856]. (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1987) 174. 
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 throwing the ship’s live crew members “overboard” (91).  There is the scene, too, of Don 
Alexandro Aranda’s demise, perhaps the most brutal of all:  
[A]nd immediately the negro Babo commanded the Ashantee Martinque and the 
Ashantee Leche to go and commit the murder; that those two went down with 
hatchets to the berth of Don Alexandro; that, yet half alive and mangled, they 
dragged him on deck; that they were going to throw him overboard in that state, 
but the negro Babo stopped them, bidding the murder be completed on the deck 
before him, which was done, when, by his orders, the body was carried below, 
forward; that nothing more was seen of it by the deponent for three days. . .” (93) 
On the fourth day, following a number of other deaths, Babo displays a skeleton, “which 
had been substituted for the ship’s proper figure-head, the image of Christopher Colon, 
the discoverer of the New World” (93).  To Benito Cereno, and subsequently to every 
other crew member yet alive, Babo asks “whose skeleton that was, and whether, from its 
whiteness, he should not think it a white’s,” and pressing still, threatens Cereno and 
others: “‘Keep faith with the blacks from here to Senegal, or you shall in spirit, as now in 
body, follow your leader,’ pointing to the prow” (93). 
 How does one begin to theorize this order of violence aboard the San Dominick 
particularly in relation to the tempered, agonistic conflict in which Douglass conceived 
his narrative?  Where Douglass had evinced faith in the possibility of liberal democratic 
ideals and republican principles, Melville was bitten by “atheist doubt” (83).  It was an 
atheism that cast doubt, of course, on the “Providence” that guided Delano’s actions, but 
it was also a doubt in the possibility of conflict as a necessarily liberating action.  For 
Melville, there was no “final conflict,” as Douglass had envisioned, but a perpetual 
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 struggle that coincided with the security of property rights and the enforcement of 
fugitive slave law.  For its cruelty and brutal spectacle, but also for the way it shows how 
Babo’s violence and insurrection are inscribed within greater forces of domination, the 
scene of Babo’s execution and dismemberment bears repeating: “Some months after, 
dragged to the gibbet at the tail of the mule, the black met his voiceless end.  The body 
was burned to ashes; but for the many days, the head, that hive of subtlety, fixed on a 
pole in the Plaza, met, unabashed, the gaze of the whites (102).”  The scene recalls the 
execution of Nat Turner, the decapitation of other slave rebels, and the sight in Jerusalem, 
Virginia, that acquired the name “Blackhead Signpost.”265  
Attending to the topic of conflict, specifically focusing on the “war and peace 
theme” surfacing throughout Melville’s oeuvre, Joyce Adler has argued that “Melville’s 
passion against war was a great dynamic in his imagination and main shaping force in his 
art.”266  Though it’s true that Melville’s works do in fact exhibit a critical attitude toward 
the cruelties and consequences of war, especially in an era marked by the ubiquity of 
international conflicts and internal strife, Adler’s thematic reading presupposes a model 
of conflict conceived around a binary: war and peace.   For Adler, there are definitive 
boundaries between conflict and peace—a model of conflict that arranges peace as the 
resolution of conflict, and war as the dissolution of peace.  Adler’s reading of conflict in 
Melville’s work, I want to contend, forecloses the possibility for understanding 
asymmetric relations of force, especially those forces exhibited by American power that, 
                                                 
265  Kenneth S. Greenburg, Nat Turner: A Slave Rebellion in History and Memory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) notes that one or more heads may have been displayed at this location.  He also 
notes that a cavalry in the moments immediately subsequent Turner’s rebellion “had reportedly cut off the 
heads of 15 rebels.” 21.  Eric Sundquist in To Wake the Nations has previously linked Melville’s image of 
Babo’s head with “Blackhead Signpost.” (71). 
 
266 Joyce Sparer Adler, War in Melville’s Imagination (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 3. 
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 as I have been trying to show in the previous chapter and as I will further demonstrate in 
this one, had preoccupied Melville throughout the 1850s.267   
My intention in this section is not solely to critique Adler’s study of Melville but 
to redirect and pose the question of conflict in Melville’s works a bit differently.  To 
suggest the “war and peace” theme as paradigmatic of Melville’s representation of 
conflict in the nineteenth century, as Adler does, is to misrecognize his radical 
understanding of slavery and the enforcement of property rights as a set of conditions and 
arrangements in which conflict had permeated the civil sphere.268  We must remember 
that Melville understood Amasa Delano’s actions as exemplary enforcement of fugitive 
slave law on a grand, global scale.  His doubts about the “finality” of conflict—as, say, 
Douglass had imagined—allows us to examine, therefore, how “Benito Cereno” situates 
Babo’s violence within the greater schematics of Delano’s enforcement of domination 
and how this enforcement saturated the quotidian.  This totalization of conflict 
throughout the civil sphere approximates Clausewitz, but just as importantly it borrows 
from and contributes to the concept of stasis, a concept that Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, 
Hobbes, among others, had used to theorize civil strife.   
As a work of aesthetics, “Benito Cereno” styles Babo’s plot rather differently than 
Douglass’s narrative of struggle and escape.  This anti-heroic, anti-cathartic, anti-
progressive style has posed problematics for critics at least since F.O. Matthiessen’s 
                                                 
267 In the previous chapter, “Bloody Enforcement on a Grand Global Scale,” particularly in section 3, I 
explain in detail how Melville’s understanding of this arrangement prefigures the historical and critical 
work of Michel Foucault, Gille Deleuze, and Paul Virilio, among others, who examine the influence of 
Clausewitz’s theory of “total war.” 
 
268 See particularly Adler’s reading of the final scene of Moby-Dick and the resolution of a conflict that 
culminates with a “memorable surrealistic image to pictorialize the idea of a transformed and peaceful 
world” (76).   
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 American Renaissance and for those who have followed in Matthiessen’s wake.269  Of 
the dozens if not hundreds of pages devoted to Melville in American Renaissance, 
Matthiessen offered one solitary paragraph on “Benito Cereno: 
Thus Melville’s vision tended always to be more complex than the posing of a 
white innocence against a very black evil.  In Moby Dick, and drastically in 
Pierre, the symbolical values of this contrast began so to interchange that they 
could not always be followed.  In “Benito Cereno” they become distinct again, 
but the embodiment of good in the pale Spanish captain and of evil in the 
mutinied African crew, though pictorially and theatrically effective, was 
unfortunate in raising unanswered questions.  Although the Negroes were 
savagely vindictive and drove a terror of blackness into Cereno’s heart, the fact 
remains that they were slaves and that evil had thus originally been done to them.  
Melville’s failure to reckon with this fact within the limits of his narrative makes 
its tragedy, for all its prolonged suspense, comparatively superficial.270 
Rather than tracing out and theorizing the significance of how these “symbolical values” 
might be “interchanging” in “Benito Cereno” as they do in Melville’s earlier works, 
Matthiessen argued, erroneously I believe, that these “values” become stable and 
“distinct again.”  Matthiessen’s reading, therefore, posits that in order for Melville’s 
narrative to arrive at any kind of tragic weightiness or import, rather than superficiality, 
                                                 
269 See for instance Stanley T. Williams, “‘Follow Your Leader’: Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” Virginia 
Quarterly Review, 23 (1947), 61-76; Rosalie Feltenstein, “Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno,’” American 
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 Melville should have recognized that “evil had thus originally been done to [the slaves].”  
(Matthiessen misses, then, the torturous scene of Babo’s decapitation at the end of the 
story, a scene which I’ll address below.) 
The idea that “Benito Cereno” is a failed tragedy or superficial narrative, as 
Matthiessen had argued, reflects not on Melville’s inabilty to recognize the problem of 
evil “done to” slaves.  Indeed, as I have shown, as have a number of critics, Melville was 
keenly aware of this cruelty.  The “failure” of the tragedy suggests, rather, Matthiessen’s 
own incapacity to recognize how “Benito Cereno” has rendered the problem of evil in 
terms or “values” unfamiliar to Matthiessen’s “economy” of struggle within tragedy, an 
economy of struggle evinced in slave rebellion that cannot be rendered in the relationship 
of agonistic struggle.  Douglass had tried to work within this economy, providing a heroic 
representation of the slave rebel.  For Melville, though, the violence of the slave revolt 
had challenged what Matthiessen is want to describe as the “balance” and “reconciliation 
of opposites” essential to his definition of tragedy: “But not only must the author of 
tragedy have accepted the inevitable co-existence of good and evil in man’s nature, he 
must also posses the power to envisage some reconciliation between such opposites, and 
the control to hold an inexorable balance.”271  Matthiessen finds the “savagely 
vindictive” “terror” of the rebellion incompatible with producing tragedy proper.  The 
superficiality of Melville’s narrative, as Matthiessen had argued, falls outside the 
                                                 
271 Matthiessen, 180. In the opening of chapter five, “The Vision of Evil,” Matthiessen provides his 
definition of tragedy.  
The creation of tragedy demands of its author a mature understanding of the relation of the 
individual to society, and, more especially, of the nature of good and evil. . . .  For the hero of 
tragedy is never merely an individual, he is a man of action, in conflict with other individuals in a 
definite social order. . . . But not only must the author of tragedy have accepted the inevitable co-
existence of good and evil in man’s nature, he must also posses the power to envisage some 
reconciliation between such opposites, and the control to hold an inexorable balance. (179-80). 
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 “cathartic cultural form” and “dialectical/teleological economy,” to use William Spanos’s 
terms, that critics such as Matthiessen had attempted to read into nineteenth-century 
American works.  I agree with Spanos that Matthiessen like others of the Cold-War era 
had indeed appropriated an Aristotelian, but more importantly, Hegelian concept of 
tragedy and conflict.272  What Hegel had borrowed from the pre-Socratics—and what I 
would argue F.O. Matthiessen and others, including Douglass, inherited in their 
conceptions of tragedy and narrative—is the notion that opposing forces or agons express 
“the same elemental powers,” that they are “bound in a periodic order of reciprocity and 
symmetry.”273   
Quite subtly, “Benito Cereno” avoids a conception of conflict that is understood 
in terms of symmetry and equilibrium.  It poses, instead, an important historical 
problematic regarding the exercise of force by the U.S. after the passage off the Fugitive 
Slave Act that intensifies and extends to the state a capacity to reinforce slavery’s 
strategy of domination.  Rather than framing the question of violence in terms of 
                                                 
272 William Spanos, The Errant Art of Moby-Dick: The Canon, the Cold War, and the Struggle for 
American Studies (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995).  He writes, “Tragedy thus 
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273 Gellrich, 28. As Gellrich argues, Hegel’s theory of tragedy and concepts of conflict or Kollision, 
(differing from Plato’s suspicions of all conflict), “owes something to pre-Socratic ideas” and to Aristotle 
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logos.” For Hegel, whose theory of tragedy is rooted in some of the pre-Socratic ideas of conflict, “the 
universe is orderly not in spite of but because of strife and the violent opposition of elements” (Gellrich, 
25-26).   The “simultaneous destructive and revitalizing” qualities of Kollision renders this sort of conflict a 
“suitable structural principle for [Hegel’s] rationalizing account of tragedy” and his philosophy of history 
(Gellrich, 27).  The synthesis produced in conflict as agonistic or Kollision “guarantees the forward thrust 
of the dialectic, as a principle of progress as history” (Gellrich, 28).  
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 revolutionary emancipation and its triumph—a sense of order that emerges in the 
symmetric conflict of agons—Melville’s “Benito Cereno” meditates instead on the 
inhuman conditions out of which give rise the turbulence and asymmetric relationship of 
force between those who dominate and those, like Negro slaves, who are the subject of 
domination. 
*              *               * 
Though the category “asymmetric conflict” isn’t formalized as a body of research 
until the latter half of the twentieth century, “Benito Cereno” depicts how this 
relationship of force has had a long historical entanglement with American power.  First 
appearing in Andrew Mack’s “The Concept of Power and Its Uses in Explaining 
Asymmetric Conflict” in 1974, and supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
British Social Science Research Council, the category of “asymmetric conflict” as an 
object of study and a field of knowledge emerged in order to historicize and then theorize 
for the sake of strategy the disproportionate relationship of strong military state forces in 
conflict with weaker state or even non-state forces in the wake of the U.S.’s “failure” in 
Vietnam.274  The central question of this research, as Mack articulated it in a 1975 essay, 
was “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.”275  The guerrilla tactics used by the 
Vietnamese against the U.S. exemplified the kind of relationship of power that this 
research could then trace to other conflicts that occurred in places like “Algiers, Cyprus, 
Aden, Morocco, and Tunisia,” whereby “local nationalist forces [or other aggregations] 
gained their objectives in armed confrontations with industrial powers which possessed 
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 an overwhelming superiority in conventional military capability.”276  What Mack cites as 
“nationalist forces,” however, marks only one possible form of aggregation that can 
emerge as a response or counter-force to “metropolitan,” imperial power.  This 
relationship of force could be found, historically, in the internal struggles between those 
committed to American order and “domestic enemies.” 
In an archival collection arranged as The New American State Papers, and in the 
volume particularly focusing on source materials that document the “inconclusive 
guerrilla wars, such as the three fought with the Seminoles, and [other] violent threats to 
domestic tranquility,” editor Benjamin Cooling remarks, “what emerges most clearly” in 
this archive “is that organized violence through the agency of armed force was a central 
element in U.S. policy—foreign and domestic—during the period prior to the Civil 
War.”277  This fact should not go unnoticed, as it suggests the centrality that military 
preparedness had played in an era where state violence was directed toward “not full-
scale wars but small, often less then successful internal actions.”278  
Asymmetry describes the relationship; guerrilla tactics articulate the type of force 
exercised by those who struggle against state domination.  Though Mack omits from his 
analysis the “domestic” insurrections and the Negro slave revolts that occur in the 
nineteenth century (and earlier) as instances of asymmetric conflict, historian Herbert 
Aptheker had explicitly documented how the many insurrections by slaves (often in 
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 collusion with American Indians) in the Americas evinced guerrilla warfare.279  With the 
introduction and enforcement of chattel slavery in the New World since the seventeenth 
century, this type of conflict had become ubiquitous and regularly occurring.  By the 
nineteenth century, especially during the 1850s, the moment out of which Douglass and 
Melville both take up the question of slave resistance, there is a general intensification of 
insurrectionary violence.280  This violence, in turn, is coupled with a heightened security 
apparatus in the South, which in its implicit and explicit emergency status further 
deputizes and militarizes its white citizens in order to maintain control over Negro 
populations and to anticipate any possible threat of Negro slave terror.  As I’ve described 
below, the federal enforcement of slave owners’ property rights in the 1850s extended 
this security element throughout the U.S. and its territories.   
In his comments on Nat Turner, Eric Sundquist has also touched upon the 
question of guerrilla warfare, and he aptly though briefly considers the effect of terror 
that arises out of Turner’s guerrilla tactics.281  What Sundquist overlooks in his treatment 
of Turner and his general references to guerrilla conflict, however, is the perpetual and 
irresolvable qualities of asymmetric conflict.  Guerrilla tactics function within (and, 
indeed, are a function of) an arrangement of power in which decisive victory becomes 
nearly impossible to achieve for those subject to domination and brute force.  This is 
precisely the type of arrangement which Melville had attempted to dramatize in “Benito 
Cereno.” Like Clausewitz, who earlier in the nineteenth century had addressed the 
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 question of guerilla conflict, or the “people’s war” as he described the Prussian resistance 
to France, Melville also understood that “the possibility of guerilla [conflict] alone” 
would not necessarily “bring any war to a decisive end.”282   
Here I need to repeat the problematic with which I began—the problematic 
central to Melville’s meditation on violence and force in “Benito Cereno”:  Melville 
attempted to dramatize the nineteenth-century American scene as a set of arrangements 
from which there is no ready escape, no resolution to strife.  As it begins, so too does the 
story end: still caught in medias res—as entangled as the leitmotif of the knot that 
reappears throughout the story.  The possibility of escape and the finality of conflict that 
was central to Douglass’s political, aesthetic, and rhetorical project, in Melville’s story 
becomes cast in shadowy doubt.  Babo may have duped the American Amasa Delano and 
reversed, though temporarily, the relationship between master and slave, but in the end, 
the weight of “recaption,” evinced by Delano’s foot which “ground the prostrate Negro,” 
stifled the possibility of flight to Senegal (“Benito Cereno” 85).  The story, though, does 
not end here—with Babo’s defeat and the containment of slave property—but with the 
subtle yet haunting image of a “subtle” mind: “the black—whose brain, not body, had 
schemed and led the revolt, with the plot” (102).  Melville’s mediation becomes as much 
about a lingering and historical intelligence under domination as it was about how the 
U.S. instantiated a form of state-sanctioned and enforced domination. 
*              *               * 
Like Douglass, Melville assumed intelligence on the part of the rebellious slave.  
Rather than situating this intelligence within a heroic persona, though, Melville’s “Benito 
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 Cereno” took up the question of Babo’s “hive of subtlety” as an historical and political 
problematic that had emerged with the trade and enforcement of human slavery.  Where 
Douglass invoked Madison Washington’s actions as exemplary of the type of mind 
necessary from bringing about revolutionary, historic change, the possibility of escape 
from the bondage, Melville’s Babo seems coincidental with the long history of 
domination and, therefore, with insurrections that had defined arrangements of force in 
the Americas since the sixteenth century.  In other words, the dramatis persona of Babo 
is not necessarily exemplary or exceptional (rhetorically or physically) in the ways that 
Madison is, but he does figure as an example of the uncountable minds in the long history 
of slavery and slave insurrections that had invented strategies for insurrection, invented 
tactics for the possibility of success, even as this success was temporary.  
To avoid the detection of Amasa Delano’s intervention aboard the San Dominick, 
Babo’s insurrection necessitates a mask.  He does this by actually inventing another 
“plot,” by discovering and making use of the discursive resources and topoi such as race 
and nationalism, gender and strength, sublimity and gothic aesthetics—the very topoi that 
give order, shape, and meaning to Delano’s world.  After boarding and offering to help 
the suffering crew and “human cargo” of the San Dominick, Delano continues to believe 
the “story” about the cause of the ship’s demise told to him by Cereno, even though he 
senses at times that something is amiss.  At one point, he conjectures, “If Don Benito’s 
story was throughout an invention, then every soul on board, down to the youngest 
negress, was his carefully drilled recruit in the plot” (56, my emphasis).   
The reference to invention and plot here and elsewhere throughout the narrative 
underscores how “plot” operates ironically on two different registers: first, as piratical or 
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 insurrectionary scheme; second, as fictional or dramatic narrative.  How Babo exhibits 
inventiveness through his plots, and the role of invention in relation to tactics, I will 
elaborate anon.  First, however, Delano’s suspicions that there is a “plot” and that 
something is amiss aboard the San Dominick are not entirely wrong, but he is unable to 
recognize the source, attributing it mostly to the Spaniard.  What makes it difficult for 
Delano to think the worst of the situation is that all aspects of the story and how the 
miserable condition befell the ship can be corroborated.  In a mode of inquiry that 
resembles detective work, for instance, Delano asks other crew members if they can re-
tell and therefore substantiate Benito Cereno’s initial story about how the San Dominick 
had been imperiled and disabled off the island of St. Maria.  In one instance, “He 
advanced to an old Barcelona tar, in ragged red breeches and dirty night-cap.”  Delano 
then asks him, “several questions concerning the voyage, questions purposely referring to 
several particulars in Don Benito’s narrative, not previously corroborated by the 
impulsive cries greeting the visitor on first coming aboard.  The questions were briefly 
answered, confirming all that remained to be confirmed of the story” (59-60). 
It appears to Delano that every member aboard the San Dominick, “down to the youngest 
negress,” is able to rehearse and perform the particulars of this miserable, gray narrative.  
Occurring at least halfway through the novella, Benito Cereno “resumed, 
rehearsing to Captain Delano” the plot, making “repetitions of former statements” as if 
reciting lines, retelling “how it came to pass that the passage from Cape Horn to St. Maria 
had been so exceedingly long, now and then mingling with his words, incidental praises, 
less qualified than before, to the blacks, for their general good conduct” (73). And some 
moments later, in one of the most ironically constructed and highly theatrical scenes of 
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 the novella, where the servant Babo is shaving his master, Delano is again confronted 
with the possibility that Cereno and all those aboard the San Dominick are masquerading 
while some other plot lies below the surface: 
To Captain Delano’s imagination, now again not wholly at rest, there was 
something so hollow in the Spaniard’s manner, with apparently some reciprocal 
hollowness in the servant’s dusky comment of silence, that the idea flashed across 
him, that possibly master and man, for some unknown purpose, were acting out, 
both in word and deed, nay, to the very tremor of Don Benito’s limbs, some 
juggling play before him.  Neither did the suspicion of collusion lack apparent 
support, from the fact of those whispered conferences before mentioned.  But 
then, what could be the object of enacting this play of the barber before him?  At 
last, regarding the notion as a whimsy, insensibly suggested, perhaps, by the 
theatrical aspect of Don Benito in his harlequin design, Captain Delano speedily 
banished it.  (73-74, My emphasis) 
More explicitly than any other scene in “Benito Cereno,” this one presents the ironic 
masquerading of the conflict and of the temporary reversal of power relations between 
“master and “man.”  The irony—or the real force of Babo’s invention—is that though the 
insurrection has temporarily reversed or inverted the relations of master and slave, the 
servant-slave continues to play the role of servant-slave.  While Delano suspects that 
Cereno and Babo are “enacting this play of the barber before him,” he is unable to 
recognize how the “play” performs the very thing that he habitually always-already 
anticipates.  Even Cereno’s seemingly “hollow” performance plays into that which 
Delano expects from the Spaniard’s inadequate ability to execute the role of commander.  
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 To Delano, Don Benito Cereno is the harlequin already masked.  His scabbard 
“artificially stiffened” and “without sword,” he is an impotent who performs, as 
commedia dell’arte, the role of captain in a world that requires strong “policy.”  
Though it is important to recognize, as many critics have, that Delano here 
continues to misread the shaving scene, a performance of the very master-slave 
relationship that has already been inverted, I want to suggest that performativity itself is 
not the central issue.  Nor is it central that all those aboard the San Dominick are 
performing the “plot.”  The real threat is the invention, a creative though potentially 
destructive force that borrows from the loci or topoi of Delano’s own cosmography. 
Douglass’s protagonist uses physical strength coupled with his powers of 
persuasion equal to or greater than that of his oppressors.  Babo evinces none of these 
qualities, as the story renders in the penultimate paragraph of the narrative: “As for the 
black—whose brain, not body, had schemed and led the revolt, with the plot—his slight 
frame, inadequate to that which it held, had at once yielded to the superior muscular 
strength of his captor, in the boat” (102).  Against Delano’s “superior muscular strength,” 
here the full and ironic force of Babo’s cunning intelligence, “the head, that hive of 
subtly,” comes to the fore.   
In the arrangement of the hunt, of chasing and fleeing, of applying force and 
exploiting subterfuges, Melville marked the arrangement par excellence of the mid-
nineteenth-century moment.  In Moby-Dick the question of intelligence, “malicious 
intelligence” as Ahab called it, Melville dramatized this arrangement through the hunt of 
the white whale.  With further mediation on this arrangement and its link to the juridical 
and political problematic imposed by the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, Melville’s 
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 attention turned directly to the figure of the slave in flight.  Babo’s intelligence and the 
tactics he deploys holds likeness to what Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant have 
described in their scholarship on ancient Greek culture as “a power of cunning and 
deceit” that “operates through disguise” (21).  They trace these and similar tactics 
through the figure of an intelligence exhibited by mētis.  Michel de Certeau would later 
call upon Detienne’s and Vernant’s work on Greek mētis, along with other “ancient 
ruses” such as the Chinese I-Ching and the Arabic hīla, to examine these inventive 
“tactics” as “an art of the week.”283  We need to remember, though, that Melville had 
long discovered these tactics as well in his own reading and philology.  As Detienne and 
Vernant mark in a genealogy, the topic of “cunning intelligence” could be found, of 
course, in Homer’s Odysseus, the man of twists and turns, but could be traced out in the 
influences that linked the writings of Aristotle to Plutarch and Oppian, figures whom 
Melville would have had access, either directly or indirectly.284  Joshua Leslie and 
Sterling Stuckey have also noted Melville’s reading of Mungo Park and, therefore, the 
possibility that, through Park’s knowledge of Senegalese culture and African irony, had 
based Babo’s on the trickster figure, Brer Rabbit.285   
As Vernant and Detienne claim, the history of mētis is long, “extending over more 
than ten centuries.”  My aim here is not to repeat this history but to draw out certain 
qualities and characteristics of intelligence and tactics that Babo evinces as a figure 
entangled in a relationship that pits him and other slaves against brute force and 
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284 See chapter two, “Fishing for Whales as Practices of Empire” 
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 domination, to which the Greeks had also given names, Bie and Kratos.286  It is out of 
this arrangement with domination that cunning intelligence has any chance for success.  
Metis “comes into play” in “the pursuit of success,” taking place “in a particular sphere 
of activity,” in a particularly sphere of conflict.287  Writing in the same century as 
Melville, Clausewitz also explored the “tactics of the weak,” locating these tactics in 
practices of deception, trickery and wit, as de Certeau reminds us.288  In opposition to 
Delano’s “muscular strength,” Babo must throughout resort to cunning (dolos), tricks, 
(kerde), and the ability to seize an opportunity, kairos.”  Cunning intelligence and deceit, 
in other words, are those capacities which give “the weaker competitor the means of 
triumphing over the stronger, enabling the inferior to outdo the superior rival.”289  
                                                
Babo’s insurrection and flight can only be successful if he is able to convince 
Delano that what he sees before him is not a Negro slave revolt but a ship in distress, one 
paralyzed by storms and bad currents and in need of his charity.  As a weaker force in 
conflict with the strength of Delano, Babo must ironically continue to perform weakness 
and inferiority. Convincing Delano of requires Babo’s plot to develop from and deploy 
topoi that are congruent with Delano’s frame of reference, his own purview of the world 
and the place of America within it.  The situation in which Babo and the other slaves find 
themselves calls for a way of concealing the revolt by posing or masking themselves as 
already-enslaved beings who show no signs of agency and intelligence equal to that of 
the American.  They act the part of docile “Newfoundland dogs” as Delano expects them 
 
286 Detienne and Vernant, 13. 
 
287 Detienne and Varnant, 11 
 
288 de Certeau, 37. 
 
289 Detienne and Varnant, 27.  Leslie and Stuckey note these qualities in Babo as well (295). 
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 to do, so their success in this instance depends upon Delano’s continued belief in white 
supremacy and a racial-logical hierarchy—not only over Africana slaves but over the 
Spanish as well.  Out of his invention must materialize the proper face (persona) for its 
role.  This form of intelligence manifests itself “the thousand ploys which will make 
actions effective in the most varied of circumstances.”290 
In Melville, “invention” assumes the tactical element of the field of battle that 
becomes central to the thinking of de Certeau, via the philology and classical research of 
Detienne and Vernant, but it likewise calls on a use central to the arena of rhetorical 
argument.  Receiving its most influential treatment in Cicero’s De Inventione and De 
Oratore, invention (from the Latin inventio or Greek heuresis) carries the double 
meaning of both to make and to discover.  Whether in the arena of battle or the 
argument—the tactical challenges invoked by invention are similar: to invent what will 
help one succeed, to make or discover the topics that are suitable to the task at hand.  The 
success of Cicero as orator and rhetorician, someone who was “an expert in the ars 
topica,” was a lesson that did not go unnoticed by Vico.291  Asserting that rhetorical 
invention should be the principal or central component of education and the formation of 
intelligence, Vico posits in De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (On the Study of 
Methods of Our Time) that training in the ars topica is something that should not be lost 
to “modern” methods.  Vico was of course in conflict at the time with Cartesian ideas 
about deduction and philosophical criticism, which he maintained had “utterly 
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 disregarded the art of topics.”292  Recognizing the potential of rhetorical invention and 
the mastery of the “loci” that Cicero had exercised, Vico insists that it “was exactly by 
[the use of these loci] that he was able to dominate the law and courts, the Senate, and 
(most important of all) the Assemblies of the people” (16).  Vico’s argument about 
education on the ars topica, eloquence, and invention gives shape to other ideas about 
secular history and human making (that is, on verum factum).  Vico’s use of the term 
“discoverta” (discovery), Giuseppe Mazzotta reminds us, “is not different from the 
invention rhetoricians such as Cicero have elaborated.”293  Invention enacts not only an 
argument or tactic in conflict but recognizes the historical as integral to the conflict.  “As 
a discovery of what the past keeps hidden, invention finds and brings to light what is 
always already there.”294  As does Melville’s novella through the figure of Babo, 
invention or “discovery” has “the power to unsettle the past and the understanding of the 
past.”295  In “Benito Cereno,” Babo’s invention unsettles the past and in doing so shows 
its entanglement with the present.   
Like trickery, entanglements and knots, too, are the “special weapons of mētis, 
Detienne and Vernant remind us.296  “To weave (plékein) and to twist (stréphein) are key 
                                                 
292 Vico, On the Study of Methods, 14. “Traditional ‘topics,’” he instructed, “is the art of finding 
[discovering or making] ‘the medium,’ i.e., the middle term: in the conventional language of scholasticism, 
“medium” indicates what the Latins call argumentum.  Those who know all the loci, i.e., the lines of 
argument to be used, are able (by operation not unlike reading the printed characters on a page) to grasp 
extemporaneously the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case” (15).   
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 words in the terminology connected with it.”297  The Greeks had given the name 
Strophaios (from which we recognize the word strophe) to the “sophist who knows how 
to interweave and twist together speeches and artifices.”298  Speeches interwoven can 
become traps or knotted puzzles, “which is the name given to some types of fishing 
nets.”299  Melville offers little in the way of dramatizing Babo’s speech as Douglass does 
Madison Washington’s.  Still, Babo’s plot evinces an ability on the slave’s part to 
discover and manipulate words, albeit they are mouthed through other characters such as 
Benito Cereno.  But this, perhaps, becomes the trap of all traps, a work of sophistry so 
elaborate, a knot so tangled that Delano finds it nearly incapable of deciphering. 
Discovering from an ancient set of figures, and from the classical and humanists 
notion of invention, Melville’s philology allowed him to create a scenario for thinking or 
understanding the arrangements that had come to define American power in the 
nineteenth-century present.  In other words, the figures that Melville deploys in “Benito 
Cereno” and elsewhere cannot be taken as universal, but through invention they help 
form a more adequate way for depicting how the U.S. was shaping the world in the 
1850s.  Babo’s tactics, his “plot,” centered on subtlety, cunning, and trickery, but as 
trickster this does not necessarily make him heroic as other critics have claimed, most 
notably Leslie and Stuckey.300  Trickery and cunning are not necessarily the mode of 
“final escape,” as Douglass had presented Madison Washington, but a set of tactics that 
might make possible a brief survival, maybe a temporary reversal of power relations.  
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 Melville understood cunning and trickery as the tactics for a set of arrangements that 
resembled an aporiatic struggle, of stasis.  Success under these conditions of domination 
was ephemeral.  Babo’s flight from bondage, we are forced painfully to recall, ends in his 
own destruction and the return of his comrades to bondage.   
As all stories do, the words on the page come to an end, but in “Benito Cereno,” 
the force of the narrative re-installs the haunting presence of Babo’s mind into a present 
that has yet to recognize and understand how to escape from the very forces and 
conditions in which this order of intelligence becomes necessary:  “Some months after, 
dragged to the gibbet at the tail of a mule, the black met his voiceless end.  The body was 
burned to ashes; but for many days, the head, that hive of subtlety, fixed on a pole in the 
Plaza, met, unabashed, the gaze of the whites” (102).   
It’s telling that Melville’s many images of entrapment or sabotage, of waif and 
line, figure also into his metaphors for writing and narrative.  Moby-Dick performs an 
elaborate weave, “Benito Cereno” a hempen knot.  In The Confidence-Man (1857), his 
final work of prose fiction from that turbulent decade, Melville would twist and turn one 
of the most elaborate aporias, would enact a sophistry so cunning that at least one critic 
would call it “one of the most infidel books ever written by an American.”301  In the 
following and final chapter, I take up the question of Melville’s writing as infidelity, 
examining how The Confidence-Man establishes a problematic around the notion of 
movement and freedom, particularly how freedom as movement had formed the basis of 
a liberal doxa in the U.S.  This is the same order of liberalism that, while celebrating the 
U.S. as an instantiation of movement and energy, had paradoxically produced a set of 
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 conditions resembling stasis.  Like “Benito Cereno,” The Confidence-Man becomes an 
exercise of inventing in stasis, where stasis signifies both the arrest of movement but also, 
historically and critically, the conditions of internal strife. 
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4. THE FIDÈLE AND AMERICAN MOVEMENT 
 
4.1. A New Stultifera Navis  
  
Here reigned the dashing and all-fusing spirit of the West, whose type is 
the Mississippi itself, which, uniting the streams of the most distant and 
opposite zones, pours them along, helter-skelter, in one cosmopolitan and 
confident tide. 
Herman Melville, The Confidence-Man302 
 
But the historian will see that trade was the principle of Liberty; that trade 
planted America and destroyed Feudalism; that it makes peace and keeps 
peace, and it will abolish slavery. . . . Every line of history inspires a 
confidence that we shall not go far wrong; that things mend. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American”303  
 
The mast which had powered Sabastian Brant’s Stultifera Navis (1494) gives way 
to the force and intensity of the steam engine in The Confidence-Man (1857).  Not only 
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 an intensification of energy, but a new historical and political arrangement had provided 
Herman Melville an American “ship of fools” (21)—this one moving “helter-skelter, in 
one cosmopolitan and confident tide” (14).  With the power of steam, Melville ironically 
linked the movement of commerce, and with commerce the necessity of “confidence” 
and “trust.”  “Confidence is the indispensable basis of all sorts of business transactions,” 
preaches the “philosopher” of the “Intelligence Office,” satirically echoing Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s sentiments in his 1844 lecture “The Young American.”304  “Without it, 
commerce between man and man, as between country and country, would, like a watch, 
run down and stop” (155).    
Time, trade, and markets form the confluence of a cosmopolitan movement that 
Melville allegorizes in the flow of the Mississippi River: “The sky slides into blue, the 
bluffs into bloom, the rapid Mississippi expands; runs sparkling and gurgling all over in 
eddies; one magnified wake of a seventy-four” (94, my emphasis).  Yet sky, bluffs, and 
bloom figure the extent of the landscape in The Confidence-Man, and nature’s innocence 
is cast with the pall of the war machine—troped metonymically by the displacing force of 
the dominant nineteenth-century gunship, the seventy-four.305  Preceding this, the 
                                                 
304 Who is this “philosopher” of the “intelligence office”?  Though critics have referred to the essay 
“Friendship” as an object of Melville’s satire in The Confidence-Man, it seems clear from the beginning 
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305 One the most comprehensive texts on the Seventy-Four gun ship is Jean Boudriot’s The Seventy-Four 
Gun Ship: A Practical Treatise on the Art of Naval Architecture in 4 volumes. trans. David H. Roberts. 
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 opening of the narrative offers another iconic instrument of siege and security:  The 
Fidèle “might at distance have been mistaken by strangers for some whitewashed fort on 
a floating isle” (13).  The allusion is subtle, but here the fortresses and strategies designed 
by the seventeenth-century military engineer Sébastien Le Prestre Vauban cannot be 
mistaken.  Vauban’s name had circulated with some regularity in nineteenth-century U.S. 
discourse.306  And as Paul Virilio reminds readers, it was Vauban’s conception of the 
modern fortress that gave rise to a “fatal merger” between the “association of wealth and 
the production of destruction.”307  The liberalization of trade or “Bourgeois power,” 
Virilio calls it, “is military even more than economic, but it relates most directly to the 
occult permanence of the state of siege.”308  Melville’s floating “whitewashed” fortress 
riding the cosmopolitan and confident tide anticipates catastrophes seen and unseen from 
its interior, and it depicts the subtle and not so subtle ways the “state of siege” 
accompanied and made possible the continuation of trade.  Like other works that I have 
examined in this dissertation, The Confidence-Man presents a world in which the 
practices of war had permeated the quotidian, totalizing the field of conflict on a global 
scale.  Here, Melville links this order of conflict directly to the energies of trade and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986-1988).  See also John F. Guilmartin’s review of this text in 
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 commerce, the “confident tide” and kinetic forces of the market made possible by 
American power.   
Compressed and framed through the “small embrasure-like windows,” the view 
from aboard the Fidèle offers nothing to resemble an American vista as Whitman had 
imagined it, no perspective of the sublime horizon (13).  Labyrinthine and 
claustrophobic, the quarters of the steamboat come to resemble the narrative’s perplexed 
arrangement, closing in on a myopic vision of trade and exchange between characters: 
Merchants on ’change seem the passengers that buzz on her decks, while, quarters 
unseen, comes a murmur as of bees in the comb.  Fine promenades, domed 
saloons, long galleries, sunny balconies, confidential passages, bridal chambers, 
state-rooms plenty as pigeon-holes, and out-of-the-way retreats like secret 
drawers in an escritoire, present like facilities for publicity or privacy. Auctioneer 
or coiner, with equal ease, might somewhere here drive his trade.  (13)   
The mass of the “whitewashed fort” shrinks to the inner space of exchange, the space of 
the market.  Yet this interiority, as I will show in more detail below, recalls the violence 
and siege of the world exterior, recalls with it a “metaphysics”—as in the chapters on the 
“Metaphysics of Indian-Hating”—that makes possible the removal and annihilation of 
populations who impede or who are otherwise un-assimilable to the flow and fluidity of 
commerce and the expansion of the market.  The Mississippi in conjunction with the 
locomotion and technologies of steam (boat and train)309—all of which Melville craftily 
stages—had been integral to the intensification and expansion of the slave trade as 
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 well.310  Onward towards New Orleans, the hub from which the business of the internal 
slave trade operated, the Fidèle transports those whose occupations drive and derive from 
the slave market: “Auctioneer or coiner, with equal ease, might somewhere here drive his 
trade” (13).   
 In the marketplace of exchange aboard the Fidèle, The Confidence-Man alludes to 
a more extensive and ineluctable arrangement of forces that had entangled white settlers, 
native Indians, and Negro slaves, and this arrangement extends geographically, 
politically, and economically to spaces over the globe.  Concomitant with Indian 
“removal” is an emerging American cosmopolitanism, what the confidence-man 
describes as “World Charity,” enabling the removal of “obstacles” and opening “Hong 
Kong” and other markets to the “Wall street spirit” (51-52).  The “dashing and all-fusing 
spirit of the West” as an expression of movement and the advancement of trade carried in 
its wake not the “principle of Liberty,” as Emerson was wont to claim in 1844, 311 but an 
intensification of managerial forces that further organized (and even annihilated) human 
life around the needs of liberating the market.  It was in this sense of liberation and 
liberalism that Melville discovered the war-like catastrophes of the 1850s.312   
The Confidence-Man considers the stakes of “movement” as it was invoked in 
nineteenth-century American discourse and liberal imagination.  This ship of fools, a 
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 Latinization and genitive construction of the “faithful,” steeps of Melville’s satirical 
attitude toward an American belief in “a sublime and friendly Destiny,” as Emerson 
phrased it.313  The steamboat Fidèle further alludes to the image of religious conquest and 
crusades from earlier centuries.  Melville’s The Confidence-Man poignantly recollects 
the violence and conditions in which the terms Infidel and Faithful had been deployed, 
re-associating the conflicts of sixteenth-century Spain with the arrangements of power 
evidenced in the nineteenth-century U.S.  As Deborah Root’s research has shown, the 
inquisitorial system in Spain made use of the juridical categories infidel and heretic in 
order to address the problems posed by an “internal” and “potentially dangerous element 
of society.”314  Recalling the arrangement of power inscribed with the Spanish state’s 
“Morisco problem,”315 Melville wasn’t the first to layer palimpsest-like the new map of 
conquest occurring in North America with the religious wars of the past.  Henry David 
Thoreau—who, along with Emerson, appears as an object of Melville’s satire in The 
Confidence-Man316—had lectured at the Concord Lyceum in 1851 on the habit of 
“walking.”  In contrast to Melville’s spiny irony, Thoreau put it in terms metaphysical 
and imperial, associating the act of walking with the violence exercised by the Faithful’s 
conflict against Muslims:  
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 I have met with but one or two persons in the course of my life who understand 
the art of Walking, that is, of taking walks,--who had a genius, so to speak, for 
sauntering: which word is beautifully derived ‘from idle people who roved about 
the country, in the Middle Ages, and asked charity, under pretense of going à la 
Sainte Terre,’ to the Holy Land, till the children exclaimed, ‘There goes a Sainte-
Terrer,” a Suanterer,--a Holy-Lander.317    
Thoreau’s iconic image of pilgrimage then melds with the march of war, sanctioned by 
State and Church: “For every walk is a sort of crusade, preached by some Peter the 
Hermit in us, to go forth and reconquer this Holy Land from the hands of the Infidels.”318   
With all the references to movement and transport, of river current and capital 
fluidity, the narrative ironically and paradoxically seems arrested in a recurrent play of 
exchange, a hellish repetition the likes of which we might find in the depths of Dante’s 
Inferno.  This, though, is the material of Melville’s theatrum mundi or, more specifically, 
theatrum Americana.319  The narrator at the book’s end calls it a “masquerade” (298).  
And as critic Helen P. Trimpi has recognized, The Confidence-Man evinces elements that 
locate it within the satirical genre of dramatic pantomime and the commedia dell’arte.320  
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318 Thoreau, “Walking,” 225 (my emphasis).  Though Thoreau has reached a level of celebrity status for his 
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319 For a brief and helpful understanding of the concept of theatrum mundi, or the stage as the “scene of the 
world,” see Harriett Bloker Hawkins, “‘All the World’s a Stage’: Some Illustrations of the Theatrum 
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 This is not the adventure novel, not a Typee (1846) or an Omoo (1847), which many of 
his contemporaries had admired and praised.   
In this drama of arrested development, Melville’s pantomime displays human 
interaction as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of Adam Smith’s liberal economy of 
exchange, an order in which “exchange” functions as the arrangement par excellence 
between humans.  For Smith, humans are “naturally” inclined towards the market, and 
the world of “exchange” defines the activity of the species:  
The division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not 
originally the effect of human wisdom, which foresees and intends the general 
opulence to which it gives occasion.  It is the necessary, though very slow and 
gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view 
no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing 
for another.321 
Aboard Melville’s Fidèle, there is little that resembles human relations and meaning 
outside the marketplace of exchange, little in the way of a shared and common human 
experience which arises out of struggle or adventure, little or no sense of development or 
depth of character, and, finally, no arrival at a destination—just the “waning light 
expired” and “a darkness” into which “the cosmopolitan kindly led the old man away” 
(298).  The masquerade replaces the development inherent in the novel proper, and the 
market aboard the Fidèle evinces a world not necessarily of movement and progress, but 
of a pantomimic repetition found in the market.  
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 In a world in which human social relations are constitutive of market exchange, 
where humans function as nodes through which “business” and commerce “transact,” 
The Confidence-Man raises the prickly and dirty questions that liberalism of the 
nineteenth-century had failed to ask:  How, for instance, does a liberal political economy 
and the cosmopolitan ideals of trade account for (and manage through violence) those 
“populations” who inhibit or render inefficient the expansion and fluidity of the market, 
who cannot enter confidently into commercial trade, who do not, in other words, exhibit 
the “natural” inclination of the species toward exchange?  Melville had looked to the 
example of indigenous populations in the Americas, to populations in China and other 
parts of the globe where humans were encountering the oncoming influence and violence 
of trade.322  In the U.S and the world over, he found populations inchoate with the 
development of economic modernity, populations constituted as “problems” that would 
have to be “converted” by missionary “World Charity” or “removed” by “strategical, 
implacable, and lonesome vengeance” (180).  Melville’s story forces the question, too, 
that critic Uday Mehta has recently examined, namely how “liberalism, from the 
seventeenth century to the present, has prided itself on its universality and political 
inclusionary character” yet “is unmistakably marked by the systematic and sustained 
political exclusion of various groups and ‘types’ of people.”323  Melville’s rendering of 
the U.S. “West” here depicts more than exclusion, however.  As Joyce Adler has 
previously noted, chapter after chapter in The Confidence-Man alludes to signs of 
                                                 
322 See chapter seven, “A Gentleman with the Gold Sleeve-Buttons.” 
 
323 Uday S. Mehta, “Liberal Strategies of Exclusion,” Politics and Society 18:4 (1990), 427-454. 
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 disease, death, and annihilation.324  These conditions which had attended the market and 
its aftermath poignantly suggest Melville’s incredulity in Emerson’s “confidence that we 
shall not go far wrong; that things mend.”325  Like others of the period, Emerson extolled 
the “anti-feudal power of Commerce” as a defining characteristic of America’s 
“beneficent” “influence” over the globe, marked it also as the thing that “makes peace 
and keeps peace.”326   The Confidence-Man pantomimes liberalism’s sense of historic 
progress and the market’s liberating potential.  It dramatizes, too, those arrangements, 
those characters and ideas that were giving force and legitimacy to the liberal imagination 
in the nineteenth century, and in this pantomime we can discover how the doctrine of 
movement and futurity elides its own complicity in catastrophe and conflict. “The liberal 
imagination,” argue Nicholas and Peter Onuf, “emphasizes the good in modern 
history.”327  “Even if national imperatives, market forces, and the risks of unlimited war 
threaten the modern world with moral and material catastrophes, and perhaps even with 
destruction, the liberal imagination can only look ahead.”328    
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 *              *               * 
As had his previous works of fiction, particularly those that I have examined in 
other chapters of this thesis, The Confidence-Man had called on topics and examples of 
the historical past in order to discover and know better the mid-nineteenth-century world 
that was undergoing transformation.  Attendant with the ever expanding world of trade, 
with exchange functioning as the reductive and repetitive activity of the species, and with 
the forces of “removal” accompanying the “opening” of new markets over the globe, 
Melville found instances of conflict that had yet to be fully grasped or understood by his 
contemporaries in the mid-nineteenth-century.  The conditions and arrangement of forces 
that had helped define sixteenth-century Spain provided one example, and Melville, as 
I’ve already begun to show, made use of the terms Fidèle and Infidel to discover 
associations between that moment and the conflict of the nineteenth-century.  Yet 
Melville complicates and conflates this with other orders of conflict.   
In the following sections, “Missionary Liberalism, World Charity, and Immovable 
China” and “Weaving the Web of Trade,” I examine how Melville’s critical 
dramatization of Indian “removal” in North America coincided with more extensive 
attempts by the U.S. to expand global trade, specifically opening up the Chinese market.  
Melville’s pantomime discloses the coalition between state forces, Christian missionary 
projects, and commercial interests.  While a number of literary critics have given 
attention to the “Metaphysics of Indian-Hating” chapters of The Confidence-Man, noting 
Melville’s condemnation of the racism and violence that accompanied these actions, few 
have addressed how this “metaphysics” accompanied and extended liberalism’s reach in 
other parts of the globe.  I argue here that Melville discloses the violence inherent in the 
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 metaphysics of liberalism, a metaphysics that had informed Adam Smith’s notion that the 
human’s “natural” inclination is towards the market, towards exchange.    
I follow this section by addressing how Melville’s story pantomimes and critically 
dramatizes “movement” as it was invoked in nineteenth-century American discourse and 
liberal imagination, particularly in relation to the expansion of trade and the “destiny” of 
the nation.  I note how The Confidence-Man depicts an absurd repetition of exchange that 
collapses in on itself, captures the Fidèle and its passengers in a state of arrest, or what I 
will call the stasis of American movement.  I examine this paradox—the stasis of 
movement—by first recalling the historical importance of the term stasis in political and 
philosophical thought dating back to Thucydides.  I elaborate on how stasis has denoted 
both civil faction as well as disease, and how it takes on important significance in 
nineteenth-century liberalism.  In the liberal tendency towards movement, Paul Virilio 
reminds us, “stasis is death.”329  Michel Foucault helps recall how an entire discourse on 
disease and health had emerged in this period and had been applied broadly to the 
“population.”  As Melville’s story dramatizes, and as Michel Foucault’s work on 
nineteenth-century “biopolitics” helps explain, the violence necessary for diagnosing and 
removing those populations who were marked as the stasis or disease of liberal 
movement, ironically or paradoxically, instantiates a stasis even greater.  In this way, I 
argue, Melville’s pantomime thereby exposes the logic of biopolitics and the metaphysics 
of liberalism that had been practiced on populations who were seen as unwilling or 
incapable of entering the market.   
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 I proceed by making further note of literary criticism that has attended to the 
question of movement.  I take my cue from Jonathan Arac’s illuminating study of 
nineteenth-century “locomotion” and “vision” in the works of Melville, Dickens, 
Hawthorne, and Carlyle.330  It is here also that I demarcate a critical departure.  In 
addressing the question of motion as it arises in Melville’s The Confidence-Man, a title to 
which Arac gives little attention in Commissioned Spirts, I argue that Melville attempts 
not so much to offer a new “system of vision and knowledge,” as Arac suggests.331  
Instead, The Confidence-Man troubles the arrangement of power that makes this vision 
possible, just as “Benito Cereno” had problematized the arrangement of forces that made 
possible a near-totalizing perspective, global purview, and a managerial force exercised 
on a grand scale.  Indeed, The Confidence-Man troubles this metaphysics to the point that 
it provides no alternative, no “newly conceived order,” as Arac has described it, no 
passage out (poros). By suggesting this, I intend to show how Melville’s literary 
invention attempted to document rather imaginatively the nineteenth-century moment as 
one defined and influenced by a permanent “state of siege”—to recall Virilio again—a 
conflict in which its effects could be found in the American West extending to the Asia 
Pacific, that was coincident with the forces that Emerson and others had extolled for 
expanding trade and bringing peace.  Like other works that I’ve examined in this 
dissertation, The Confidence-Man obliges questions about American power.  We could 
put the question this way: What order of conflict becomes integral with American 
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 conceptions of movement, energy, transport, and exchange?  The Confidence-Man marks 
as an attempt to invent (to make and discover) under the conditions of stasis, to dramatize 
stasis, where stasis signifies not just an arrest of movement but also, historically and 
critically, the conditions of internal strife coincident with American power.   
 
4.2. Missionary Liberalism, World Charity, and Immovable China 
 
Yes.  You see, this doing good to the world by driblets amounts to 
nothing.  I am for doing good to the world with a will.  I am for doing 
good to the world once and for all and having done with it.  Do but think, 
my dear sir, of the eddies and maëlstroms of pagans in China.  People here 
have no conception of it.  Of a frosty morning in Hong Kong, pauper 
pagans are found dead in the streets like so many nipped peas in a bin of 
peas.  To be an immortal being in China is no more distinction than to be a 
snow-flake in a snow-squall.  What are a score or two missionaries to such 
a people?  A pinch of snuff to the kraken.   I am for sending ten thousand 
missionaries in a body and converting the Chinese en masse within six 
months of the debarkation.  The thing is then done, and turn to something 
else.  
From The Confidence-Man332  
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  In a conversation with the “gentleman with gold sleeve-buttons,” the confidence-
man evinces a cosmopolitan view of the world.  Regarding the population and the order 
of life in China, he says to his fellow traveler, “People here have no conception of it” 
(52).  After he alludes to the conditions in which “the pauper and pagan” populations 
exists, he then proceeds by explaining his intentions to enter the “charity business” (49).  
Inspired by the global possibilities that emerged from the model of the 1851 “World’s 
Fair in London”—a space which instantiated the concentration and worldly exhibition of 
industrial technology and wealth—the confidence-man explains how “on the fourth day” 
there he issued his “prospectus of the World’s Charity” (50).  “Let some world-wide 
good to the world-wide cause be now done,” he proclaims (49-50).  Playing the role of 
“philanthropist and financier” (50), the confidence-man reveals his design towards 
converting and bringing the “heathen” populations of China and other parts of the world 
into the greater flow and fluidity of modernity.  And in a kind of sophistry and 
convoluted explication, he conflates the project of Christian missionary “charity” with the 
“magnifying and energizing” force of what he calls the “the Wall street spirit”:  
“Yes; for if, confessedly, certain spiritual ends are to be gained but through the 
auxiliary agency of worldly means, then, to the surer gaining of such spiritual 
ends, the example of worldly policy in worldly projects should not by spiritual 
projectors be slighted.” (52)  
As if to make this clearer, he provides a strategic map akin to nineteenth-century 
imperialist cartography, dividing the globe into manageable parcels:  
In brief, the conversion of the heathen, so far, at least, as depending on human 
effort, would, by the World’s Charity, be let out on contract.  So much by bid for 
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 converting India, so much for Borneo, so much of Africa.  Competition allowed, 
stimulus would be given.  There would be no lethargy of monopoly.  (52) 
All the populations of the world, he says, can be “brought to bear” by “Archimedean 
money-power” (52).  The tropes of water and motion abound, and Melville’s character 
associates the project of World Charity with Archimedean mechanisms and energies that 
render “eddies and maëlstroms” into the smooth flowing form or “confident tide” of the 
“liberal Mississippi” (52, 14, 158).  “This doing good to the world by driblets amounts to 
nothing,” he reasons (52, my emphasis).  
 In contrast to these “driblets,” the confidence-man notes the hyperbolic scale of 
World Charity.  And this hyperbole marks the exponential force needed to enact it: “I am, 
and always have been, as I always will be, I trust, in the charity business, as you call it; 
but charity is not like a pin, one to make the head, and the other the point; charity is a 
work to which a good workman may be competent in all branches” (49).  The allusion to 
Adam Smith is clear, particularly Smith’s opening chapter in The Wealth of Nations that 
formulates a new theory of political economy and wealth based the division of labor.  In 
contrast to the mercantilist paradigm of wealth as the accumulation of bullion, the wealth 
Smith envisioned was made possible by increased labor productivity, whereby wealth 
could be achieved through such ostensibly inconsequential commodities like the pin.  By 
assigning individuals specific and specialized tasks, labor power could then yield higher 
production.  “The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the 
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or 
applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labor.”333   
                                                 
333 Adam Smith, 9. 
 
176 
  The confidence-man’s comments regarding the labor necessary to produce the 
“pin” verses the work required in spreading charity seem, at first, to contradict Smith’s 
theory of labor and, moreover, seem to contradict Smith’s ideas generally about the role 
of charity in the commercial world.  If we recall Smith’s protracted argument about 
“charity,” he begins by first acknowledging that “man stands at all times in need of the 
co-operation and assistance of great multitudes.”334  In developing this line of thought, 
Smith theorizes this “need” in humans as the basis from which emerges the “trucking 
disposition,” the human’s “natural” inclination towards exchange:  
In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown to 
maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the 
assistance of no living creature.  But man has almost constant occasion for the 
help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence 
only.  He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his 
favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he 
requires of them.  Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do 
this.  Give me what I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the 
meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one 
another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.  It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from the regard to their own interest.”335 
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 The question, however, that arises out of the allusion to Smith in the narrative is not how 
the confidence-man’s scheme sets out to controvert Smith’s understanding of the division 
of labor, but how charity, particularly “World Charity,” as a force extends the logic and 
potential of Smith’s political economy.  For Smith, humanity “occasions the help of his 
brethren,” but this “help” is mediated through the market.  Exchange provides the 
necessary conditions under which these needs are best met.  Or as Smith states, “It is in 
this manner [of the market] that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those 
good offices which we stand in need of.”336   
Applying this logic in extremis, the confidence-man envisions charity as 
something exercised with and through the “Wall street spirit,” as the thing that brings to 
bear “Archimedean money-power.”  It is in this sense that the confidence-man’s 
hyperbolic and global strategy qua “charity” amplifies and extends Smith’s understanding 
of money-power as “the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of commerce.”337  
Pantomiming the telic and progressive registers attendant with the discourse of liberal 
economic development, the confidence-man understands “charity” as “converting the 
Chinese en masse,” so that “within six months . . . the thing is then done,” and he can 
then “turn to something else” (52).  In this American arrangement of power, the 
confidence-man gestures to the conflation between commercial expansion and the role of 
Christian missionary influence over a population whose order of life and “nature” has yet 
entered into the fluid medium of the market.   
                                                 
336 Smith, 23. 
 
337 Smith, 371. 
 
178 
  Here Melville’s story recollects a topic that had long haunted his fiction and 
memory.  It was in Typee (1846), in fact, that he first critiqued the practices of Christian 
missionary influence over the Sandwich Islands, where “the natives had been civilized 
into draught horses and evangelized into beasts of burden.”338  The U.S. edition of Typee 
would endure censorship and expurgation because of its depiction of the missionaries in 
Honolulu, but Melville’s narrative maligned other modern forces as well.339  In the 
opening pages of Typee, the splendid view of Nukuheva bay is interrupted by “the tri-
colored flag of France trailing over the stern of six vessels, whose black hulls and 
bristling broadsides proclaimed their warlike character.”340  This was not merely an 
indictment of the French, however; the image of state imperial force broadly, and U.S. 
force specifically which followed and further assisted the security of commercial 
expansion, would reemerge in many of Melville’s other works over the next decade.341  
In Moby-Dick, for instance, Melville problematizes Ishmael’s “advocacy” on behalf of 
the laborers of the whaling business, for it was in this form of advocacy that Ishmael 
unwittingly supplies an apologetics for the commercial and imperial influence wrought 
by the industry.  “For many years past the whale-ship has been the pioneer in ferreting 
out the remotest and least known parts of the earth,” Ishmael claims.  “She has explored 
seas and archipelagoes which had no chart, where no Cook or Vancouver had ever 
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 sailed.”342  “If American and European men-of-war now peacefully ride in once savage 
harbors,” Ishmael continues, “let them fire salutes to the honor and the glory of the 
whale-ship, which originally showed them the way, and first interpreted between them 
and the savages.”343  Concluding this panegyric, he proclaims, “Whaling is imperial!”344  
 As Jean Heffer has recently documented, whaling was indeed imperial, and the 
American whalers were by the mid-nineteenth century particularly responsible for 
opening up and even dominating the industry in the Pacific.345  “Without the whalers,” 
Heffer notes, “the Hawaiian islands might never have come under American 
domination.”346  With the ever-increasing presence of whale ships in the Pacific, and with 
the increasing cartographic knowledge, so, too, came the further expansion of commerce.  
“The Hawaiian economy became one more cog in the machinery of the international 
market and, since the great majority of companies, such as Eliah Grimes and Company or 
Pierce and Brewer, had come there from the United States, ever closer links were forged 
with America.”347  To protect these commercial interests and the expanding web of trade 
that entangled the Sandwich Islands, “the United States Navy was led to show the flag in 
the Pacific.”  It was in the Pacific, and because of its growing interests in the Pacific, that 
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 the United States was beginning to develop and flex its political, economic, and military 
muscle.348    
Though non-conspiratorial and not always ideologically in concert with each 
other, religious, commercial, and state forces nevertheless coalesced around a grander 
effort to open the terraqueous globe to their interests, ultimately bringing about further 
development and the expansion of trade.349  While whaling may have provided the initial 
cartography and established a series of links across the more expansive portions of the 
Pacific—particularly making Hawaii a principal hub of this commercial expansion—
“nothing  tangible could have been accomplished without” the influence of Christian 
evangelical missions and the efforts to transform or convert indigenous populations.350  
Originating from a “spiritual crisis which shook New England” in the wake of 
rationalism and the “triumph of Unitarianism,” American Protestantism had responded by 
energizing both its domestic evangelical efforts as well as developing those abroad.351  
“In an attempt to re-create their lost unity,” Jean Heffer explains, “Congregationalist and 
Presbyterian ministers, brought together by the Plan of Union of 1801, turned to the 
foreign missions as one way to enlist all the New England Protestants in a common 
cause, which it hoped would heal the rift between denominations and bridge their 
political differences.”352  And in 1810, New England Calvinists had established their own 
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 version of the British London Missionary Society.  The American Board of 
Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM), as they called it, provided new impetus 
to unify their efforts and solidify their identity by “bringing the Gospel to heathens and 
saving them from eternal damnation.”353  It was because of Christian missionary efforts, 
Heffer notes, that “by 1840 the groundwork had already been laid for the 
Americanization of Hawaii.”354   
 While the U.S. could boast of a successful “Americanization” and subjugation of 
the Polynesians, the same could not be said of U.S. influence in and over China through 
the 1850s.355  Even by 1870, “in comparison with Hawaii, the efforts of American 
Protestant missionaries in China seemed to have been a failure.”356  This fact by itself 
underscores the hyperbole of the confidence-man’s “charitable” effort to send, with 
“Wall street spirit,” a fleet of  “ten thousand missionaries” in order to convert “the 
Chinese en masse within six months of debarkation” (52).  By pantomiming the 
missionary discourse and its conflation with commercial money-power, The Confidence-
Man further exposes the problematic China had posed to the expanding political 
economies of the West.  That is, it satirically recollects how critical the missionary 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
353 Heffer, 110. 
 
354 Heffer, 115.   Heffer notes further:  
“In 1848, the Boston organization felt that the conversion of the populace had gone far enough for 
them to envisage an independent Hawaiian church, where Americans, whether from the United 
States or born locally, and native Polynesians would worship side by side.  Fifteen years later, it 
transferred its remaining responsibilities to the Hawaiian Evangelical Association.  Nevertheless, 
it was the resident or naturalized Yankees who retained control.  The indigenous culture, 
weakened by a declining population, was losing ground, contrary to the hopes of the first 
missionaries.  In 1853, the government chose English as the language of instruction in Hawaiian 
schools.  Conversion to Christianity was leading inexorably to Westernization” (115). 
 
355 Jean Heffer has provided extensive and specific evidence of this in his research.  See Heffer, 115-118. 
 
356 Heffer 117. 
 
182 
 project of converting heathens to the ways of Christianity was to a broader cultural 
leveling that made liberal trade more efficient and successful.  This sense of cultural 
leveling couldn’t have been rendered more poignantly than in the confidence-man’s 
response to his interlocutor’s skepticism that China poses certain “obstacles”:  
“Obstacles?  I have confidence to remove obstacles, though mountains” (52).   
That China had been understood as one “obstacle” to the growing political 
economy of trade and commerce was not new to Melville’s meditations on American 
power.  Several years earlier, Melville dramatized in White-Jacket (1849) an association 
between the doctrine of futurity in American thought and the expansion of U.S. political 
economy:  
The world has arrived at a period which renders it the part of Wisdom to pay 
homage to the prospective precedents of the Future in preference to those of the 
Past.  The Past is dead, and has no resurrection; but the Future is, in all things, our 
friend. . . . Those who are solely governed by the Past stand like Lot’s wife, 
crystallized in the act of looking backward, and forever incapable of looking 
before.  Let us leave the Past, then, to dictate laws to immovable China. 357   
The reference to “immovable China” at first seems oblique, but Melville had aptly 
discovered and then characterized in several works of prose—including White-Jacket as 
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 we see here, Moby-Dick, “Benito Cereno,” and again in The Confidence-Man, among 
others—how American habit of thought conceived of China as both a destination as well 
as an “obstacle” to be overcome or moved—that is, the population that by force or 
conversion must yet be brought into the modern liberal movement of trade.  In a 1841 
publication on “Free Trade,” for instance, the authors depict China as the antithesis of the 
“goals of the modern movement,” noting China’s impenetrability and how these 
conditions have created a “people” who “vegetate in stupidity, barbarism, and 
selfishness.”358    
In characterizing China, the confidence-man seems to draw from a range of 
discursive sources, including Christian Protestant missionary discourse as well as from 
Smith’s descriptions of China as “stationary”—a nation which exhibits a historical and 
economic “stand still.”  “China has long been one of the richest, that is, one of the most 
fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the world,” 
Smith explains.  “It seems, however, to have been long stationary.”  Smith then refers to 
Marco Polo, “who visited [China] more than five hundred years ago.”  Comparing Polo’s 
description of the “cultivation, industry, and populousness,” with those descriptions made 
“by travelers in the present times,” Smith finds there to be very little difference, very 
little progress or change. 359 
As a cosmopolitan “traveler” himself—or so he wants others to believe—the 
confidence-man describes the impoverished conditions of China: “Of a frosty morning in 
Hong Kong, pauper pagans are found dead in the streets like so many nipped peas in a 
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 bin of peas” (52).  The image of pauperism provides the confidence-man all the evidence 
he needs to initiate “Global Charity” and “energize” or “quicken” the missions in China 
with the “Wall street spirit.”  His description, moreover, bears likenesses to Smith’s, who 
remarks, “The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses that of the 
most beggarly nations in Europe.  In the neighborhood of Canton many hundred, it is 
commonly said, many thousand families have no habitation on the land, but live 
constantly in little fishing boats upon the rivers and canals.”360  Smith’s mediated account 
of the impoverished conditions in China continues, and he provides further images of 
people eating “the nastiest garbage” or “any carrion” that a “European ship” might throw 
“overboard.”361  As does the confidence-man, Smith uses this depiction of Chinese 
poverty as evidence for his own theories on wealth and modern political economy.  
Several pages later, Smith associates China’s “stationary” status to its “neglect” of 
“foreign commerce”: “A country . . . which admits the vessels of foreign nations into one 
or two of its ports only, cannot transact the same quantity of business which it might do 
with different laws and institutions.”362  
While for Smith the “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” is a “natural” 
human disposition, he finds this inadequately developed in Chinese culture, hence the 
reason for its seemingly “stationary” tendencies. 363  If the Chinese were to open up to the 
world of international trade, or, as he puts it, open up to “more extensive navigation, the 
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 Chinese would naturally learn the art of using and constructing themselves all the 
different machines made use of in other countries.” 364  
 
4.3. Weaving the Web of Trade 
 
“And Indian-hating still exists; and, no doubt will continue to exist, so 
long as Indians do.” 
  The Confidence-Man365 
 
In this pantomime that hyperbolizes and satirizes Adam Smith’s understanding of 
the human’s “natural” inclination towards commerce and exchange, and satirizes too the 
role that “charity” plays as a set of relations among humans that becomes subsumed by 
the market, Melville’s The Confidence-Man further raises questions regarding liberal 
conceptions of humanity.  More specifically, it dramatizes how human “nature” is 
constituted through the relations of trade and exchange under the emerging conditions 
and arrangements of liberalism.  It provides further glimpses of how orders of human 
populations are subject to specific operations of power, especially as the “nature” of these 
populations come under suspicion—that is, are interpreted as inchoate or alien to liberal 
political economy.  At one moment in Melville’s narrative, the confidence-man (or one 
version of him) attempts to pawn herbal medicine.  His words put into play the liberal 
conception of “nature.”  Describing the herbal remedy, he proclaims, “Trust me, nature is 
                                                 
364 Smith, 866 (my emphasis). 
 
365 Melville, The Confidence-Man, 172. 
 
186 
 health; for health is good, and nature cannot work ill . . . Get nature, and you get well” 
(99).  Getting “nature” here, of course, means also to enter into exchange, to pay “half a 
dollar a vial” (100).   
In chapter twenty-five, the “cosmopolitan” encounters “The Metaphysics of 
Indian-Hating.”  In a work of prose that jump-cuts more often than not from one scene of 
exchange to the next, the story of Colonel Jon Moredock, “Indian-hater of Illinois,” 
importantly plays out over three continuous chapters.  The problem of mediation 
becomes immediately apparent, as Moredock’s tale is notably twice or thrice removed 
from the “passenger” who retells the story: “I never fully saw the man [Moredock], yet, 
have I, one way and another, heard about as much of him as any other; in particular, have 
I heard his history again and again from my father’s friend, James Hall, the judge, you 
know” (171).  Melville, in fact, recasts the 1846 publication of James Hall’s Wilderness 
and the Warpath.366   
While many critics have written extensively on this section of The Confidence-
Man, few have linked it to the broader questions regarding liberalism and an 
intensification of managerial forces that further organize human life around the needs of 
opening the market.  Michael Rogin has made mention of how “the confidence man 
exposes the absent core of marketplace reality itself,” and here his reading holds some 
adjacency to my own.367  His analysis, however, then veers towards explicating the 
“absent core,” examining how Melville’s masquerade “calls attention to the fictionalized, 
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 self-constructed character of American life.”368  Taking a different approach, my aim has 
been to theorize more fully how Melville stages the “marketplace” as the thing around 
which human life on the globe is organized and managed.  The Confidence-Man depicts 
the metaphysics of Indian-hatred as a counterpart to nineteenth-century forces set on 
liberalizing and expanding trade, particularly trade that had confronted populations who 
would not or could not enter into the smooth and fluid relations of exchange.  Melville’s 
character uses the terms “Indian molestation,” and we can recognize how these terms 
ironically abbreviate the long history of colonial and indigenous relations in America, a 
history which Melville’s Moby-Dick helps to recollect as well by alluding to the Pequots’ 
fate after 1637.  In the nineteenth-century occasion, Melville makes clear that the role of 
the “Indian-hater” is to clear the path by “strategical, implacable, and lonesome 
vengeance” (180), remove those populations who may impede or who are otherwise un-
assimilable to the greater movement of trade.   
Joyce Adler refers (rather vaguely) to this order of conflict in The Confidence-
Man as a “masked war,” but her argument then turns to the “warring impulses within 
individuals.”369  This idea gets lost by the end of her analysis, however, and it is there 
that war, for Adler, seems less about individuals and more about “race extermination.”370  
“In the Indian-hating section of The Confidence-Man,” she argues, “the war is the war of 
white America against the American Indian, and the ‘historian’ is its accessory.”371  
Adler aptly recalls the following line from The Confidence-Man: “And Indian-hating still 
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 exists; and, no doubt will continue to exist, so long as Indians do” (172).  This is the same 
line that I’ve used in the above epigraph to this section.  She then writes, “[These words] 
take on a new, more sinister meaning when the whole book has been read, for it is clear 
then that the judge is not making a sad prediction but setting forth the doctrine of race 
extermination.  He can be seen, then, to have expressed from the beginning the view of 
the master race.”372   For Adler, “race” seems to function as a given, a priori category.  
To complicate Adler’s argument, and to further theorize how the question of race and 
conflict come together in The Confidence-Man, I want to suggest that Melville’s 
narrative dramatizes how race and racial-logic are a function of the conflict, not the 
conflict itself.  What is at stake in The Confidence-Man is a metaphysics that makes 
“race” possible.  That “Indian-hating still exists,” that it “will continue to exist, so long as 
Indians do,” presents again the problematic entanglement between a nineteenth-century 
metaphysics and perpetual conflict, the totalized “state of siege.”373   In other words, 
conflict arises and continues to arise with the very metaphysics that invokes race as an 
index for measuring a population’s relationship to liberal political economy.  The 
“Indian” functions as an order of humanity that exhibits an impasse to the movement and 
expansion of the market.  We are reminded again and again of the liberal “confidence” 
that “removes obstacles, though mountains” (53).  
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 As I’ve attempted to show in the previous section, this metaphysics is not 
necessarily isolated to Indian hatred and removal.  For the Chinese, whose development 
seems caught in a kind of stasis or “station,” the liberal missionary cosmopolitanism of 
the confidence-man calls for a cultural conversion that would enable the Chinese to both 
open up and enter into the market.  Under the metaphysics of liberalism, “nature” (and 
the discourse of “nature” and “race” are not far removed) operates as a conceptual 
category for indexing a population’s proximity, inadequacy, or obdurate relation to the 
market.  The “nature” of American Indians and Chinese, as well as the “nature” of the 
populations from India, Borneo, and Africa, and those from potentially other parts of the 
globe, is continually read through a hermeneutic that allows liberalism to gage and 
respond to orders of human life that are or are not “naturally” inclined to the market. This 
metaphysics further legitimizes particular mechanisms that intervene and manage 
populations, whether by “removal” or “conversion.”   
Of course, U.S. expansion under the ideology of Manifest Destiny had played a 
part in Melville’s satire of American life in The Confidence-Man, as critics have 
repeatedly noted.374  As Joyce Adler reminds us, James Hall’s “history” showcases the 
grander strategy of Indian removal and annihilation that accompanied the further 
conquest of territory, “the ever-beckoning seductions of a fertile and virgin land” 
(177).375  More than depicting a frontier narrative, however, Melville’s pantomime, I 
argue, dramatizes the arrangements and conditions in which trade and “business 
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 transactions” were made possible.  The Confidence-Man, moreover, seems less interested 
in the debates that raged during the early and mid-nineteenth century between the 
protectionists and proponents of free trade than he is in the overwhelming sense that the 
“business transaction” (155) itself had become the arrangement par excellence between 
humans, that a liberal economy, despite the debates, had come to define the world in 
which humans interacted.  In other words, though he had satirized the propensity in the 
U.S. towards free trade, this wouldn’t have made him a protectionist.  In fact, as Nicholas 
and Peter Onuf suggest, the debate had not been about trade itself but how best to achieve 
trade, how best to interpret Adam Smith’s understanding of wealth and the role of the 
nation or nations.  Should the “progressive development” of trade, as protectionists had 
argued, give priority to “the home market”?  Or should the development of trade, as 
Ricardo had written, function in the “universal society of nations through the civilized 
world”?376    
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Webster’s Whig position.  Webster’s speech on “Currency” argued, “Every man, Sir, who looks over this 
vast country, and contemplates the commercial connection of its various parts, must see the great 
importance that this exchange should be cheap and easy.”  Christopher Newfield explains that Webster 
favored a “federally sponsored uniform currency while rejecting “local self-regulation” of the state banks.  
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 Along with the currency (and counterfeits) that change hands aboard the Fidèle, 
Melville’s novel depicts human beings as the indispensable nexus of these arrangements, 
as the nodes through which capital and commerce must pass.  Any exchange requires 
confidence, a trait or capacity found in humans.  Chapter after chapter, confidence-men 
attempt to seal the deal by reminding potential victims that the world requires confidence, 
not the kind of meditative thought exemplified by minds skeptical of empire, minds like 
Tacitus and Thucydides.  “Whatever our lot, we should read serene and cheery books, 
fitted to inspire love and trust,” remarks one confidence-man to an unsuspecting 
“sophomore.”  “But Tacitus!”  The confidence-man then further explains, “he is the most 
extraordinary example of a heretic; not one iota of confidence in his kind.  . . . Without 
confidence himself, Tacitus destroys it in all his readers” (35).  
  The “all infusing spirit of the West” has less to do with land than it does with 
what Emerson and others praised as “the thousand various threads” bound fast in a “web” 
of human and commercial connections.  Locomotive and steamboat were the means by 
which space and time could be annihilated, and Emerson, like others of his moment, 
celebrated the “steam [that] has narrowed the Atlantic to a strait,” but these forms of 
kinetic energy and transport were the means to an end, the means to “bring people so 
much nearer” for the sake of trade.377  In the latter portions of The Confidence-Man, we 
                                                                                                                                                 
What was central to Webster’s intention was the “unity” of the commercial market, not necessarily the 
“freedom.”  “Its means is not free contract but a uniform currency, one in which a central power guarantees 
the mutual resemblance, the perfect correspondence, of all signs of value.” See Christopher Newfield, The 
Emerson Effect: Individualism and Submission in America (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996.), 196.  Newfield cites Daniel Webster, “The Currency, September 28 and October 3, 1837,” in 
The Papers of Daniel Webster: Speeches and Formal Writings, vol. 2, 1834-1852, ed. Charles M. Wiltse 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1988), 165, 162, 193. 
 
377 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American” [1844], Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays & Lectures 
(New York: Library of America, 1983), 216, 213. 
 
192 
 recall, Emerson appears in the character of Mark Winsome.  His “disciple and poet,” 
Thoreau, dons the mask of Egbert, and regurgitates the “doctrines” of the “master’s” 
“system” (233-36).   
In the “web” of commercial and human connections, Emerson somewhat 
awkwardly invoked cosmopolitanism through the new nation’s “Americanizing 
influence,” which, he further observed, “promises to disclose new virtues for ages to 
come.”378  Here he envisioned America as the exemplary force for “the uprise and 
culmination of the new and anti-feudal power of Commerce,” and therefore as an order of 
cosmopolitanism made possible through the connections of its population.379 
A heterogeneous population crowing on all ships form all corners of the world to 
the great gates of North America, namely Boston, New York, and New Orleans, 
and thence proceeding inward to the prairie and the mountains, and quickly 
contributing their private thought to the public opinion, their toll to the treasury, 
and their vote to the election, it cannot be doubted that the legislation of this 
country should become more catholic and cosmopolitan than that of any other.380 
Emerson’s “Young American” lecture (1844) had echoed (though with some distortion 
and reverberation) a Kantian understanding of trade as the grounds for perpetual peace, 
“that [trade] makes peace and keeps peace.”381  The reverberations had, most likely made 
their way through an elaborate and extensive discourse on free trade, picking up ideas 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, too.  Thomas Cooper a decade before Emerson had 
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 asserted that “War is seldom the interest of any nation, and is likely to be less so in the 
future than formerly.”382  Free trade, he insisted, connects everyone as “whole human 
family,” “makes one family of all the nations on earth.”383  And in 1838, the economist 
Henry Vethake argued that the principles of a free trade would help bring about “the 
piece of the world.”384  In a “Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons” 
on the topic of “Free Trade” (1840), which was reprinted a year later in the U.S. by the 
Democratic Review, the authors wrote, “[Free Trade] is the offspring of a grand 
movement, the first-fruits of a rich harvest, the precursor of a mighty, world embracing 
revolution.”385  Like Emerson, this document saw the liberalizing of markets and the 
expansion of free trade as a greater step toward global progress: 
[Free trade] is connected with a great question of political and social 
improvement, with the elevation of the depressed millions, with the expansion of 
the sphere of human activity and happiness, with the progress of civilization and 
refinement, and with the establishment of universal peace over the globe.386 
Contrary to Emerson’s liberal sensibilities and belief that “trade” was the “plant which 
grows wherever there is peace, as soon as there is peace, and as long as there is peace,” 
387 Melville’s The Confidence-Man re-imagines the historical and material conditions of 
commerce in less than pacific terms, especially as it coincided with the intensification 
                                                 
382 Cited in Unof and Unof, 261. 
 
383 Cited in Unof and Unof, 261. 
 
384 Cited in Unof and Unof, 261. 
 
385 “Free Trade,” The United States Democratic Review 9:40 (Oct. 1841), 329. 
 
386 “Free Trade,” Democratic Review, 329. 
 
387 Emerson, “The Young American,” 220. 
 
194 
 and expansion of American power in the 1850s.  Emerson’s “web” had for Melville 
become an instantiation of strife and conflict—a “state of siege” that accompanied what 
some understood as forces of liberation.  While Emerson had imagined this power in 
terms of progress, peace, and movement, Melville’s The Confidence-Man dramatizes 
paradoxically this movement as a set of conditions and arrangements resembling stasis.  
*              *               * 
In what follows, I examine the term “stasis” as a critical category in political and 
philosophical thought.  I further note how stasis denoted in the classical sense both civil 
faction as well as disease, and how it takes on important significance in nineteenth-
century liberalism and the emergence of what Foucault calls biopolitics. 
 
4.4. The Stasis of Movement 
 
Narratively speaking, The Confidence Man is meager and monotonous.  A 
work like Candide, which expresses somewhat similar thoughts, is still 
viable because, as a tale, it moves; moves swiftly, gaily, and variously; 
Melville’s book is all but motionless.” 
Newton Arvin388   
 
It its immediate sense, the term stasis denotes a standing (histanai) or stoppage.  
We are reminded of Newton Arvin’s condemnation of the The Confidence-Man for its 
lack of movement and motionless.   In what follows, I attempt to theorize this 
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 “motionless” tale in relation to a long historical discussion on “stasis.”  From its earliest 
instantiations, particularly as it was used by classical political theory, stasis referred to 
faction or discord, civil strife or even anarchy.  Classicists have debated over its exact 
translation.  One of the earliest and most influential writings on the term, preceding 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s thinking, was the Greek historian Thucydides, who documented 
the stasis at Corcyra—depicting how stasis emerged out of conditions made possible by 
the Peloponnesian war.389  Hobbes’s translation of the History of the Peloponnesian War 
had used the term “sedition,” and in this notable passage from Book Three, the stasis of 
Corcyra depicts not only a civil strife but a corruption of logos, meaning, and value:     
But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent master, 
and conformeth most men’s passions to the present occasion.  The cities therefore 
being now in sedition, and those that fell into it later having heard what had been 
done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the 
art of assailing and for the strangeness of revenges.  The received value of names 
imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary.  For inconsiderate 
boldness, was counted true-hearted manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome 
fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise in every thing, to be lazy in 
every thing.  A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour.  To re-advise 
for the better security, was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation.  He that was 
fierce, was always trusty; and he that contraried such a one, was suspected.  He 
that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap 
laid, a more dangerous man than he. . . . In brief, he that could outstrip another in 
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 the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it, 
was commended.390 
As Kostas Kalimtziz has recently argued, the “dominant image” that the Greeks 
associated with stasis was not merely “intransigent factions,” but the “governing concept 
of νόσος (nosos) or disease.” 391  After Plato and Aristotle, the conceptual connection 
between stasis and disease would follow the meaning and use of the term up through the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.  As the Oxford English Dictionary notes, 
it was in the eighteenth century that the term was applied by medical and physiological 
discourse to diagnose “a stagnation of the humors” in the body.392   
By the twentieth century, physician Walter Cannon, in the book The Wisdom of 
the Body (1932), had expanded this concept and coined the term “homeostasis” to denote 
how the body underwent particular regulating and self-regulating mechanisms for 
“stabilizing” the “fluid matrix of the body.”393  Understood as an “open system,” the 
body required mechanisms to maintain the proper “balance” or “steady states” of 
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 equilibrium for health.394  In this sense, Cannon had invoked the older and residual 
meaning of stasis as disease (nosos), designating homeostasis as the means of regulating 
and keeping the body free from illness or “defects.”  In the closing chapter of his book, 
Cannon enlarged his theory of homeostasis to encompass and find parallel the “body 
physiologic” with the “body politic.”395  Michel Foucault’s research and lectures from the 
mid- to late-1970s would provide a critical genealogy and further problematize the kind 
of discourse that Cannon was invoking in the 1930s, arguing in fact that this discourse 
and the mechanisms associated with “homeostasis” were already in place by the early 
nineteenth century.  In the opening of his epilogue, Cannon asks, “Are there not general 
principles of stabilization?”396  “May not the new insight into the devices for stabilizing 
the human organism, which we have been examining in the foregoing chapters, offer new 
insight into defects of social organization and into possible modes of dealing with 
them?”
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 tenets of his analogy is the importance of the “division of labor” among those “massing 
of cells” organized in higher, more complex organisms.399  “The list of special types of 
workerss in a civilized society is almost unlimited.  Again, like the division of labor in 
the animal organism, the division of labor in a complex social group has notable and 
positive effects.”400  Cannon then situates the organization and division of labor into the 
larger s
credit may temporarily be its substitute.  By means of his money or his credit any 
                                                
chematics of a liberal political economy.  I cite this passage at length:  
In a functional sense the nearest equivalent to the fluid matrix of animal 
organisms that is found in a state or a nation is the system of distribution in all its 
aspects—canals, rivers, roads and railroads, with boats, trucks, trains, serving, 
like the blood and lymph, as common carriers; and the wholesale and retail 
purveyors, representing the less mobile portions of the system.  In this vast and 
intricate stream, whose main channels and side branches reach more or less 
directly all communities, goods are placed, at their source, for carriage to other 
localities.  These other localities are sources of goods which likewise are placed in 
the stream.  Thus the products of farm and factory, of mine and forest, are borne 
to and fro.  But it is permissible to take goods out of the stream only if goods of 
equivalent value are put back in it.  Ordinarily, of course, this immediate 
exchange does not occur.  It would be highly awkward.  To facilitate the process 
of exchange, money which has a generally recognized value, is employed.  Or 
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 individual can take from the stream whatever he needs or desires.  Money and 
credit, therefore, become integral parts of the fluid matrix of society.401 
*              *               * 
In the mid- and late-1970s, Michel Foucault’s research set out to examine an 
order of governance which, emerging in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries, took up the problematic of “life” through the medical discourse of care for the 
body.402  “It seems to me,” he lectured, “that one of the basic phenomena of the 
nineteenth century was what might be called power’s hold over life.”403  With the 
emphasis on “life,” political right in the nineteenth century underwent one of the 
“greatest transformations,” shifting from the “old” right of sovereignty, that is, “the right 
to take life or let live,” to a “new right which does not erase the old right but which does 
penetrate it, permeate it.”  “It is a power,” Foucault explained, “to make live and to let 
die.”404  This new right, this “biopolitics” he called it, constituted a reorganization of 
power that intervened with a new set of mechanisms, not on the individual necessarily as 
might disciplinary power (though this power was not entirely erased), but on the 
“population as a political problem.”405  “Of those mechanisms,” Foucault claimed, 
“regulatory mechanisms” had been established in order to make for “an equilibrium, 
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 maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations 
within this general population and its aleatory field.”406   
This physiology and the mechanisms for determining health and diagnosing 
disease were transposed onto the population as a body politic, as biopolitic.  In the 
language of physiology, homeostasis denotes the tendency to maintain normal, internal 
stability.407  In this lecture, and others given over the following couple years, Foucault 
would expand on his understanding of “homeostasis” in terms of a broader 
“normalization” of the population.408  What is important, that is, what emerged with this 
new arrangement of power were new technologies which were aimed at establishing and 
maintaining “a sort of homeostasis . . . by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects 
the security of the whole from internal dangers.”409  Coincident with the emergence of 
biopolitics, Foucault noted, are a whole set of regulatory forces, security forces, whose 
aims were to maintain the homeostasis of the population qua body.  “It is, in a word, a 
matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of 
ensuring that they are not [necessarily] disciplined, but regularized.”410 
The emergence of a biopolitcs, and with it the mechanisms that determine health, 
that protect or secure health of the population, had coincided with preoccupations 
regarding the success of an expanding liberal economy and the further division of 
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 labor.411  Illnesses, broadly conceived, “sapped the population’s strength, shortened the 
working week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they led to a fall in 
production and because treating theme was expensive.”412   If, as The Confidence-Man 
further dramatizes, the fluidity and movement of exchange and the flow of trade must go 
through humans, then the health, adequacy, and therefore integration of humans 
instantiates the object on which these mechanisms must focus.  In this way, Melville had 
anticipated Foucault’s lengthy question on the politics of death, on the war machine, on 
security mechanism, that enforce and maintain “health” in a population that is integral to 
the market: 
If it is true that the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat and that 
disciplinary or regulatory power is on the advance, how will the power to kill and 
the function of murder operate in this technology of power, which takes life both 
as its object and its objective?  How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that 
its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its 
chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?  How, under these 
conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand 
deaths, to give the order to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but its own 
citizens to the risk of death?  Given that this power’s objective is essentially to 
make live, how can it let die?  How can the power of death, the function of death, 
be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?413 
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 Foucault’s response to this question led him to think further how race or “racism 
intervenes.”  Melville’s Confidence-Man imaginatively documents this moment when 
“race” enters into the domain of modern State power, when mechanisms are put in place 
to establish a “caesuras within a biological continuum.”414   Race or racism, Foucault 
reminds us, “can justify the murderous function of the State,”415 can justify what the 
confidence-man sees as the natural “removal” of “obstacles” or internal threats. 
*              *               * 
Jonathan Arac’s Commissioned Spirits takes up the topic of movement in the 
works of Melville and his near contemporaries, Hawthorne, Dickens, and Carlyle, 
beginning with William Wordsworth.  Lines from The Prelude provide the title for his 
study: “Like that of angels or commissioned spirits, / Fix us upon some lofty pinnacle, / 
Or in a ship on waters, with a world / Of life, and life-like mockery, beneath / Above, 
behind, far stretching and before.”416  These lines provide, too, the question of 
“overview” and “social motion” that play a central role in Arac’s reading of these 
nineteenth-century figures.  Documenting the “mobile thrusts and counterthrusts of 
energy” which “shook things loose, forming an ever shifting set of circumstances” 
ushering in the nineteenth century, Arac persuasively argues that “writers understood 
their task as a process of shaping, of giving direction to this motion, a form to this force, 
to create a vision from which action might follow.”417  There is agency here.  As a 
category, the term “action” allows Arac to locate a “shaping” force in these nineteenth-
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 century writers’ conception of the literary.  “Not the least disturbing aspect of their work 
for the writers of the mid-nineteenth century,” he further claims, “was the extent to which 
writing itself as a force was not only trying to form the world, to shape the energetic 
chaos, but was also transforming the world, itself actively joining in the motion it was 
trying to chart.”418  Force and form provide the literary stuff suitable to the occasion.   
Importantly, Arac locates this transformative power in the novel, for it was the 
novel as form, he argues, that marked an important institutional relationship “to the other 
forms and forces of the age”—forces “disrupting the age,” forces “building it, or—most 
typically—those doing both.”419  “The novel,” he further shows, “had to discard old 
forms and techniques; it had to appropriate smaller forms and borrow form adjacent 
practices of discourse to make new forms in order to contain the mobility of its age in a 
new totality.”420  In using terms such as “action,” “contain,” “chart,” among others, Arac 
suggests the novel as an exercise of human will that functions coincidentally with the 
very forces that seem otherwise to overwhelm modern human life in the nineteenth 
century.  “To ‘contain’ new forces,” he says, “is not only to check and perhaps neutralize 
them, but also to be invigorated by them, and, most importantly, to use and direct 
them.”421  The nineteenth-century novel, a “new literary technique,” supplied an 
epistemology, “gave them a grasp on the new content of their society.”422 
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 Along with addressing principally the works of Dickens, Hawthorne, and Carlyle, 
the bulk of Arac’s study of Melville focuses on Moby-Dick.  Ishmael’s propensity toward 
the kind of mobility, overview, and containment that Arac also finds in other works of 
that historical moment allows for Moby-Dick to be nicely situated in Arac’s larger 
critical schematic.  While my reading of Moby-Dick poses another set of questions in 
relation to the novel’s propensity toward movement and overview, my intention here is to 
elucidate the problematics posed by Melville’s last work of prose fiction from the 1850s, 
problematics that trouble Arac’s understanding of how Melville had, or had not, I will 
argue, “actively [joined] in the motion [he] was trying to chart.”423 
The question of form surfaces subtly like a whale.  While Moby-Dick might 
instantiate what Arac understands as a will-to-order found in a number of nineteenth-
century novels, while it might evince the inclination to “actively join in the motion,” we 
find in The Confidence-Man that “motion” itself becomes wholly problematized.  If a 
novel, it had completely absorbed the artifice of pantomime, of masquerade, of commedia 
dell’arte, until this style of pantomime wrested it from the conventions of novelistic 
development and narrative structure itself.  With its episodic chapters, repetition of 
trickery, minimal description of setting, no presentation of inner consciousness or 
thoughts, The Confidence-Man resembles less a novel, Helen Trimpi reminds us.424  Its 
“analogue,” she has shown, can be “found in various forms of stage comedy”—ancient, 
early-modern, and, especially, contemporary English stage pantomime.425   
                                                 
423 Arac, 4. 
 
424 Trimpi, 2. 
 
425 Trimpi, 6. 
 
205 
 As a pantomime, then, The Confidence-Man performs in such a way that it could 
not fit the prescriptions of the nineteenth-century novel as Arac understands them, that is, 
as a shaping force actively joining in the motion it was trying to chart.”426  As 
pantomime, then, it presents motion in absurdum until motion and movement resemble a 
kind of stasis, a standing (histanai). (Trickery, disguise, knavery, and cunning are the 
predominate modes of character interaction in the pantomime,427 but as we recall these 
are also attributes of stasis, particularly since Thucydides’s description of the strife at 
Corcyra.)  This gives further insight, I think, as to why Arac seems to have bypassed the 
problematic of stasis in Melville’s story.   
Melville also finds ambivalent the power that he locates in Moby-Dick, but the 
work exults in the mobility of its subject, form, and language; only in Pierre, The 
Confidence-Man and ‘Bartleby,’ do tortured immobility, drifting, and apathy 
characterize Melville.428   
One aspect of my work in this dissertation, and in this final chapter specifically, 
has been to offer some account of this “tortured immobility,” not as the exception 
operating in Melville’s oeuvre, as Arac seems to suggest, but as an important thread that 
weaves through much of Melville’s prose fiction of the 1850s.  As an argument and 
method, I’m less interested in mapping the structural and formal elements of The 
Confidence-Man onto the pantomime.  Helen Trimpi, as I’ve noted already, has provide 
new knowledge in this area.  By marking a distinction between Arac’s articulate 
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 understanding of the role of the nineteenth-century novel and the kind of “work” that The 
Confidence-Man performs, I have attempted to distance Melville from Arac’s thesis, that 
is, of Melville “actively joining the motion.”  I try to show, therefore, how Melville’s 
interest in the question of energy and mobility, in the opening of a liberal economy and 
the expansion of markets throughout the terraqueous globe paradoxically linked this 
mobility to stasis, a linkage that depicts a more elaborate problematic of American power 
and an order of conflict that coincided with this power.   
*              *               * 
While Jonathan Arac’s Commissioned Spirits tended to the question of motion 
over immobility in Melville, more as a matter of method I believe, there have been other 
critics whose readings of The Confidence-Man have leaned towards resentment and 
dismissal.  Confounded by the general sense of obstruction and lack of movement in The 
Confidence-Man, for example, mid-twentieth-century critic Newton Arvin had 
condemned outright the work on artistic and moral grounds: “There is an infinitely 
stronger sense of flow and movement in two pages of Life on the Mississippi than all the 
forty-five chapters of Melville’s book: the magical power of sensuous embodiment that 
had rendered the sea with grandeur in Moby Dick had now failed him, all but wholly.”429  
Like countless other critics have, Arvin saw in Melville’s spirit and artistry a general 
fading.430  After all, The Confidence-Man would be Melville’s final work of prose fiction 
published in his lifetime.  The world would not find the manuscript to Billy-Budd until 
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 the “revival” of Melville in the early twentieth century.  Yet Arvin’s resentment of 
Melville here runs deeper than a story about commercial and artistic failure.  “Narratively 
speaking,” Arvin had further denounced, “The Confidence Man is meager and 
monotonous.  A work like Candide, which expresses somewhat similar thoughts, is still 
viable because, as a tale, it moves; moves swiftly, gaily, and variously; Melville’s book is 
all but motionless.”431  Along with the work’s sense of narrative stasis, Arvin charged 
The Confidence Man as being one of “the most infidel books ever written by an 
American; one of the most completely nihilistic, morally and metaphysically.”432   
We need underscore that while Arvin condemns The Confidence-Man, his 
condemnation aptly highlights an important association between the doctrine of mobility 
that informed nineteenth-century liberal political economy and the figure of the infidel 
that emerged out of a set of relations established in and through war during sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  As Deborah Root has aptly reminded us, “the infidel was marked 
in the initial moment of conquest, at the fall of Muslim Granada in 1492.433  In Expulsion 
justificado de los moriscos españoles, the seventeenth-century theologian priest Aznar 
Cardona had likened the Moriscos in Spain to “wolves in the sheepfold, the drones in the 
behive, the ravens among the doves, the dogs in the Church, the gypsies among the 
Isrealites, and finally the heretics among the Catholics.” 434  This document had followed 
a long-standing “problem” of separating and indexing the heterodox Muslim population 
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 from the Christian in Spain.  And so the metaphorical comparisons helped frame a larger 
project by the Church and State to justify the expulsion of a “deviant” Muslim 
population.  The Repertorium inquisitorum, written a century earlier, provided the 
inquisition with the definition of the Infidel, the being whose religion threatened 
“Christian claims to universality.”435  This definition then supplied the inquisition with a 
proper juridical and “inquisitorial apparatus” for separating the “wolves” from the 
“sheepfold,” the “enemy of Christian society” from the Christian.436  The question of 
population, integration, removal, and annihilation (and, therefore, the question of race 
and war) in the nineteenth-century echoed a sixteenth- and seventeenth-century problem.  
Melville’s Infidel narrative recollected an order of “internal” conflict from a previous 
historical moment and used that moment to dramatize the nineteenth-century American 
present.   
More recently, Michael West’s work on Transcendental Wordplay, which 
generally celebrates the twists, turns, and witticisms of language in nineteenth-century 
writing, accuses The Confidence-Man of an excess.  West remarks that “Punning is 
pandemic,” thus locating the style of the The Confidence-Man within the metaphors of 
pathology and contamination; it “teems with enough practical punning to make it a 
peculiarly humorless and unlovable book.”437  Cleverly modeled after the heroes of his 
study—particularly Thoreau—West here puns the word “humorless,” commenting 
therefore on the lack of the comedic in Melville’s story as well as the deficiency of 
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 cardinal humors (blood, phlegm, choler, and melancholy) which, when kept in balance, 
constitute the health of the body.  West’s all-too-brief account of The Confidence-Man 
doesn’t reach the acrid judgment evinced by Arvin, yet Transcendental Wordplay’s 
propensity as criticism toward “play” and delight seems ready to dismiss The 
Confidence-Man on grounds of over-playing puns that then upset the homeostatic 
balance of “humor” and seriousness.  So prone to puns and imbalance of humor, in fact, 
the story becomes too serious, too ill even, for West’s understanding of “wordplay.” He 
dismisses it, as well, for being “unlovable,” a reference perhaps to R.P. Blackmur’s 
understanding of the critic as amateur, as the lover.  In this case, according to West, The 
Confidence-Man stands outside the possibility of love, and outside the possibility of 
critical engagement.   
By attributing to Melville’s novel a kind of pathology, as a disease that disrupts 
the homeostatic equilibrium necessary for the proper “humor” in punning, West refuses 
to examine perhaps the mid-nineteenth-century’s most serious attempt at puns, double 
meanings, wordplay, and allusion.  He refuses also to see how Melville’s redoubling of 
language, masking, and cunning was an attempt to invent (discover and make) those 
relations that had come to characterize the American scene, invent them as a way of 
knowing and giving thought to American power.  West’s criticism, ironically, refuses to 
examine the things about America that he diagnoses as disease (“pandemic”) within 
Melville’s The Confidence-Man, all the while celebrating these things in other authors as 
they evince “balance, “play,” and “delight.”  And so he exercises a discourse and invokes 
a set of critical categories which, historically, arose out of the relations of power that The 
Confidence-Man had attempted to problematize.  I will put this differently.  By ascribing 
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 a pathology to Melville’s story and by diagnosing its imbalance of “humor,” West’s 
criticism unwittingly recalls and reframes the story within a biopolitics that emerged in 
the nineteenth century.   
 
I reiterate that Melville’s dramatization of stasis in The Confidence-Man is not 
necessarily an endorsement of the excess and conflict that West, Arvin, and others have 
condemned, but an inventive tactic for approximating the arrangements of power and the 
conditions that exemplified aspects of American modernity.  In other words, Melville 
discovered and borrowed from a classical category in order to reinterpret it within a 
moment that had given rise to the liberal expansion of the markets and “free trade.”  As 
an invention that calls on the past, that discovers from the past, Melville’s story helps 
make clear in its present how an order of violence and metaphysics arose in the 
nineteenth-century that made it possible to diagnose, manage, and, if necessary, remove 
populations who instantiated a kind of impasse or disease to American movement.  By 
dramatizing this violence and this readying need to movement, Melville’s story helps 
make clear how this movement had evinced a stasis even greater.  Melville’s pantomime 
thereby exposes the logic of biopolitics and the metaphysics of liberalism that had been 
practiced on populations who were seen as unwilling or incapable of entering the market.  
Finally, we need to resist, therefore, the tendency to read Melville’s The Confidence-Man 
as a necessarily nihilistic perspective of human life in modernity.  To do so is to risk the 
chance of placing his work in binary categories of hope and despair, as Andrew Delbanco 
has done with his previous works of criticism and biography.438  We risk, too, the 
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 occasion to understand more clearly how Melville’s literary heretical inventions help us 
look upon the past and understand better the catastrophes that follow in the wake of the 
American doctrine of futurity. 
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